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The study focuses on anti-corruption as a CSR issue.  Corruption is not typically 
associated with CSR.  This may be because corruption is seen as an issue primarily 
addressed by hard laws and regulations, while CSR is seen as a voluntary corporate led 
initiative to promote self-regulation.  It may also be because discussions on corruption 
typically address public corruption with the spotlight centered on public officials and 
governments.   
However, bribery which is a form of corruption often involves international 
business and raises CSR issues.  Therefore, there is the need for a study on corruption 
focused on the supply side of corruption which international business is guilty of.  There 
is also the need to address how international business can be held accountable for the 
bribery of foreign corrupt officials which in most cases adversely affect the economic, 
social and political aspects of society.    
The study merges the two areas of corruption and CSR by examining voluntary 
and mandatory rules applicable to business for curbing corruption, particularly 
transnational bribery.  A central argument in the study is that CSR involves voluntary and 
binding rules which corporations should conform to in a bid to be socially responsible.   
Through the examination of the voluntary and mandatory laws applicable to transnational 
bribery, the study posits a model framework for CSR and provides a fresh outlook on 
avenues for eliminating corruption, especially in developing countries.   
Corruption must be fought on multi-levels.  Many countries have domestic laws 
including extra-territorial laws prohibiting the bribery of domestic and foreign public 
 ix
officials.  The domestic laws of four selected countries are examined.  The examination 
shows that not all countries have overseas bribery laws applicable to corporations.  Even 
for countries which have such laws, lack of political will and costs of investigations are 
factors which prevent corporate liability.  There are also many principles, guidelines and 
initiatives geared towards the specific goal of curbing corruption.  However, these non-
binding rules are by themselves inadequate to ensure corporate responsibility for corrupt 
practices.   There is therefore the need to consider other means by which corporations can 
be held accountable for corrupt practices.  The study considers the implications of 
international law, civil law remedies, corporate governance and global governance for 
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1.1 GENERAL STATEMENT 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has gained tremendous recognition in recent 
times.  Human right abuses with corporate allegations of complicity, environmental 
and labour issues which have mostly occurred in developing countries have brought 
CSR to the forefront.  CSR emerged from the need to address wrong corporate 
behaviour towards social issues or issues which do not directly impact on business 
bottom line.  As such it became fashionable to talk of CSR in respect of 
environmental, labour and human right abuses external to the company, particularly 
abuses occurring in developing countries.  CSR was seen as the voluntary actions 
businesses take to address these issues.  Many CSR related codes, guidelines and 
initiatives evolved and were adopted by companies to prove they were social 
responsibility inclined.   
CSR also related to the philanthropic and charitable activities companies carry out 
to suggest they are good corporate citizens.  Just as good citizens who can afford it 
give charitably, so corporations began to give charitably but perhaps on a larger scale.  
Such charitable giving are not without questions and proponents of capitalism have 
questioned the right of executives to give away money which does not belong to them.1  
CSR was about business measures to regulate business activities because companies 
                                                        
1 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
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believed it was the moral thing to do and would improve public perceptions of their 
style of business and ultimately improve bottom line, thus a direction relationship 
between CSR and profit maximization was proven.   
However, it soon became clear that CSR was not really about improving the 
bottom line.  It is about the social contract between business and the society.  If this 
contract is breached by either party, there will be consequences.  In the case of 
business, there are repercussions for wrong company action which affect societal 
expectation.  These consequences may not merely give rise to legal sanctions, they 
may affect the very nature of the social contract.  To illustrate the point, in June 2008, 
President Yaradua of Nigeria announced that Shell would have to leave the Niger Delta 
and be replaced by another firm in realization of the best interest of the country and 
exploration of oil which has significance beyond the shores of Nigeria.  The reason 
given is because of a total loss of confidence between Shell and the Ogoni people.2  
Shell was implicated in the killings of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others in the late 
1990s as a result of protests against the environmental degradation and egregious 
human rights abuses occurring in the Niger Delta at the time.3  Those killings which 
happened more than 12 years ago have catapulted the Niger delta into a war zone with 
historical and economic dimensions for Shell in particular. 
Human rights, environmental and labour issues are broad or external CSR issues.  
                                                        
2 Golu Timothy, “Shell to leave Ogoniland by December – Yaradua” All Africa Global Media (5 June 
2008). 
3 See The Social Economic Rights Action Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria, 
Communication No 155/96 which provides a good synopsis of the implications for Shell.  Although 
Shell was implicated in the case, Shell could not be brought before the commission as it was not a party 
to the charter.   
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They have received much attention from writers and commentators.  However, one 
other external CSR issue which has received minimal attention is corruption.  There 
has been little in the way of analysis of corruption and CSR, even though corruption is 
an issue associated with CSR.  Discussions on CSR seldom include corruption and 
corruption is hardly seen as a core CSR issue.  CSR as a potentially useful approach 
for combating corruption has been under explored.4  However, the many instances of 
corporate bribe payments which impact economic, political and social aspects of 
society, especially in developing countries call for a serious examination of the role 
CSR can play in the fight against corruption, especially transnational bribery.  
Transnational bribery occurs when corporations offer or give money, goods or other 
benefits to foreign government officials in order to influence favourable business 
transactions.  The term transnational bribery will be used interchangeably with 
international corruption which has been defined as “the direct and indirect offer or 
provision of any undue pecuniary or other advantage to or for a foreign political 
official, in violation of the official’s legal duties, in order to obtain or retain business”.5  
Corruption, including transnational bribery is seen as an issue which has primarily 
been addressed by hard laws and regulations, thus falling outside CSR.  This line of 
argument would be enticing for those who see CSR as beyond legal rules.  In this 
study, ‘social responsibility’ does not mean beyond legal rules.  Social responsibility 
                                                        
4 See Indira Carr and Opi Outwaite, “Surveying Coruption in International Business” (2008) 5 
Manchester J. Int’l Econ. L 3 at 28. 
5 See Ernesto U. Savona & Laura Mezzanotte, “Double Standards in Public Life: The Case of 
International Corruption” in Barry A.K Rider (ed.), Corruption: The Enemy Within (Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International, 1997) 105 at 106. 
 4
is the broad responsibilities corporations have spanning beyond profit maximization.  
Compliance with such responsibilities requires the use of both binding and 
non-binding rules. 
Now, it can be said that CSR aims to regulate corporate behaviour through 
attempts that are binding and non-binding to ensure corporations carry out business 
activities in consideration of multi-stakeholders interest and the impact such activities 
have on the social, political, economic and developmental aspects of society.  
Currently, the major approach towards application and implementation of CSR 
standards has been through the use of soft laws which are non-binding voluntary 
initiatives. 
Soft laws are inadequate for enforcing broad CSR standards.  There is therefore 
the need to examine the role emerging and settled laws may play in the enforcement of 
CSR standards.  In the area of human rights, labour and environmental issues, much 
has been written about the soft and hard laws applicable to these CSR.  However, not 
much has been said about the soft and hard laws applicable to corruption as a CSR 
issue. 
States and non-state actors such as Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and 
Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) are playing vital roles in addressing CSR 
issues.  They are involved in multilateral initiatives regarding CSR.  These initiatives 
typically lead to development of codes of conduct, guidelines and principles giving 
corporations direction on how to approach CSR issues.  An industry specific example 
which comes to mind is the UK-US led government Extractive Industry Transparency 
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Initiative (EITI).6  Non-state actors such as Transparency International (TI), a well 
known NGO which addresses corruption issues is at the forefront of attempts to 
eliminate corruption.  Its annual publication of perceptions on corruption in different 
countries listing the countries with the least and most corrupt tendencies is globally 
well received.7  Nevertheless, corporate abuse of environment, labour and human 
rights; and corporate bribe payments are still rampant.     
Corruption including transnational bribery is being fought on multiple grounds.  
At the domestic, regional and international levels, there is constant activity to eliminate 
or at least reduce corruption.  There are laws in place addressing the issue of 
corruption.  These laws are in many instances a result of regional and international 
multilateral treaties which States enter into to address corruption.  The United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)8 is the latest in this spate of international 
laws seeking to address corruption on a global level.  The role corporations play in 
fuelling the engines of corruption is best addressed under CSR.  CSR places the focus 
mainly on corporations.  It provides the opportunity to examine the regulatory 
frameworks - soft and hard laws and supporting mechanisms relevant for corruption 
involving corporations. 
The hope is that with this multiplicity of global attempts to address corruption, 
there will come a time when corruption will recede.  Until then, the need for fresh 
                                                        
6 See online: EITI <http://eitransparency.org/>. 
7 See online: TI 
<http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpihttp://www.transparency.org/policy
_research/surveys_indices/cpi>. 
8 See U.N Doc A. Res/58/4.  
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perspectives on the issue of corruption is needed.  This study is borne out of the need 
for such fresh perspectives and of the need for increased scholarship in the area of 
corruption and CSR.  This study of corruption and CSR aims to (1) provide a model 
framework for structuring CSR which is widely seen as a broad subject with a 
haphazard structure; and (2) provide a fresh outlook on avenues for eliminating 
corruption in countries, especially developing countries through the lens of CSR.  The 
focus is on the implications of transnational bribery by international business for 
developing countries and how international business can be held responsible for 
transnational bribery through the use of binding and non-binding laws. 
 
1.2 SCOPE AND JUSTIFICATION OF RESEARCH 
This study spans the area of CSR, corruption and corporations.  The focus on 
corruption is limited to transnational bribery.  Other corruption issues such as 
embezzlement of public funds, trading in influence, concealment and laundering of 
proceeds of corruption are not addressed in any detail simply because attempts to curb 
these other corrupt activities are not primarily directed at corporations.  Attempts to 
curb transnational bribery, on the other hand are directed towards corporations, 
especially MNCs.  The MNC is any firm which owns (in whole or part), controls and 
manages income generating assets in more than one country.9  The term MNC would 
be used interchangeably with international business. 
The study will address transnational bribery in relation to CSR by examining the 
                                                        
9 Beth Stephens, “The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights”, (2002) 22 
Berkeley J. Int’l L. 45 at 48.  
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voluntary and mandatory rules regulating corporate practice.  CSR evolved as 
voluntary rules.  Since the evolution of CSR, there have been multiple attempts to 
associate the law with CSR.  Many claim that CSR rules are not voluntary in the 
literal sense of the word because they create standards for corporate best practice 
which though not mandatory are not purely voluntary either because they are the 
standards by which company actions are judged in the global economy and become the 
performance standards towards which companies direct their conduct.10  Others have 
sought to find ways to implement codes through contractual claims and principles.11  
These suggestions are novel but have not given rise to any claims, despite the number 
of codes and potential claims possible.   
Others still have approached the relevance of the law to CSR in the specific 
context of the role law plays in ensuring CSR which is still mostly seen as voluntary 
self governance driven by external social and market forces.12  This study takes the 
evolution of CSR further and submits that CSR involves voluntary and mandatory 
rules developed to improve corporate behaviour.  The focus of CSR should therefore 
include both voluntary rules corporations adopt willingly and relevant mandatory rules 
developed and applicable to CSR.  Indeed, this is already happening in the area of 
corruption. The same applies in other areas addressed under broad CSR issues.  
Zerk has pointed out the need to be conversant with the progress made on CSR in 
                                                        
10 Cynthia Wallace, “Civil Society Initiatives and ‘Soft Law’ in the Oil and Gas Industry”, (2003) 36 
N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 457. 
11 Janet Koven Levit, Bottom –up International Law Making: Reflections on the New Haven School of 
International Law, (2007) 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 393 at 414. 
12 Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell eds., The New Corporate Accountability: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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the regulation of substantive CSR related issues such as health and safety, 
environmental standards and consumer protection.13  In this study, the focus is on the 
progress on CSR brought about by regulation in the area of corruption.  The impact of 
soft and hard laws currently available and/or emerging which are useful for deterring 
MNCs from engaging in corrupt practices particularly transnational bribery will be 
examined.   
In the area of hard laws, the focus for curbing corruption has been on criminal law.  
Anti-bribery legislation typically criminalizes acts of bribery.  In the context of 
corporate liability, criminalization may not be the most suitable form of deterrence for 
a number of reasons.  Many countries have issues with the concept of criminal 
responsibility.  Criminal sanctions for corporations would typically be limited to fines.  
Fines may not serve as sufficient deterrents for corporate crimes especially where big 
corporations with deep pockets are concerned.  The study will consider both criminal 
and civil possibilities for holding corporations responsible for corruption.  
Considerations of civil possibilities are necessary to address the lacuna present in legal 
considerations of anti-corruption mechanisms.  The aspects of civil law will be 
limited to specific areas in contracts law, tort law, corporate governance and 
international arbitration law.  Topics would include illegality and enforcement of 
arbitral awards under contracts and private international law; use of derivative actions 
under corporate governance; and breach of fiduciary duties and anti-competition laws 
under tort.   
                                                        
13 See Jennifer Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and 
Opportunities in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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A rationale for curbing transnational bribery from a developed country point of 
view prevalent in the early 80s to late 90s was to stop corruption as a barrier to trade.  
This point of view sees the need to prevent corrupt payments from causing economic 
inefficiencies; impediment of trade and investment in transitional markets; and the 
development of accountable democratic and market-oriented institutions in transitional 
markets.14  This rationale is myopic in outlook.  It ignores the fact that foreign 
bribery may have adverse effects on the social development of developing countries 
and that a free and unguarded reign of democratic and market oriented institutions may 
not be suitable for some transitional or developing markets.   
Since then, there has been another rationale for curbing corruption.  In addition to 
impeding investment, corruption undermines economic growth, burdens the poor and 
affects all aspects of development.  On the adoption of the UNCAC, Kofi Annan then 
secretary general of the UN said “corruption hurts the poor disproportionately – by 
diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government’s ability to 
provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice and discouraging foreign 
investment and aid”.15   This alternative rationale seems more discerning of the 
interests of both the developed and developing world. 
Effective deterrence of transnational bribery is needed not only to ensure 
competitiveness in international trade, but to impact positively on development, 
                                                        
14 Jeffrey P. Bialos & Gregory Husisian, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Coping with Corruption in 
Transitional Economies (New York: Oceana Publications Inc.,1997) p 5. 
15 See the Secretary-General's Statement on the Adoption by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption, New York, 31 October 2003.  online: UN 
<http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=602>. 
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economic growth and poverty reduction - issues developing countries are all too 
familiar with.  Transnational bribery impacts countries negatively.  The study will 
explore the linkages between corruption, development and governance from a CSR 
perspective.  The aim of these linkages is to consider how governance can impact 
anti-corruption and CSR.  The elimination of corruption will improve the plight of 
developing countries, while ensuring trade and development for all. 
Governance is a term that has acquired substantial significance in recent times.16 
Traditionally, governance is used synonymously with ‘government’ and refers to 
characteristics associated with a system of national administration.17  The term good 
or bad governance is usually attributed to governance on the national level. 18  
However, governance as it will be addressed in this study involves more than 
government.  Governance is a broad term capable of diverse meanings.19 Governance 
connotes a complex set of public and private structures and processes necessary for 
managing common affairs.  Corporate governance and global governance are 
                                                        
16 For example in the development sectors, governance is a term which comes up frequently.  See 
Daniel Kaufmann, “Back to Basics – 10 Myths about Governance and Corruption” (2005) 42 Finance 
and Development, IMF Magazine.  Thomas G. Weiss, Governance, “Good Governance and Global 
Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges” in Porden Wilkinson, ed., Global Governance Reader, 
(New York: Routledge, 2005). Weiss notes that governance became fashionable in the 1980s and 1990s. 
17 Weiss, ibid. 
18 For example, corruption is seen as the outcome of bad governance.  Governance is seen as the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good.  See 
Weiss, supra note 12. See also Commonwealth Expert Group on Good Governance and the Elimination 
of Corruption, Fighting Corruption: Promoting Good Governance, (London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2000).  Some characteristics of good governance which have been identified include – 
transparency in decision making and implementation of institutional and operational decisions; 
participatory decision making; assess to information; well functioning civil service; appropriate 
reporting and evaluation mechanisms and financial management.  
19 For a list of different views on governance, see Weiss, supra note 12 at 69.  However, note most of 
the views stated therein relate to governance in the context of the government.  
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examples of governance as understood in broader terms.  
The usefulness of corporate governance for external or broad CSR issues will be 
analyzed and the extent to which corporate governance has relevance for international 
business in their conduct at the global level will be explored.  Discussions on 
corporate governance will be limited to external or broad CSR issues corporations face 
such as human rights, corruption and the environment.  Regulations concerning 
internal issues such as corporate fraud, shareholder expectations which lead to the 
creation of legislation such as the Sarbanese-Oxley act20 will not be addressed in any 
detail.    
Global governance involves governments, intergovernmental networks and 
relationships.  It includes non-state actors such as NGOs, MNCs and the global 
capital market.  Global governance gives legitimacy to the multiple actors on the 
global scene who ordinarily would have no international legal personality.  Global 
governance can therefore be seen as a means of by-passing some of the structural 
problems of international law in relation to non-state actors. These problems include 
issues of legal personality, liability, jurisdiction and political will power.  International 
law is evolving to include global governance and its multiple players. 
With multiple players on the global scene, there would be a multiplicity of rules.  
The study will consider whether global governance is leading merely to a multiplicity 
of rules for corporate responsibility or whether global governance can actually lead to 
a convergence of such rules.  It will consider whether global governance is leading to 
                                                        
20 2002 Pub.L.no. 107 – 204, 116 Stat 745. 
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improvements in CSR, particularly anti-corruption.  It will examine the role global 
governance plays in the regulation of international business for social responsibility. 
Most discussions on corruption address the issue from a traditional governance 
point of view and focus on developing countries.  Developing countries are usually 
required to improve government structures and mechanisms.  Primary mechanisms 
include adopting a system of punishment of public officials as a deterrent; 
implementation of strategies for reform such as introduction of codes of conduct for 
public officials; legislating, creating and restructuring institutional frameworks to 
coerce discipline and accountability.21  Mechanisms for strengthening the role of the 
judiciary are also considered.  These frameworks are good and have their place if the 
governments of developing countries support and promote their implementation and 
bureaucracy is curtailed.22   
Governments in such countries are also encouraged to adopt principles of good 
governance, democracy and rule of law which are seen as panaceas or cures for 
corruption.  These are administrative type principles.  Good governance essentially 
is the capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently and to formulate, 
implement and enforce social policies and regulations.23  The aim of good governance 
is to foster accountability and transparency, two principles borrowed form 
administrative law principles.  The World Bank institute has programs which focus on 
                                                        
21 Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr and Bornwell C.Chikulo, eds., Corruption and Development in Africa: 
Lessons from country case-studies (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999) p 28. 
22 Ibid. 
23 See World Bank Institute, Governance: A Participatory Action-Oriented Program (October 2001) 
online: World Bank <http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/205639/fy02_brief.pdf>. 
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in-depth analysis of institutional factors behind corruption practices and behaviour and 
seek to help countries understand the shortcomings of their policies and institutions.  
Countries are encouraged to design their own strategies to improve governance.24  As 
with creating avenues to improving government structures and mechanisms, a program 
which aims to foster accountability and transparency is good.   
However, a critical point which needs to be made is that administrative type 
principles must be adopted in light of detailed evidence which shows that such 
principles and other western imports may fuel violence and ethnicity in developing 
countries.25  Such principles raise issues of colonization and cultural imperialism26 
and in some instances may do more harm than good.  Moreover, even in countries 
with ‘good governance’, there is still a lot of corruption.  There is therefore the need 
for caution in the adoption and use of administrative law principles in developing 
countries to ensure they are beneficial to such countries. 
There is the need to address the issue of corruption from a global governance point 
of view which recognizes States and non-state actors as significant actors on the global 
scene.  The study will address the role of multiple actors which impact corruption.   
                                                        
24 See the World Bank Institute Governance Learning Program Catalog 2001-2002 online: World Bank 
<http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/205640/catalog_matrix.pdf> Examples include 
“Controlling Corruption: Towards an Integrated Strategy in Latin America”.  This particular program 
targets government officials. Ombusmen and judges amongst others as the target audience.  The 
program aims to help participants design an integrated anti-corruption plan tailored to their country’s 
specific institutional and political realities as well as improving existing national anti-corruption 
strategies. 
25 See Amy Chua, “Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Toward a new paradigm for Law and 
Development”, (1998) 108 Yale L.J. 1. 
26 Carol Harlow, “Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values”, (2006) 17 E.J.I.L 
187 at 214. 
 14
It will discuss global governance attempts to reduce corrupt activities.  It will focus on 
enforcement mechanisms and on the need for effective adherence through the use of 
collective (co-operative) actions rather than on the mere multitude of agreed 
frameworks present on the global scene for curbing corruption.  Questions it will seek 
to address include the need for co-ordination of these actions and the part the UN and 
other specialized international institutions namely, the WTO, IMF and World Bank 
play in such co-ordination; whether these specialized institutions address corruption 
directly, and from a stance amenable to corporations not simply governments. 
There has been much discussion about the relationship between global governance 
and global administrative law.  In addressing the role of actors on the global scene, the 
relevance of global administrative law which seeks to regulate global governance 
through the use of administrative law principles will be considered in relation to CSR 
and Developing countries.  In relation to CSR, the implications for implementation of 
global administrative law caused by the multiplicity of actors on the global scene and 
the voluntary nature of many of the CSR rules will be considered.  In relation to 
developing countries, the implications of the application of global administrative law 
through the system of the WTO will be examined in the context of the elimination of 
corruption.  The relationship between administrative law, development and human 
rights will also be considered.   
There is evidence suggesting that global governance approached in the light of 
global administrative law tends to promote neo-liberalism, ‘good’ governance, 
democracy and rule of law principles.  When these principles are applied in 
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developing countries they exacerbate the clash of standards of civilization or 
globalization.  They also lead to conflicts and create avenues for the breeding and 
manifestations of corrupt activities and other vices.  The role corporations play in 
fuelling such conflicts; the breeding and manifestation of corrupt activities which in 
many instances involve corporations; and the impact corporations have on 
development will be addressed.  This is necessary because the study seeks to posit 
CSR and corruption within global governance discourse.  It is geared towards 
identifying the impacts of global governance in the regulation of international business 
for broad CSR issues, such as corruption.   
 
1.3 METHODOLOGY AND ARRANGEMENT OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of the study is to examine the role of CSR in the anti-corruption fight.  It 
explores CSR as it relates to corruption.  The first aim is to examine voluntary and 
mandatory rules applicable to corporations for corrupt practices, particularly 
transnational bribery.  The study also aims to determine the adequacies and 
inadequacies of such rules to ensure responsible corporate behaviour.  CSR 
mandatory rules for anti-bribery are criminal in nature.  As a result, the focus of legal 
discussions has been on criminalization.  A further aim of the study is to discuss civil 
law attempts applicable to CSR, helpful for deterring corrupt corporate practices.  
Specific civil law attempts in areas of contracts, tort, corporate governance, arbitration 
and private international law will be addressed.  Finally, the study aims to show the 
roles corporate governance and global governance play in ensuring corporations 
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address broad or external CSR issues, especially in developing countries. 
 The study is empirical and normative in nature.  The subject of the study – CSR 
and Corruption – is approached from a socio-legal point of view.  Corruption by 
international business impacts economic, social and developmental aspects of society.  
Corruption potentially leads to increased profits for the company, but also potentially 
leads to reduction in economic growth, development and other social advantages.  
The goal of the study is to contribute to the development of an organized framework 
for CSR by identifying and studying different approaches to CSR in the area of 
transnational bribery. 
 Chapter two of the study will address the general subject of CSR.  It will 
discuss the issues of profit maximization versus broader responsibilities, voluntary 
versus mandatory approach and emergence of universal standards of CSR.  The major 
problem the evolving universal standards face is that of enforcement.  Chapter two of 
the study will address the problems the Draft norms on the Responsibility of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human 
Rights (Draft Norms)27 faced in attempts to create binding enforcements mechanisms 
for the evolving CSR standards.  It will also show how soft laws emerged as the 
preferred norm for enforcing CSR.  Finally, chapter two will discuss the global 
changes taking place in domestic and international spheres aimed at improving CSR.  
These include changes in legal awareness, public scrutiny, international legal action 
and corporate awareness.  One stark observation is that the global changes focus on 
                                                        
27 E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/rev.2, adopted by the United Nations Sub-Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights in 2003. 
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human rights and environmental problems. 
Chapter three will focus on anti-corruption as a CSR standard.  It will address the 
application, implementation and enforcement of anti-corruption standards relevant for 
international business.  Examples of transnational bribery carried out by international 
business or MNCs primarily through third party agents or intermediaries will be cited.  
The chapter will then examine the soft and hard laws regulating international business 
in relation to corruption.  The impacts of such laws in improving CSR and eliminating 
corruption will be discussed.  The voluntary rules developed by three non-state actors, 
namely TI, World Economic Forum (WEF) and the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) to curb international bribery will be examined.  Following, the 
examination of selected voluntary rules will be an examination of mandatory 
applicable national laws in four selected countries, namely Nigeria, Singapore, United 
Kingdom and the United States addressing transnational bribery. 
The limitations of both soft laws and domestic hard laws will lead to 
considerations of international law in chapter four. Chapter four will examine 
international laws relevant for curbing international corruption.  The international law 
will be categorized as regional and multi-regional laws.  Regional laws include the 
Organization of American States Inter-American Convention against Corruption 
(Inter-American Convention), 28  Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention, 29 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU 
                                                        
28 OAS Doc B-58. 
29 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No: 173. 
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Convention) 30  while multi-regional laws are the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention)31 
and UNCAC.  Similar to national laws, the regional laws, (with the exception of the 
Inter-American Convention and AU Convention) and multi-regional laws on 
corruption address the issue of transnational bribery and require States to criminalize 
such acts and enforce violations.  The chapter will review the approach of current 
international law towards corporate liability and jurisdiction for prosecuting 
international corruption.  In light of the failure of States to hold corporations liable for 
transnational bribery, the chapter considers the justification, criticisms and 
consequences of holding corporations directly responsible for the international crime 
of corruption. 
Chapter five will explore the role of civil liability in the enforcement of 
anti-corruption CSR standards.  Civil liability for other universal CSR standards such 
as human rights is discussed in chapter two.  Chapter five will examine the 
application of contracts laws such as illegality and the approach of English courts 
towards enforceability of corrupt contracts and arbitral tribunal awards.  It will 
discuss the recent trends in international arbitration regarding the role of arbitrators in 
addressing international corruption.  It will also consider the application of tort laws 
such as breach of fiduciary duties and interference in economic advantages used in the 
UK and US courts which may serve as deterrents against corrupt corporate practices.  
                                                        
30 43 ILM 5 (2004). 
31 OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/BR(97) 20. 
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Most approaches to transnational bribery see it as a crime warranting state prosecution 
and seldom consider the relevance of civil law. 
Chapter six will explore the role of corporate governance in CSR.  The chapter 
primarily examines the role of corporate governance in the regulation of international 
business in matters concerning broad or external CSR issues, especially transnational 
bribery.  Many writers believe corporate governance is relevant for addressing CSR 
and needs to be revamped.  The chapter therefore considers the current status of 
corporate governance in relation to broad or external CSR issues.  It examines 
derivative actions which fall under the umbrella of corporate governance, arguably as 
an example of how corporate governance impacts CSR.  It considers the usage and 
impact of derivative actions in compelling corporate responsible behaviour against 
transnational bribery by directors and manager of international business.  The chapter 
attempts a comparative study of the use of derivative actions in the U.S and the U.K.  
Derivative actions in the U.S are at the forefront of developments for such usage in 
curbing transnational bribery.  The recent changes in the U.K law pertaining to 
derivative actions and the relevance of these for CSR and transnational bribery are also 
considered.   
Chapter seven explores the role of global governance in the regulation of 
international business in matters concerning broad or external CSR issues.  Global 
governance and the emergence of administrative law are significant concepts in the 
anti-corruption fight.  The link between global governance, anti-corruption and 
development from a CSR point of view will be explored.  The manner in which global 
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governance can reduce corruption in international business beneficial for development 
will be explored.  Hitherto, links between corruption and development are usually 
addressed from international development or governance (government) point of views.   






CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
CSR is currently the rage.  Debates about CSR range from its meaning, applicability and 
efficacy to international regulation for responsible business behavior.  Modern CSR is 
generally associated with voluntary non-binding rules which corporations adhere to in an 
attempt to be socially responsible.  However, there is scope for the view that CSR 
involves binding rules.  There is a need for a closer examination of the role of law in 
attempts to improve corporate behaviour and of the legal sanctions which are available or 
possible. 
There are those who believe CSR is simply hype for public relations departments of 
many big MNCs and a thriving business for those involved in marketing it.  CSR is more 
than hype.  It has the potential to be a very useful tool in ensuring responsible business 
behavior.  Some believe that foci for any attempt to improve corporate behavior should 
come via a change in the perception of corporate governance and corporation law.  Dine 
believes there needs to be a more fundamental approach to the problems of controlling 
companies than by asking for commitments to human rights and social responsibility.1  
CSR involves more than corporate governance.  Corporate governance deals primarily 
with the relationship between managers and shareholders.  CSR deals with the 
relationship between the company and multiple stakeholders. 
                                                 
1 See Janet Dine, Companies, International trade and Human Rights, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004).  The role of corporate governance will be addressed in chapter six. 
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Traditionally, businesses were known to be created for the sole reason of generating 
and maximizing profit.  They were responsible to the shareholders who owned the 
companies and were really only concerned with the interests of such shareholders in 
business decisions.   At best, they may also have been concerned with employee 
interests, but in most cases, such interests were already protected by law.  In January 
2005, the Economist published a survey on CSR which suggested profit maximization 
should be the corporation’s goal.2  Needless to say, the survey produced many responses 
from individuals and organizations involved in CSR who believe businesses have broader 
responsibilities.3 
The CSR proponents aim to show that businesses have responsibility to other 
stakeholders including the society at large.  Businesses should therefore consider the 
interests of such stakeholders in their policies, principles and practices.  While this seems 
a laudable perception, critics say that such aspirations should be for states, governments 
and the international community.  Indeed, the global changes taking place in domestic 
and international spheres aiming to improve CSR which will be discussed later suggest 
corporations do have broader responsibilities.  Attempts to improve corporate behavior 
will come from both emerging as well as settled laws and norms. 
 
2.2 DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF CSR 
There is no consensus on the meaning of CSR.  CSR covers a wide spectrum.  
However, this chapter will address three main issues at the heart of CSR, namely: whether 
                                                 
2 See Survey: Corporate Social Responsibility, The Economist (20 January 2005), online: The Economist 
<http://economist.com>.  Articles in the survey include: The good company; The union of concerned 
executives; The world according to CSR; Profit and the public good; and The ethics of business. 
3 See Letters: The good company, The Economist (3 February 2005), online: The Economist 
<http://economist.com>.     
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corporations have broad responsibilities other than profit maximization; whether CSR is 
beyond rules, subject to voluntary rules or mandatory rules; and whether universal 
standards of CSR are evolving. 
 
2.2.1 Whether Corporations have Broad Responsibilities? 
This issue has two main schools of thought, traditional and emerging.  The traditional 
school says the only responsibility corporations have is that of maximizing profits to 
shareholders.  A well known author associated with this view is Milton Friedman.  In 
1962, Milton Friedman in his book “Capitalism and Freedom” which was based on a 
series of lectures he gave in 1956 said: 
“the view has been gaining widespread acceptance that corporate officials and 
labor have a “social responsibility” that goes beyond serving the interest of their 
stockholders or their members.  This view shows a fundamental misconception of 
the character and nature of a free economy.  In such an economy, there is one and 
only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in 
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the 
game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or 
fraud.”4 
The CSR issues Friedman was concerned with included philanthropy, production and 
labor costs. Examples Friedman cited of CSR are alleged social responsibility of business 
and labor to keep prices and wage rates down in order to avoid price inflation and claims 
that business should contribute to support of charitable activities and especially to 
universities.  Friedman felt a responsibility to keep prices and wage rates down would 
                                                 
4Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
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lead to product shortages, labor shortages, gray markets, black markets.  He said price 
controls, whether legal or voluntary, if effectively enforced would eventually lead to the 
destruction of the free-enterprise system and its replacement by a centrally controlled 
system and would not be effective in controlling inflation.  With regard to charitable 
activities, Friedman felt such giving was inappropriate use of corporate funds in a 
free-enterprise society.5   
Corporate philanthropy is but one aspect of CSR and should not be equated with CSR.  
Friedman’s objective was to ensure social responsibility does not affect the workings of a 
free market economy adversely, specifically focusing on the market in America at the 
time.  The CSR issues of concern in this study are human rights, environment, 
development and anti-corruption.  They are more global in scope.  There are instances in 
which adherence to these responsibilities will rub against a free market economy and 
corporate ultimate goal of profit maximization. A close examination of these broad CSR 
issues show that Friedman’s assertions can no longer hold true.  In these areas, 
corporations increasingly have to consider other stakeholders. 
Moreover, it would seem that the proponents of this school are not averse to state 
regulation or intervention for controlling business in many different areas of business 
activity.  They simply want business to focus on the business of making profits and to 
stay accountable to shareholders only.  Indeed in a 1970 article published in the New 
York Times Magazine, Friedman made reference to the need for corporate executives in 
carrying out their business responsibility for profit maximization to be mindful of the 
                                                 
5 See Ibid.pp 134-136.   
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basic rules of society, embodied in law and ethical custom.6  The 2005 Economist survey 
also suggests that CSR reflects a mistaken analysis of how capitalism serves society and 
will distract attention from genuine problems of business ethics that need to be addressed.  
In its view, getting the most out of capitalism requires lots of public intervention of 
various kinds such as taxation, public spending and regulation in many different areas of 
business activity.  It also requires corporate executives being accountable to 
shareholders.7  Despite Friedman’s writings in 1962 and following, an analysis of the 
emerging school and recent developments in CSR suggest corporations do have broader 
social responsibilities.   
The other school is emerging and shifting noticeably towards a concept called 
corporate social responsibility.  It believes business has broader responsibilities that 
extend beyond owners and shareholders to include employees, customers, suppliers and 
host communities (multi-stakeholders).  Proponents of this school believe businesses 
should be increasingly considered responsible because they are effectively the actors in 
society – producers, distributors, tax payers, polluters, investors, service providers etc.  
They are the most effective ‘private forces to do both widespread good and widespread 
harm’.8 Christopher Stone, a well known writer who believes corporations should be 
socially responsible has challenged the fundamental assumption - that managers of 
                                                 
6 Ibid.  See also Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits” in W. 
Michael Hoffman and Robert E. Frederick, eds., Business, Ethic, Readings and Cases in Corporate 
Morality, ( New York.: McGraw-Hill, 1995) pp137-141.  
7See The Good Company, supra note 2,  See also Friends of the Earth, “Behind the shine: The other Shell 
Report 2003”, online: Friends of the Earth <http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/behind_shine.pdf> 
quoting a Financial Times editorial of 5 April 2004, “There is a respectable body of opinion that believes 
social responsibility is a costly distraction from companies’ one true purpose of making a profit.” p 33 
8 Christopher Stone, Where the Law Ends, (New York: Harpers& Row, Publishers, Inc., 1975). 
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corporations should be steered by profit and not societal values - underlying four related 
though separate propositions opposing CSR9.   
 
2.2.2 Whether CSR is Beyond Rules, Subject to Voluntary Rules or Mandatory Rules? 
This issue is subject to much controversy.  For instance, when it came to identifying what 
CSR is, Stone believed it was beyond legal rules.10   He likened CSR to the role 
responsibility plays in humans which guide a person to act in a certain way despite the 
lack of legislative prohibitions.  He advocated a legal system that in dealing with 
corporations moves towards an increasingly direct focus on the processes of corporate 
decision making.11 This argument is rejected.  While a focus on processes of corporate 
decision making is ideal, corporate decision making in present times is very complex.  
More often than not, it does not reflect the individual perceptions of any one decision 
maker and may override personal values.  Therefore, there is the need for rules which 
would hold corporations accountable and guide them towards certain actions.  A realistic 
look at the structure and pattern of the modern corporation suggests the broader 
responsibilities should be within clearly defined rules.   
On the other hand, Christian Aid see CSR as an entirely voluntary, corporate-led 
initiative to promote self-regulation as a substitute for regulation at either national or 
                                                 
9 Ibid. at 80-87. The four related propositions are the promissory argument – supposed promise running 
from management to shareholders it would maximize shareholder profits; Agency argument – shareholders 
designated management as their agents; Role argument – supposed consideration of role of management; 
and Polestar argument – if managers act as though they promised shareholders they would do so, this would 
be best for all.  See also Christopher Stone “Why Shouldn’t Corporations be Socially Responsible?” in W. 
Michael Hoffman and Jennifer Mills Moore, eds., Business, Ethic, Readings and Cases in Corporate 
Morality (New York.: McGraw-Hill, 1995) pp 141-145. 
10 Supra note 8. 
11 Ibid. at 120 – 121. 
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international level.12  According to Christian Aid, modern CSR was born during the 1992 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, when UN-sponsored recommendations on regulation 
were rejected in favour of a manifesto for voluntary self-regulation put forward by a 
coalition of companies called the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(“WBCSD”). 13  CSR encompasses the voluntary codes, principles and initiatives 
companies adopt in their general desire to confine corporate responsibility to 
self-regulation.14  Christian Aid believes business needs to be bound by tighter national 
laws and regulations held in a framework of agreed international standards.15  
Christian Aid’s view that CSR is entirely self-regulatory is not correct.  CSR 
includes both voluntary and mandatory rules developed to improve corporate behavior.  
Anti-corruption laws are examples of mandatory CSR rules.  Increasingly, businesses are 
now being bound by laws in areas which would typically fall under ‘social’ responsibility.  
However, such laws are limited and have enforcement issues of their own.  The 
enforcement issues of anti-corruption laws as a CSR standard will be addressed in chapter 
three. 
 
2.2.3 Whether Universal Standards of CSR are Evolving? 
The WBCSD is a powerful coalition of companies actively involved in CSR.  They 
define CSR as the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute 
to economic development, while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their 
families as well as of the community, and society at large.  This definition is sound, but 
                                                 
12 See Christian Aid “Behind the mask, the real face of corporate social responsibility” (21 January 2004), 
online: Christian Aid <http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/indepth/0401csr/csr_behindthemask.pdf>. 




unfortunately, the WBCSD also say there can be no universal standards in CSR because 
CSR means different things to different people, depending upon a range of local factors 
including culture, religion and governmental or legal framework conditions.16  This study 
argues that universal standards are evolving in the area of human rights; contribution to 
sustainable development; the environment; and anti-corruption.  Multiple actors are 
involved in the evolution of these standards.  They include NGOs such as Christian Aid; 
global business leaders such as WBCSD; corporations; international organizations such as 
the United Nations; and States.   
One fundamental issue which must be addressed within this evolution is how the law 
can ensure that corporations behave in a responsible manner particularly, in relation to 
these emerging standards  The need for corporate responsibility is a persistent challenge 
in matters relating to these universal standards.  How can these evolving CSR standards 
be enforced?  Presently, soft law norms and initiatives play a very important role in 
enforcement.  Soft law norms are created by informal processes, being in nature 
moral-political obligations. They are subject to looser internal 'sanctions' inducing 
compliance, such as peer pressure or generated expectations.17  Are the soft laws which 
appear to be the norm adequate? Are such laws crystallizing into hard law as has been so 
prevalently argued?  Is hard law necessary?  Will hard law ensure CSR?  Attempts to 
answer these questions will be dealt with in the next section under ‘global changes to 
CSR’.  But first, the next sub-section will address the evolution of universal standards 
and the implementation of such standards.  
 
                                                 
16 See WBCSD , “Business Role: CSR”, online: WBCSD < http://www.wbcsd.org>. 
17 See Thio Li-ann, “Soft Law and the Management of Religious Liberty and Order: The 2003 Declaration 
on Religious Harmony” 2004 Sing. J. L. S. 414 at 434.   
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2.2.3.1 Evolution and Implementation of Universal Standards 
In the area of human rights, corporations have allegedly been accused of involvement in 
complicit acts with the governments of the countries in which they invest.18  In the area of 
anti-corruption, corporate scandals involving corrupt payment to domestic and foreign 
public officials is well documented.  Chapter three will highlight some examples.  
Corporations have also been implicated in environmental issues which cause 
environmental degradation and damage.  Such implications suggest a disregard for 
environmental protection.  Environmental protection is an integral part of sustainable 
development.19  Sustainable development is a form of development that meets the needs 
and aspirations of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.20  Therefore, corporate involvement in environmental destruction 
leaves much to be said for corporate contribution to sustainable development.   
These implications led to the development of Draft Norms21 aimed at producing 
standards which would be applicable to all corporations (MNCs and other business 
enterprises) integrating human rights, labour rights, environment, development and 
anti-bribery issues.  Arguably, this is proof of the evolution of universal standards.   
The 2003 Draft Norms also aimed to ensure the implementation of these universal 
standards, arguing that voluntary implementations have not been effective.  The 
implementation of these standards via the Draft Norms would have been novel because it 
                                                 
18 For example, see the case of Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., infra note 90.    
19 United Nations Conference on Environment and Declaration, 1992, Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration on 
environment and development makes it clear that in order to achieve sustainable development, 
environmental protection is an integral part which should not be considered in isolation from sustainable 
development. 
20 G. Bruntland, ed., Our Common future: The World Commission Environment and Development (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987). 
21 E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/rev.2, adopted by the United Nations Sub-Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights in 2003. 
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would have allowed for corporations to be held directly responsible in international law 
for violating such standards.  However, the Draft Norms were not implemented because 
of the strong criticisms they received from industry bodies and governments concerned 
with its legitimacy to hold corporations directly responsible for human rights norms.  
Such critics point to international law which requires state responsibility for enforcement 
of human rights norms.22 
 In 2004, the Commission on Human Rights recommended that the Economic and 
Social Council request the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to compile 
a report setting out the scope and legal status of existing initiatives and standards relating 
to the responsibility of transnational corporations and related business enterprises with 
regard to human rights.  A report was submitted to the Commission at its sixty-first 
session in order for it to identify options for strengthening standards on the responsibilities 
of transnational corporations and related business enterprises with regard to human rights 
and possible means of implementation.23  The report concluded that a review of existing 
initiatives and standards showed gaps in understanding the human rights responsibilities 
of business with regards to human rights.  The report recommended the need to discuss 
further the possibility of establishing a UN statement of universal human rights standards 
                                                 
22 For examples, see Canada’s Submission to the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Responsibilities of Business with Regard to Human Rights, online: OHCHR 
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/business/docs/canada.doc>.  See Carlos M. Vasquez, 
“Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations under International Law” (2005) 43 Colum J. Transnat’l L. 
927 at 929 where Vasquez highlights such criticisms. 
23 UNESC, Commission on Human Rights Report, Report on the Sixtieth Session, 15 October, 2004.  UN 
Doc E/2004/23, E/CN.4/2004/127. 
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applicable to business and to look into the nature of positive responsibilities on business to 
support human rights.24 
 In 2005, the commission on Human Rights at its 61st session requested the 
Secretary-General to appoint a special representative on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises.25 John Ruggie was appointed.  
In an interim report Ruggie presented in 2006, he stated that the most challenging part of 
his mandate concerned the issue of standards because “standards in many instances do not 
simply “exist” out there waiting to be recorded and implemented but are in the process of 
being socially constructed”; and any dialogue about standards revolves around the Draft 
Norms which claim to represent a definitive comprehensive set of standards.26  Ruggie 
concluded that the ‘norms exaggerated legal claims and conceptual ambiguities’ created 
confusion and doubt, particularly in the area of its legal authority and the principle by 
which it sought to allocate human rights responsibilities between states and firms.27 
While it may be true that the Draft Norms legal authority to hold corporations directly 
responsible for human rights norms is flawed, it is argued that discussions which have 
since followed its adoption point to the evolution of universal standards.  The issue which 
needs to be addressed, especially in light of the Draft Norms inability to command 
implementation and enforcement is how corporations can be held responsible.  As a 
                                                 
24 UNESC, Report of the United Nations Commissioner on Human rights on the responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with Regards to Human Rights, February 
2005.  UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/91. 
25 UNESC, Commission on Human Rights, Sixty-first session, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
Agenda 17, 15 April 2005.  UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/L.87. 
26 UNESC, Commission on Human Rights, Sixty-second session, Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights: Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, Agenda 17, 22 February 2006.  UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2006/97, para 55. 
27 Ibid. at para 59. 
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result of States’ failure to hold such corporations responsible accountability is increasingly 
been pushed into the area of soft law standards and initiatives.   
Indeed, Ruggie in a 2007 report concluded that in the area of human rights and 
corporate responsibility there is a gradual extension of liability to companies for 
international crimes under domestic jurisdiction but reflecting international standards.  
However, in other areas of human rights, legal responsibility is greatly debatable, but there 
is much potential for the use of soft law standards and initiatives in the future development 
of corporate responsibility for human rights.28  It is interesting to note that in the same 
report he requested for his mandate to be extended for a further year to iron out all the 
issues in his mandate and provide options and proposals for consideration.  Ruggie’s final 
report was presented to the Human Rights Council in April 2008.  In the 2008 report, he 
proposed a framework based on three principles, namely: the State duty to protect against 
human rights abuses; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and the need for 
more effective access to remedies.  With regards to corporate responsibility, companies 
are required to carry out a due-diligence process that complies with national laws and 
manages the risk of human rights harm.29 
 Therefore, it would seem that although universal standards of CSR are emerging in 
human rights, soft laws are for the time being the means of enforcing corporate 
responsibility.  For instance in the area of sustainable development and the environment, 
Agenda 21 is a soft law instrument which aims to promote efficient and cleaner 
production, including increased reuse and recycling of residues and reduction of the 
                                                 
28 Ibid. at para 44. 
29  See John Ruggie, “Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights”, Report 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008. 
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quantity of waste discharged.  Agenda 21 considers the role of business and industry in 
sustainable development advising business and industry to recognize environmental 
management as highest corporate priority and key determinant to sustainable 
development.  Activities which should be carried out to ensure this include government 
identifying and implementing in consultation with business and industry economic 
instruments and normative measures such as laws, legislation and standard.  Voluntary 
private initiatives and reporting are encouraged.30 It will be recalled that the WBCSD 
during the earth summit in Rio de Janeiro had compaigned strongly for voluntary 
self-regulation. 
The need for and evolution of universal standards for sustainable development is also 
recognized through soft law mechanisms such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises which are recommendations addressed by government to multinational 
enterprises providing voluntary principles and standards for responsible business conduct.  
The OECD guidelines are part of the OECD Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinationals.31  In the area of the environment they encourage enterprises to raise their 
environmental performance through improved internal environmental management and 
better contingency planning for environmental impacts.  The Global Compact also 
addresses environmental issues.32  In the area of anti-corruption, soft laws also play a 
significant role.  The next chapter will examine more closely selected soft laws in the 
area of anti-corruption.  Soft laws are in many ways inadequate as they are non-binding 
                                                 
30 Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 United Nations Conference on Environment and Declaration, 1992. 
31 See OECD Guidelines, Preamble, online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org./dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf>. 
32 See UN Global Compact, online: UN <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/>.  The Global Compact will be 
addressed in more detail under “Global Changes to CSR” p 43 ff. 
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and non-enforceable leaving little room for enhanced corporate responsibility.  More on 
soft laws in CSR generally will be encountered in the next section on global changes. 
 
2.3 GLOBAL CHANGES TO CSR 
In the domestic and international spheres, there have been changes to the approach on 
CSR.  These changes illustrate that corporations have broader responsibilities.  They 
also illustrate the legal possibilities for CSR and the role different segments of society play 
in ensuring CSR.  Four changes will be addressed in this chapter. 
 
2.3.1 Legal Awareness of the Need for CSR. 
There is an increasing awareness in law that MNCs play a role in the making of 
international legal norms favorable to foreign investment and should therefore have more 
responsibility corresponding with their increasing power.  MNCs are economic entities 
with great power to influence the making of international legal regime.  To illustrate the 
point of their power, in an interview with Sarah Anderson, one of the co-authors of the 
study titled Top 200: The Rise of Corporate Global Power published by Institute of Policy 
Studies in 2000, when asked the following questions: 
“Given that 51 of the largest economies in the world are corporations, what 
conclusions can be drawn about the state of economic dominance?”   
Anderson replied  
“I think once you understand the extent of their economic power, it should be no 
surprise that most governments in the world have been pursuing policies that are in 
the interest of these large corporations. Through the World Trade Organization, the 
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World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and also regional trade agreements, 
large corporations are getting more and more powers and privileges to operate as they 
like around the world… And as we've seen in Seattle and Prague and many other 
places around the world, a new peoples' movement against corporate globalization is 
beginning to take off.”33 
In the report, above, the economic and political power of the world’s top 200 corporations 
was examined.  It was found that of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are 
corporations, whereas 49 are countries; of the 200 largest companies, U.S corporations 
have dominance.  Corporations are driving the process of corporate globalization and 
arguably benefiting the most from it.  The conclusions are that widespread trade and 
investment liberalization have contributed to a climate in which dominant corporations are 
enjoying increasing levels of economic and political clout that are out of balance with the 
tangible benefits they provide to society.34  
International law is defined as the law between States.  Traditionally, States were 
seen as the subject of international law.  They have legal personality – rights and duties 
enforceable at law along with certain international organizations e.g UN which they 
create.  Presently, MNCs have not been granted full legal personality in international 
law, 35  although, increasingly, it is becoming apparent that they are important and 
powerful actors on the international scene36. 
                                                 
33 See Tamara Straus, “Study Finds Rise in Corporate Power”, Alternet (7 December 2005) online: Alternet 
< http://www.alternet.org/story/10184>. 
34 See Sarah Anderson and John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of Corporate Global Power (Washington 
DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 2000). 
35 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law Institute, (St.Paul, 
Minn: American Law Institute, 1997) at 126 notes that the transnational corporation, while an established 
feature of international life, has not yet achieved individual status in international law. 
36 Other important actors include Non-governmental Organisations. 
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A good illustration of the role MNCs play in fashioning international law can be 
found in intellectual property legislation.  Private actors have played an important role in 
the evolution of intellectual property rights.37  Writers document the role private actors 
such as business leaders played in pressing for higher standards of patent protection and 
seeking protection for the fruits of corporate research and development. 38  Private actors 
also played an important role in the establishment of the 1883 Paris Convention for the 
protection of Industrial property.39  Private sector lobbyists were influential in decisions 
reached resulting from the successful negotiations of the 1994 Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.40   
Intellectual property (IP) also illustrates the capture of international law by political 
and economic powers.  IP frequently serves as an instrument of power and once captured 
is a basis for further accumulation of power.41  Susan Sell explains that a critical 
approach to IP acknowledges the power of private actors and recognizes that the interests 
of the powerful are often enhanced at the expense of others42  She warns against treating 
the State as a unitary actor with well-defined interest and focusing on the State as 
legislator because in the context of intellectual property, private actors rather than States 
have frequently prompted changes in intellectual property protection.43 
                                                 
37 Susan Sell, Symposium: Intellectual Property as a Crossroads: The Use of the Past in Intellectual Property 
Jurisprudence: Intellectual Property and Public Policy in Historical Perspective: Contestation and 
Settlement, (2004) 38 Loy.L.A.L.Rev 267 at 321. 
38 Ibid. at 291 and accompanying footnotes. 
39 Ibid. at 292-293. 
40 Ibid. at 314. 
41 Ibid.at 274. 
42 Susan K. Sell & Christopher May, Moments in Law: Contestation and Settlement in the History of 
Intellectual, (2001) 8 Rev. Int'l Pol. Econ. 467, 469-473. 
43 Supra note 37 at 275.  See also reference to Tony Porter, Hegemony and the Private Governance of 
International Industries, in A. Clair Cutler et al. eds., Private Authority and International Affairs, (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1999) 257, 258-59. 
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 Another illustration, of the role MNCs play in fashioning international law can be 
found in foreign investment law.  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a direct investment 
made to obtain a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of 
the investor. The lasting interest implies a long term relationship between the direct 
investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the 
enterprise. 44   Through FDI, MNCs have been able to influence the making of 
international legal regimes.  Kamminga and Zia-Zarifi writing in 2000 note “that 
corporations were (and remain) very active in promulgating internationally binding 
standards for the protection of their investments and competitiveness, now securely in 
place through the World Trade Organisation system, the macroeconomic regulations of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the nearly 2,000 bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) in existence”.45  
 The use of BITs has become more common.  It has even been said that BITS have 
contributed to prevailing customary international law, although this is controversial.46  
Sornarajah refers to a wide divergence in the practice of States and standards in BITs 
which suggest it is unlikely BITs will give rise to any significant customary international 
law.47  He argues that a better reason for the explosion of BITs is the need for States to 
agree on definite rules relating to foreign investment in view of the absence of rapid 
development in international law which was badly needed.48 
                                                 
44 See IMF, Balance of Payment Manual (1993) online: IMF 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bopman/bopman.pdf> para 359.   
45 Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., Liability of Multinational Corporations under 
International Law (Boston: Kluwer International Law, 2000) p 8. 
46 See Andreas F. Cowenfeld, Intenational Economic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003) p 493.  
Note however, M. Sornarajah, International Law of Foreign Investment 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) where he says it is difficult for BITs to give rise to customary international law. 
47 Sornarajah, Ibid. at 206, 267. 
48 Ibid. at 213. 
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The law on FDI which protects the investments of MNCS demonstrates the impact of 
MNCs on international law and States.  MNCs need protection to secure their investment.  
The developed States ensure the protection of MNCs because they expand trade and 
investment which increases the economic power of the developed States.49  MNCs 
themselves as a result of the power and resources they command are able to influence the 
law to achieve their interest.    
The resolution of disputes under international law directly between foreign investors 
and host States has become fairly established.50  MNCs are able to enter into direct 
contracts with States and include choice of law, stabilization and arbitration clauses to the 
detriment of such States.  Arbitrators have consistently held that such contracts are 
subject to international law and not the local law of the host State.  They are able to use 
low order sources to formulate applicable international legal norm.51  Sornarajah, while 
referring to the theory of internationalized contracts, says they were built on the basis of 
the low-order sources of international law and “it would not be far-fetched to argue that 
they were manipulated in order to secure the protection of foreign investments made by 
multinational corporations.” 52   In essence, MNCs are able to fashion or influence 
international legal principles favourable to the protection of their investments. 
The problem that lies with fashioning international law this way is that international 
law may be captured by dominant powers in the economic and political spheres.  Some of 
the established principles in foreign investment law are to the detriment of developing 
                                                 
49 Ibid. at 4. 
50 See Cowenfeld, supra note 46 at 493. 
51 For extensive discussions on the negative impact of low order sources of law in foreign investment law 
and on theory of internalization of Contracts, see supra note 46 and more particularly, M. Sornarajah, The 
Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000), Ch. 9.    
52 Supra note 46 at 68. 
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countries.  Unfortunately, because in reality, most developing countries have some 
degree of international indebtedness, foreign exchange problems and balance of trade 
deficits, they need foreign investments to survive.  Too much hold on liberalization 
and/or deregulation may create a loss of investment, which is badly needed in developing 
countries, and so host States in these countries have to be careful in their relations with 
MNCs.  As a result, they sign BITs, concede to arbitration which may be detrimental to 
their economy.  Similarly, home States in order to allow for the free flow of investments 
and economic development find it expedient to ensure MNC protection. 
 Examples of how developing countries succumb to foreign investment 
disadvantageous to them can be found in policies they adopt that reflect an unproven 
linkage between intellectual property protection and incentives to invest.53  Desperate for 
foreign investment, many countries sign foreign investment agreements that require them 
to offer much higher standards of protection than are incorporated in TRIPS. 54    
However, there has also been notice of the mobilization of groups to protest the broad 
expansion of property rights such as the movement to provide HIV/AIDS drugs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 55   These suggest countries may not be too willing to adopt 
disadvantageous policies.  There is much to be said for the right of developing countries 
to have access to drug production without intellectual property rights issues looming in the 
background.  There is a tendency to conclude that developing countries are pressured and 
coerced into signing BITS.  Sornarajah sees BITS as agreements which without evidence 
to the contrary should be seen as voluntary agreements entered into between consenting 
                                                 
53 See supra note 37 at 319.  See also Peter Drahos, “BITS and BIPS: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property”, 
(2001) 4 J. World Intell. Prop. L. 791,791-93.  
54 Sell, Ibid. 
55 Sell, Ibid at 319. Drahos, Ibid at 801. 
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parties.56  The outcome of each treaty should be based on the relative strengths and 
mutual confidence of the parties.57 
Most legal norms formulated in international economic law protect the rights of 
foreign investors.58  For instance, calls to incorporate social standards into free trade 
agreements have been contentious.59   More recently, the responsibilities of foreign 
investors are being considered but legal norms formulated for the time being are usually as 
soft law.60  Seidl-Hohenveldern suggests that the main value of international soft law 
which is very important in the field of international economic law is as a device to 
overcome a deadlock in relations between states pursuing conflicting ideological and or 
economic aims.61   
Some writers are quick to point out that some norms embedded in soft law 
instruments become hard law and as such it may be better to refer to such instruments as 
law.62  Such writers see international law as being constituted by not just treaties and 
custom but include multiple normative forms63 of which arguably the soft laws paraded 
on the international sphere can lay claim.  It is submitted that soft laws which crystallize 
                                                 
56 Supra note 46 at 208.  Evidence which he cites as contrary includes the signing of a treaty made 
conditional on granting of aid, loans or trade preferences. 
57 Ibid. at 216. 
58 The MNC is a prime example.   
59 See Kevin Kolben, “Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private Regulatory Approaches in the 
Design of Trade and Labour Regimes” (2007) 48 Harv. Int’l L. J. 203 where the author was concerned with 
labour rights. 
60 Examples include OECD guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; ILO 2000 Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy; Transnational Draft Norms on 
Responsibility for TNCs and other business rights with regard to Human Rights; UNCTAD’s code of 
conduct for Transnational Corporations. 
61 See D.J Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 6th ed. (London : Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) at  
62. 
62 Janet Koven Levit, “Bottom –Up International Law Making: Reflections on the New Haven School of 
International Law”, (2007) 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 393.  
63 Ibid. 
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into hard laws raise no substantial issues, since the soft law norms can now be adequately 
referred to as hard law and treated accordingly. 
The problem arises when soft laws are used as a means of overcoming deadlock or as 
a smoke screen to avoid considerations of hard law possibilities.  In such situations, soft 
laws which are typically non-binding and self-regulatory may fail to effect adequate 
change.  Furthermore, without the authority which hard laws command, the effectiveness 
of soft laws may be further doubtful.  These beg the question – why are soft laws 
considered for responsibility issues while hard laws are considered for investment 
protection issues? 
The importance of MNCs even in international law can no longer be ignored.  
International law, while recognizing the significance of these actors, is still very much in 
infancy in analyzing their impact on international law and global affairs.  Even the 
encyclopedia of Public International Law does not pay them much attention save 
acknowledging they have limited legal capacity.   The modern age of globalisation 
makes it clear this can no longer hold.  As has been said, the scope of international law 
today is immense… its involvement has spread from the primary concern with the 
preservation of peace, to embrace all the interests of contemporary international life64.   
The regulation of MNCs for social responsibilities is one of these interests.   Arguably, 
international law as it currently is does not regulate MNCs simply because current 
international law is based solely on liberalism of free trade, markets and democracy.  
This study argues there is the need to regulate MNCs in broad CSR issues. 
                                                 
64 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, 5th ed. (Cambridge: New York : Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 
43. 
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The Draft Norms65  which have been discussed are examples of an attempt at 
international regulation.  The Draft Norms re-affirm that MNCs have human rights 
obligations and responsibilities.  The Draft Norms contribute to the making and 
development of international law regarding responsibilities for MNCs.  However, the 
international corporate legal responsibility for human rights abuses which the Draft Norms 
aimed to establish is greatly contested.66  Nevertheless, the Draft Norms illustrate rather 
nicely the difficulties international regulation of MNCs face.  The enforcement of the 
Draft Norms seems unachievable, because they call for corporate internal rules of 
compliance, including rules relating to contract and other arrangements with a host of 
legal persons.67  It is widely accepted that internal rules or self regulation with no 
compliance measures are ineffective for holding corporations responsible. 
The enforcement of the Draft Norms also calls for periodic monitoring and 
verification by UN, or other international and national mechanisms regarding the 
application of the Draft Norms.68  However, the UN’s reputation as an institution with a 
weak system of enforcement may serve as a hindrance.  Finally, there are requirements 
that States should establish legal and administrative framework for implementing CSR69. 
This requirement ignores the situation very prevalent in developing countries where states 
cannot or refuse to establish or enforce legal rules and mechanisms for enforcement.  On 
the whole, when one considers all the contentions raised by the Draft Norms, coupled with 
lack of enforcement and monitoring so prevalent in international law, it raises the 
question, whether the Draft Norms could have really been effective in ensuring CSR? 
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There have been allusions to the possibility that MNC non-compliance with corporate 
codes of conduct or socially responsible representations may lead to claims for 
misrepresentation and unfair trade practices and that third party social responsibility audits 
may strengthen such claims.70  The 2003 case of Nike Inc v Kasky 71 is typically referred 
to as justification for this stance. The case concerned allegations that Nike was mistreating 
and underpaying workers.  Nike responded to these charges by sending out press 
releases, writing letters to the press and others.  Nike also commissioned a report on the 
labour conditions at its production facilities.  The report found no evidence of widespread 
abuse or mistreatment of workers.  Respondent then sued Nike in a California court for 
unfair and deceptive practices under California’s unfair competition law and false 
advertising law.  He claimed Nike made false statement or material omissions of fact 
concerning working condition under which Nike products were manufactured.  The case 
was constitutional in nature and premised on whether Nike’s speech was commercial or 
non-commercial by which it would be protected by first amendment. The U.S Supreme 
court decided to dismiss the case and entered no decision. 
It is submitted that in reality such claims are few and far in between.  They are 
seldom made and or successful. Accordingly, arguments on the effectiveness of soft law 
corporate codes should not be based on such possibilities.  It may be better to see such 
arguments as illustrations of the global changes to CSR.  There have also been allusions 
to the fact that incorporation of social responsibility standards into contracts with third 
party suppliers or investment agreements with host governments may lead to breach of 
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contract claims72  It is yet to be seen if any such claims will be made.  Therefore it is 
useful to point out that the effectiveness of such arguments is yet to be tested.  However, 
it is agreed that these developments point to changes to CSR perceptions.  These are 
positive developments for CSR generally.  
 
2.3.2 The ‘Spotlight Effect’ 
Greater public scrutiny by international civil society which raises awareness of corporate 
misbehaviors and pressures the corporations to act responsibly has been termed the 
‘spotlight effect’.73  For example, MNCs in the Nigerian oil industry have much been in 
the news for complicity in human rights and environmental abuses.  In particular, Shell 
which is the largest producer and has stayed the longest in Nigeria has faced much 
criticism internationally and domestically in recent times.  In the 90s, Shell was 
implicated with the repressive military government of the time under the leadership of the 
late General Sani Abacha of complicity in human rights violations. 
Browen Manby74 says  
“The role played by the oil multinationals in Nigeria has received increasing 
attention in recent years as protest against oil production has grown, and with it the 
repressive response of the Nigerian government.  Shell in particular, the largest 
producer in Nigeria, has faced a barrage of criticism over its activities in the 
country.  This criticism reached a height in 1994 and 1995, when the government 
                                                 
72 Supra note 62 at 414 and footnote where she cites the example of BP entering into series of legally 
binding agreement with host states in which it committed to abide by security principles. 
73 See Scott Pegg “An emerging market for the new millennium: Transnational Corporations and Human 
Rights’’ in JG Frynas and Scott Pegg eds.,Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, (New York : 
Palgrave, 2003) at 9 – 10 referring to Debora Spar. 
74 Browen Manby, ‘‘The Role and Responsibility of Oil Multinationals in Nigeria’’ (1999) 53 J. Int’l Aff. 
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suppressed anti-Shell protests by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP), executing MOSOP leader and internationally known author 
Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activitists in November 1995”.   
As a result of this incident and others such as the Brent Spar spills and the negative 
publicty that followed, Shell was forced to reconsider CSR.   In 1997, Shell published its 
statement of general business principles. The principles have existed since 1976, but were 
revised in 1997 due to heightened public interest in human rights and the concept of 
sustainable development. 75  A further revision took place in 2005. 76   Through the 
principles, Shell recognizes the need for a social contract to operate effectively.  The 
group recognizes five areas of responsibility, namely shareholders, employees, customers, 
business partners and society as a whole.  Shell’s responsibility to society aims to 
conduct business as responsible corporate members of society, observe laws of countries 
in which they operate, express support for human rights and contribute to sustainable 
development.   
The bad publicity which Shell received in the 1990s not only forced Shell to 
re-consider CSR.  It also put other corporations on notice of the importance of respecting 
broad CSR issues.  However, whether this notice is leading to improved corporate 
behavior must be examined closely.  A 2003 confidential report commissioned as part of 
Shell’s efforts to help develop a ‘peace and security strategy’ in the Niger Delta said Shell 
feeds violence in the area and may have to leave by 2009. 77   In 2004, Ethical 
Corporations reported that Shell’s record for being a leader in corporate responsibility was 
                                                 
75 Shell Business Principles (1997), online: Shell 
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76 Shell Business Principles (2005), online: Shell < http://www.shell.com>. 
77 M. Tran, “Shell May Have to Leave Nigeria” Guardian (11 June, 2004) online: Guardian 
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under direct attack as a result of evidence suggesting its social and environmental 
performance around the world does not match its public pronouncements78  Shell’s 1997 
revised principles state Shell has a systematic approach to health, safety and 
environmental management.  The 2005 revised principles affirm this, but add security to 
the list. 
 Shell’s transparency has also come under attack.  Some have argued for a more 
receptive attitude towards outside influence with legitimate interests as a way of tackling 
such problems.79  More transparency seems to be the watchword.  The 2005 revised 
principles aimed to address this issue. It recognizes the need for stakeholder dialogue and 
engagement.  The 1997 revised principles referred simply to communication through 
comprehensive corporate information programmes providing full relevant information to 
legitimately interested parties.  The voice of external stakeholders and the media in 
crusading the deeds or misdeeds of Shell is a relevant factor exerting pressure on the 
company to take CSR seriously.  For such codes to be effective in other companies or 
industries, civil society would have to play the same role.  This may not be the case 
because the pattern of civil society has generally been to address itself to the misbehaviors 
of global giants in the pursuit of CSR ignoring lesser but equally responsible or 
irresponsible companies.   
  NGOs have used protests as well as collaborations with banks which underwrite 
projects carried out by MNCs to ensure CSR. A recent example can be seen in the 
announcement by JP Morgan Chase that it would introduce policies to promote 
sustainable forestry and indigenous peoples’ rights and block funding that could be used 
                                                 




for illegal logging.  It also promised to reduce its own, and its clients’, carbon 
emissions.80  These occurred as a result of protest on the New York City and Chicago 
offices relating to claims that the bank’s underwriting of illegal logging in Indonesia, and 
human rights abuses was tied to a chase-funded mining operation in Peru.  BankTrack, a 
loose collection of non-governmental organizations has collaborated with banks to jointly 
tackle environmental and social concerns.  JP Morgan Chase and 29 other major banks 
have signed the Equator Principles which promote responsible environmental stewardship 
and socially responsible development by evaluating the threats projects pose to forests, 
natural habitats and indigenous populations.  However, there are issues as to adequate 
transparency and monitoring of the banks on a project-by-project basis.81   
  Another example of civil society activity putting pressure on corporations to act 
responsibly is the New York City Pension Funds which proposed a resolution calling for 
ExxonMobil management to review and report to shareholders concerning the potential 
investor risks and liabilities resulting from corporate payments to the Indonesian military.  
ExxonMobil reportedly makes annual payments of $6 million for "protection" of its 
natural gas operation in Aceh. Thirteen organizations have joined the Boards of Trustees 
in urging ExxonMobil Management to publish what it pays.  Shareholders voted on 25 
May 2005 at ExxonMobils’s AGM in Irving Texas.82  At the AGM, 7.6 per cent backed 
the resolution.83 
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2.3.3 International Legal Action 
There is a real and potential threat of international legal action regarding foreign direct 
liability.  As one writer has noted: 
“… the OK Tedi case was a forerunner – and one of the most successful cases to date, 
even given its shortcomings – of international legal action regarding foreign direct 
liability, which includes cases against Freeport-McMoran’s Grasburg mine in west 
Papua (Indonesia) and Texaco in Ecuador, in addition to ExxonMobil’s natural gas 
installation in Aceh (Indonesia), Unocal’s oil pipeline in Burma, Chevron and Royal 
Dutch/Shell for their petroleum operations in the Niger Delta, Rio Tinto for its alleged 
military collusion in the civil war on Bougainville and British Thor chemicals for the 
health impacts of mercury based chemicals on its south African employees, all of which 
have recently been or are currently before the courts in the United States and the United 
Kingdom.”84  
 
2.3.3.1 United States cases 
 Alien Torts Claims Act (“ATCA”)85 cases in the U.S have been significant for holding 
MNCs directly liable for tort injuries caused by actions in violation of the law of nations or 
a treaty of the U.S.  The area of law pertaining to ATCA is still emerging, there are 
controversies on its application and it is important to note that to date, no US based MNC 
has yet been subject to an enforceable judgment in the U.S for acts performed abroad.86  
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The case of Doe v. Unocal87  is widely regarded as having the greatest potential impact 
on the scope and interpretation of ATCA.  It was the first case to find that ATCA can be 
used to hold a MNC liable for violations of universally recognized human rights standards 
committed jointly by the MNC and its foreign business partners.  
In Doe v Unocal, Earth Rights International, the center for constitutional rights and 
two California based law firms assisted 11 Plaintiffs from Burma in bringing a lawsuit 
against Unocal and others.  The lawsuit alleged Unocal, a MNC which was in joint 
venture with Myanmar Ministry for Oil and Gas Enterprise and Total was complicit in 
human rights crimes against humanity, forced labour, torture, loss of homes and property, 
rape since the Burmese government’s military and intelligence personnel which were 
using illegal force under international law to the benefit of the joint venture were Unocal’s 
agents; Unocal had knowledge of this and was making payments to the personnel.88 The 
military government on its part was able to plead sovereign immunity. In December 2004 
the parties reached a settlement. Although, the case eventually settled out of court, the 
issues in Doe v Unocal have been considered in other cases including Wiwa v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co.  The Unocal case illustrates an option for pursuing direct corporate 
liability claims, but, there are limitations to its use such as issues of jurisdiction and 
interpretation.89  
                                                                                                                                                 
Obligations on Multinational Corporations: The ninth circuit strikes again in judicial activism’’ (2003)18 
Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1009 for general discussions on ATCA and the case of Doe v Unocal. 
87 963 F.Supp.880. 
88 See Carlyn Carey ‘‘Unocal Corporation can be liable for Human Rights abuses in Burma’’ (1999) 7 Hum. 
Rts. Br. 9. 
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Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.90 revolves around the murder, by hanging, of 
Nigerian activist and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa in November of 1995, the torture and 
detention of his brother, and the shooting of a woman peacefully protesting Shell’s 
planned pipeline in Nigeria.  The case was brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs by Earth 
Rights International a non-governmental organization as co-counsel with Judith Brown 
Chomsky, the Center for Constitutional Rights, Paul Hoffman, and Julie Shapiro.91  The 
plaintiffs in the case, members of the Ogoni people, alleged that companies participated in 
human rights violations against them in retaliation for their political opposition to 
companies' oil exploration activities in Nigeria.  They also alleged that Shell acted under 
colour of law by participating in the human rights violations and was a de facto state actor.  
Shell was not exempt from ATCA liability because its alleged financing of and 
participation in the torture and killings of Wiwa and the other Ogoni activists, if proven, 
establish significant ties to the state.92  
The Defendants, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and Trading 
Co, PLC moved to dismiss both the initial and the amended complaints on the grounds of 
lack of personal jurisdiction over Royal Dutch/Shell, forum non conveniens (defendants 
argued that the case should be heard in the Netherlands or England), and lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction (defendants argued, inter alia, that ATCA did not apply to a corporation 
and that the claim was precluded by the political question and act of state doctrines, as 
well as Nigerian law on corporate liability).  In September 1998, the presiding judge 
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concluded that personal jurisdiction was appropriate in New York, but also ruled that 
England was a more convenient forum, and therefore that defendants' motion to dismiss 
should be granted for forum non conveniens.93  
On appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, plaintiffs argued that a 
forum non conveniens dismissal would vitiate Congressional intent to allow plaintiffs' 
claims to be heard in US courts.  In a huge victory for the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals 
two years later in September 2000 reversed the district court's forum non conveniens 
dismissal, concluding that the United States is a proper forum.  The Court also upheld the 
district court's ruling that jurisdiction over the defendants was proper and remanded the 
case back to the district court to rule on defendants.94  In October 2008, 12 years after the 
case was first filed, trial is scheduled for 9 February 2009.95 
Another case involving litigation for corporate accountability for human rights 
abuses, incidentally also occurring in Nigeria is Bowoto et al. v. Chevron.96   The case 
involves victims of gross human rights abuses associated with Chevron's oil production 
activities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.   In May 1999, a coalition of private civil 
rights and human rights lawyers and non-profit human rights organizations filed suit 
against Chevron in a federal court in San Francisco under ATCA.97  The case is based on 
two incidents involving the shooting of peaceful protestors at Chevron's Parabe offshore 
platform and the destruction of two villages by soldiers in Chevron helicopters and 
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boats.98   Chevron argued that the case should be dismissed because corporate law 
protected it from responsibility for the acts of its subsidiary.  
In a major victory for the Plaintiffs, a federal judge on March 23, 2004 denied 
ChevronTexaco's motion for summary judgment, ruling that ChevronTexaco may be held 
liable for the acts of its Nigerian subsidiary, (CNL) where ChevronTexaco allowed the 
subsidiary to hire the notorious Nigerian military and police as a security force.  The 
presiding judge, however, found that there was evidence from which a jury might 
conclude that CNL acted as Chevron's agent. The judge noted the "extraordinarily close 
relationship between the parents and subsidiary prior to, during and after the attacks," as 
well as evidence of "cover-up" of CNL's activities by Chevron.99  
Previously, the Court in early 2000 rejected Chevron's earlier request to dismiss the 
case. Chevron had argued that Nigeria was the proper forum for the dispute. It had also 
argued that the claims arising out of the Parabe incident did not allege violations of 
international law because the Plaintiffs were trespassing on the platform and that litigation 
of the Parabe claims would interfere with U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis Nigeria. The Court 
concluded that none of these assertions warranted dismissal of the case at such an early 
stage of the proceedings.100  The case was set for trial in September 2008 and the decision 
is still pending.  A companion state case filed by the plaintiffs in February 2003 alleging 
that Chevron violated California's unfair business practices law, both through its 
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involvement in the abuses at issue and by conducting a knowingly false media campaign 
to cover up what happened is for trial in 2009.101   
John Doe 1, et al v. Exxon Mobil Corporation102 is another case on corporate 
accountability for human right abuses.  It was filed in June 2001, by the International 
Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, on 
behalf of 11 villagers from Aceh who were victims of human rights abuses by Exxon 
Mobil's security forces.103  The case revolves around Exxon Mobil’s activities to protect 
its operations.  The allegations are that Exxon Mobil knowingly employed brutal military 
troops to protect its operations, and the company aided and abetted the human rights 
violations through financial and other material support to the security forces. In addition, 
the case alleges that the security forces were either employees or agents of Exxon Mobil, 
and thus Exxon Mobil is liable for their actions. Exxon Mobil's primary defense is that the 
human rights violations may have occurred, but the company did not specifically intend 
this result, and therefore cannot be held liable.104  In October 2001, Exxon Mobil filed a 
routine motion to dismiss the claim, and the Plaintiffs filed a response against this motion.  
In 2004, the presiding district court judge asked for additional briefing on the impact of the 
2004 Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain105 upon the case.  To date, 
the court has not yet ruled on the motion to dismiss in John Doe 1, et al v. Exxon Mobil 
Corporation.106  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain was a case against a state actor.  It involved a 
foreign victim suing for damages for arbitrary arrest.  However, the case is also 
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significant for cases against non-state actors such as MNCs.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
addressed the proper scope of ATCA.  It upheld the use of ATCA by foreign victims of 
serious or heinous international law violations.107   
All the cases discussed involved allegations of human rights abuses carried out by 
MNCs in the extractive industry in developing countries.  The Doe v Unocal case settled 
out of court.  The other three cases are still pending.  It will be interesting to see the 
outcomes in these cases.  Overall, the cases illustrate the impact of international legal 
action for commanding CSR, at least where serious or heinous human rights abuses are 
concerned.  
 
2.3.3.2 United Kingdom cases 
In the U.K, the Thor,108 Connelly109 and Cape PLC110 cases have also impacted foreign 
direct liability of MNCs positively.  These cases have allowed both British citizens as 
well as foreign citizens to sue parent companies for injuries caused by their subsidiaries in 
foreign countries on the tort law principles of duty of care or negligence.   
Lubbe and others v. Cape Plc and related appeals111 involved plaintiffs (over 3,000) 
claims for damages for personal injuries (and in some cases death) allegedly suffered as 
the result of exposure to asbestos and its related products in South Africa.  The claim was 
made against the defendant, as a parent company which, knowing that exposure to 
asbestos was gravely injurious to health, failed to take proper steps to ensure that proper 
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working practices were followed and proper safety precautions observed throughout the 
group. In this way, it was alleged, the defendant breached a duty of care which it owed to 
those working for its subsidiaries or living in the area of their operations.  
The brief facts of the case were that the defendant a public limited company was 
incorporated in England in 1893 under the name Cape Asbestos Company Limited, 
principally to mine and process asbestos and sell asbestos-related products. From shortly 
after 1893 until 1948 it operated mines and mills in South Africa.  In 1948, the corporate 
structure of the defendant's group was changed.  The mines and mills were operated by 
the subsidiary of the defendant until 1979 when they were sold to a third party.  Although 
originating in South Africa, the defendant's asbestos-related business was not confined to 
that country. From 1899 the defendant operated a number of factories in England engaged 
in processing asbestos and manufacturing asbestos products. Another subsidiary, 
incorporated in Italy, operated a factory in Turin.112  
The issue before the House of Lords was whether proceedings brought by the 
plaintiffs against the defendant should be tried in England or in South Africa.  The House 
of Lords held that on an application for a stay of proceedings on the ground of forum non 
conveniens the court should leave out of account considerations of public interest or 
policy which did not relate to the private interests of any of the parties or to securing the 
ends of justice. Although South Africa was the more appropriate forum for trial of 
asbestos-related personal injury litigation brought by over 3,000 South African plaintiffs 
against an English parent company in respect of the operations of its South African 
subsidiaries, lack of means in South Africa for the plaintiffs to obtain the professional 
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representation and expert evidence essential to the just determination of their cases would 
amount to a denial of justice so that, in the unusual circumstances of the proceedings, no 
stay would be granted.  
The house thereby (1) dismissed an appeal by the defendant, Cape Plc, from the Court 
of Appeal113 which had reversed the decision of presiding judge of the High Court staying 
the personal injury action brought by the plaintiffs, Schalk Lubbe, suing as administrator 
of the estate of Rachel Lubbe, and four others; and (2) allowed appeals by the plaintiffs, 
and over 3,000 others who in nine further actions had commenced similar proceedings 
against the defendant.  The Court of Appeal had upheld the High Court judge’s decision 
which had given directions for the further actions to proceed as a group action, but had 
stayed all the proceedings in favour of South Africa.114  On 21 December 2001, the group 
action by 7500 South Africans against English Parent Company Cape plc which operated 
mines through subsidiaries there until 1979 was settled.115   
The Thor cases116 involved three sets of claims brought by 44 plaintiffs against the 
defendants, Thor Chemical Holdings Limited (Thor), an English company, its wholly 
owned South African subsidiary (Thor SA) and Mr. Cowley, the chairman and controlling 
shareholder of Thor.  Thor SA manufactured and reprocessed mercury compounds at 
factories in Natal in South Africa.  Mr Cowley took an active part in the management of 
the companies in the group of which Thor was the holding company.  The claims were 
for personal injuries damages caused by exposure to mercury during the course of their 
employment.  The defendants were each alleged to be directly liable to the plaintiffs in 
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tort for setting up and maintaining factories in South Africa which they knew or ought to 
have known would be unsafe for those who worked in them.  
In the first claim brought by three defendants in October 1994, the defendants applied 
to stay the proceedings on the grounds that they should be heard in South Africa.  Their 
application was dismissed by the presiding judge on 11 April 1995.  Amongst other 
things, the judge concluded that the defendants had failed to satisfy him that South Africa 
was clearly or distinctly the more appropriate forum for the trial of those proceedings.  
The defendants appealed but, their appeal failed because in the meantime they had served 
a defence and the Court of Appeal decided that in so doing they had submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the English court.117  
The second claim arose out of proceedings started by 17 other plaintiffs making 
virtually the same allegations against the defendants. In March 1996 the defendants 
applied to stay those proceedings but later abandoned the application. This action was then 
consolidated with the earlier action.  After an unsuccessful attempt to strike out the 
consolidated action on the grounds that it disclosed no cause of action and other protracted 
procedural preliminary battles in April 1997, the defendants settled the plaintiffs' claims 
for £1.3m.118   
In January 1998, 21 plaintiffs brought the same claim against the defendants.  The 
defendants sought to stay the proceedings on the grounds of forum non conveniens.  The 
court of appeal (1) refused the defendants leave to appeal the decision of Garland J's of 31 
July 1998 refusing to grant the defendants a stay of these proceedings on the grounds of 
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forum non conveniens and (2) granted leave to appeal Gray J’s decision of 5 November 
1998, dismissing an appeal to set aside judgment obtained in default of defence.119   
In January 1999, the Court of Appeal granted Thor permission to continue with its 
defence of the proceedings.  It then emerged from company documents filed in December 
1999 that Thor's parent company, had undertaken a demerger which involved transfer of 
subsidiaries valued at £19.55 million to a newly formed company.  Two weeks before the 
start of the three month trial, an application to the Court was then made, on behalf of the 
Claimants, for a declaration under S 423 Companies Act 1986 that the dominant purpose 
of the demerger was to defraud creditors, such as the Claimants and it was thus void.  
Thor and its chairman disputed that this was the purpose, but the Court of Appeal held that 
in the absence of information to the contrary, the inference that the demerger of Thor was 
connected with the present claims was 'irresistible'. The Court ordered Thor to pay 
£400,000 into court within seven days and to disclose documents concerning the 
demerger. The case was settled on the first day of trial.120  
Connelly v. RTZ Corp. Plc121 involved Edward Connelly, a British citizen who 
worked for the defendants in an open-cast uranium mine owned and operated by a 
subsidiary of the first defendant in Namibia.  Connelly developed cancer of the throat as a 
result of which he became permanently disabled and brought a claim in respect of his 
illness against one or more of the companies in the RTZ Group who were domiciled in 
England.  The Defendants sought to stay the action on the ground of forum non 
conveniens.  Their application in this regard was successful in the High Court.  The 
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Plaintiff's appeal against the stay was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.  While it was 
accepted that the Plaintiff had no reasonable prospect of being able to take proceedings in 
Namibia in the absence of any form of legal aid in that country, the Court took the view 
that it was prevented from taking into account the availability of legal aid for proceedings 
in England by virtue of the provisions of s.31(1) of the Legal Aid Act 1988. When the 
factor on availability of legal aid was left out of account, the country with which the claim 
had the most substantial connection, and therefore the most convenient forum was 
Namibia.  
The Plaintiff's solicitors then agreed to enter into a conditional fee arrangement with 
the Plaintiff for the preparation and presentation of a claim before the English Courts. 
Such an arrangement was legitimated by s.58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, 
and the Conditional Fee Agreements Ord 1995.  The Plaintiff then made an application to 
remove the stay.  The application failed at first instance, but the Court of Appeal allowed 
an appeal from that refusal and removed the stay.  This was on the grounds that, as it was 
permissible for the Court to have regard to the existence of the conditional fee 
arrangement (in contrast to the situation with regard to legal aid), the Court was thus 
enabled to recognise the fact that the only place where the Plaintiff could effectively bring 
any action in respect of his illness and consequential disability was the Courts of England 
and Wales. The Defendants appealed to the House of Lords but the view of the Court of 
Appeal was upheld122 not only on the basis adopted by that Court, but also on the basis 
                                                 
122 Ibid. 
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that s.31(1) of the 1988 Act did not operate to exclude the question of the availability of 
legal aid from consideration in the context of a forum non conveniens application.123  
Litigation in U.K relating to corporate accountability has been affected by the 
doctrines of entity law discussed by Blumberg.124  Blumberg notes that the widespread 
use by U.S and other multinational parent corporations of foreign-owned subsidiary 
corporations to conduct the overseas business of the enterprise inhibits the use of the 
national legal systems to achieve corporate accountability on the international level and 
enforcement of legal restraints on corporate behavior abroad.  Entity law treats each 
subsidiary as a separate legal actor, distinct from its Parent Corporation and affiliates. It 
creates a fundamental barrier to the imposition of liability, under common law and 
statutory law, upon parent and affiliates for the activities of a subsidiary of the group.125  
However, Blumberg also notes that direct liability of the parent corporation for actions of 
subsidiary company can arise if the parent corporation directly participates in the acts 
complained of.  Vicarious liability occurs if either the equitable doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil or agency law is used.126   
When jurisdictional problems such as forum non conveniens are added to the issues of 
entity law, it becomes even more difficult to hold parent companies accountable.  All the 
cases discussed involved the courts having to make decisions regarding forum non 
conveniens and liability of corporation for acts of its subsidiaries.  Cost and time delays 
in obtaining justice were other important factors which would affect the outcome of the 
                                                 
123 See background to case by Wright J in Connelly v Rio Tinto plc and another (unreported) Queens Bench 
Division dated 4 December 1998.  See also Connelly v RTZ Corp plc and another, Court of Appeal, Civil 
Division, [1996] 1 All ER 500 and [1997] 4 All ER 335, House of Lords. 
124 P. Blumberg, ‘‘Accountability of MNCs: The Barriers Presented by Concepts of the Corporate Juridical 
Entity’’, (2001) 24 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L Rev. 297. 
125 Ibid., at 300. 
126 Ibid. 
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case.  In many of the UK cases and the Unocal case in the US, the parties eventually 
settled out of court.  The decisions of the other US cases are eagerly being awaited.  The 
cases illustrate the hurdles Plaintiffs have to jump are not easy.  Nevertheless, it shows 
MNCs cannot take the prospects of litigation lightly. 
 
2.3.4 Corporate Awareness of the Importance of CSR 
Corporations themselves have an increasing awareness of the rising importance of 
corporate responsibility.  A recent questionnaire survey suggests more corporations are 
thinking of CSR.127    Many corporations now have codes and initiatives guiding their 
approach to CSR.  Generally, one advantage with such soft laws is that they are 
voluntary.  As a result they are non-threatening to companies that adopt them.  If 
adopted willingly and purposefully, they have the potential to create substantial 
significance for the CSR agenda.  Another advantage is that they are flexible and so 
easily adaptable to change.  CSR needs constant reviews and must be adaptable to 
change.  Thus, such codes are necessary tools in improving corporate behavior.  They 
create awareness for CSR issues, but in many cases the question remains whether they are 
adequate to command responsible corporate behaviour.   
  There are a number of factors which need to be considered in relation to the 
effectiveness of such soft laws.  These include the institutions involved in its creation, 
parties which subscribe to the soft laws, influence stakeholders can exert in ensuring 
compliance, how closely fit the goals of the soft laws are to the goals of those who adopt 
the laws, and the transparency mechanisms put in place for implementation, monitoring 
                                                 
127 See Jonh Ruggie, “Human Rights Policies and Management Practices of Fortune Global 500 Firms: 
Results of a Survey” September 2006, online: Business for Social Responsibility 
<http://www.bsr.org/meta/FG500_Report.pdf>. 
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and compliance.  Such soft laws will be categorized into three sectors, namely company 
initiated codes, Multi-stakeholder codes and/or general codes. The categorization is useful 
for determining the effectiveness or otherwise of the soft laws. 
  Many of the codes businesses publish are company initiated. Shell’s statement of 
general business principles already discussed is an example of industry initiated codes.128  
An advantage of such codes is that they illustrate clearly the awareness of business for 
CSR.  The voluntary and flexible nature of such codes makes it more adaptable to 
change, aiding the fulfillment of some CSR goals.  However, such codes by themselves 
cannot address CSR goals effectively.   
  The EITI is an example of a multi-stakeholder code.  The EITI is a voluntary 
initiative between governments, international organizations, companies, NGOs and 
business.  It aims to promote transparency and accountability by requiring companies to 
declare payments made to governments while governments declare corresponding 
receipts.129  Jeroen van der Veer, cites the EITI as useful for tackling the problems of 
poverty, corruption and conflict resulting from misuse of revenues because of the greater 
transparency it demands.  It aims to improve the management of resources and promote 
better governance.130  However, the UK Department for International Development has 
identified the establishment of an effective validation mechanism to assess country 
implementation; the need for broader government participation; and increasing financial 
support as key challenges for the initiative.131 
                                                 
128 Supra note 75. 
129 Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative online: EITI <http://eitransparency.org/> 
130 “Why Transparency is Important” Speech by Chief Executive of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group and 
President of Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, online: Shell  
<http://www-static.shell.com/static/media/downloads/speeches/jvdveiti.pdf>. 
131 United Nations, “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Sectoral 
Consultation ‘Human Rights and the Extractive Industry’” E/CN.4/2006/92, Item 17. 
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 Many corporations are involved in stakeholder dialogues to determine corporate 
codes which would be beneficial to business and society.  For example to address the 
problems of human rights security abuses in extractive industries operating in developing 
countries, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (Voluntary Principles) 
were created.  The Voluntary Principles stem from a tripartite initiative between business 
and civil society groups, led by the United States and United Kingdom governments and 
now include the Netherlands and Norway.132   The Voluntary Principles is another 
example of a multi-stakeholder code.  The Voluntary Principles are designed to provide 
practical guidance to ensure that security arrangements carried out in the extractive 
industry are managed in accordance with human rights standards.  
In a five year overview of the principles, member companies which include many 
with significant operations in developing country such as British Petroleum, Chevron and 
Shell identified three primary strengths of the principles.133 The first is that the Voluntary 
Principles achieve their purpose of providing guidance on managing security and human 
rights.  The second is the increased credibility the tripartite approach including 
governments, NGOs and company participation gives the principles as opposed to single 
stakeholder approach.  Finally, the Voluntary Principles raise awareness to the security 
and human rights issues faced by companies.  Lack of transparency, monitoring and 
auditing were cited as weaknesses of the principles.  Companies acknowledged the need 
for independent verification to ensure the principles are actually being practiced. 
Although the Voluntary Principles were implemented in 2000, it is difficult to 
measure the impact of implementing the principles. This is regrettable, but only too 
                                                 
132 Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights online: <http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org>. 
133 Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, “Five Year Overview of the Voluntary Principles 
on Security and Human Rights”, online: <http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/reports/2005/index.php>. 
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common.  There is no independent way of determining whether companies and 
institutions are practicing the principles.  In some instances, companies have asked for 
implementation guidelines on how to engage host nations in security arrangements.  One 
attribute of the voluntary principles which companies emphasized was it value in creating 
greater recognition for CSR issues. 134   Many standards create awareness but their 
effectiveness remains to be seen.  Nevertheless, the Voluntary Principles attempt to 
identify strengths and weaknesses and its transparency in providing the feedback from 
companies is welcomed.  Many of the challenges its member companies face have been 
identified.  There must now be concerted efforts to address these concerns.  Independent 
monitoring and auditing is a step which is recommended, but no doubt will come with 
costs and other issues. As it is now, self policing measures are inadequate. 
 Many corporations are also members of the UN Global Compact.  The Global 
Compact is a classic example of a general code.  General codes address a wide range of 
social and ethical issues which typically are broad CSR issues. The Global Compact is a 
voluntary initiative of then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan launched in 2000.  The 
aim of the Global Compact is to encourage businesses to adopt ten principles which will 
showcase their commitment to corporate social responsibility, build social legitimacy, 
trust and contribute to the UN’s broad-based development and other goals such as the 
Millenium Development Goals.135  
Principle 1 and 2 relates to human rights and urges businesses to support and respect 
international human rights and make sure their own corporations are not complicit in 
human rights abuses.  Principles 3 to 6 deal with labour issues.  Principles 7 to 9 deal 
                                                 
134 Ibid. 
135 United Nations, “The Global Compact” online: UN <http://www.unglobalcompact.org>. 
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with the environment and Principle 10 anti-corruption.  Businesses are required to adopt 
core set of values within their ‘sphere of influence’.136  However, the Global Compact 
does not define ‘spheres of influence’.  The terms ‘sphere of influence’ and ‘complicity’ 
have been the subject of debates.  Steven Ratner notes corporations should be held 
responsible within their sphere of influence, when their duty relates to relationship with 
government, there is a nexus of affected population and the corporations know the people 
doing the acts and the abuses they are likely to perpetrate.137  
Ruggie, the SRSG who was appointed to look into human rights and business issues 
had a mandate which included researching and clarifying the implication for business on 
concepts such as ‘complicity’ and ‘sphere of influence.’  In a 2007 report, he stated that 
further work on corporate sphere of influence is needed to see if it can become a useful 
policy tool and requested more time to address his mandate.138  In his final report in 2008, 
he addressed the issue of corporate spheres of influence and complicity.139  According to 
Ruggie, sphere of influence can be subject to two interpretations.  The first interpretation 
relates to the human rights impacts of corporate activities which cause harm.  The second 
interpretation relates to the leverage a corporation may have over other actors that are 
causing harm.  He opines that sphere of influence as it relates to the accountability of 
corporations should be focused on the first interpretation.  The second interpretation only 
                                                 
136 See ibid., online: UN < http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html>. 
137 Alvarez, J. et al, “Symposium: The Multinational enterprise as a global citizen” (2001) 21 N.Y.L. Sch J. 
Int’l & Comp L 1 at 15. 
138 John Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and 
accountability for Corporate Acts” A/HRC/4/35, 19 February, 2007, para 9. 
139 Supra note 29.  Here, the focus is on sphere of influence as used by the global compact. For more on 
‘spheres of influence’ and ‘complicity’ see John Ruggie, “Clarifying the Concepts of “Spheres of Influence” 
and “Complicity”, Companion Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/8/16, 15 May 2008. 
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applies in particular circumstances.140  Moreover, Ruggie states it is not desirable for 
companies to act whenever they have influence particularly where governments are 
concerned.  In relation to the issue of proximity in the sphere of influence model, he 
warns against its tendency to mislead.  Rather, he says that it is the companies’ web of 
activities and relationships which should determine whether or not a human rights impact 
falls within the responsibility to respect.141 
With so much uncertainty as to the meaning of corporate spheres of influence, it is 
questionable whether businesses fully appreciate the extent to which the Global Compact 
values should be applied.  It is likely business will approach the subject from the SRSG’s 
point of view.  There are also questions whether the Global Compact is maximizing its 
potential and ability to showcase CSR, build social legitimacy and trust and contribute to 
development.  Nevertheless, the partnership and active engagement between multi-levels 
of business, civil society and government which the global compact creates is good.  The 
Global Compact has created a mass volume of awareness in CSR issues.  Its focus on 
four core areas makes it clear which standards business need to adhere to, albeit 
uncertainty lies as to its interpretation of company spheres of influence.   
Critics of the Global Compact see it as no more than an attempt to lend the legitimacy 
of the UN to corporate public relations hype.142  The voluntary nature of the Global 
Compact raises doubts as to its ability to address the important issue of accountability - 
transparency and monitoring.  The Global Compact emphasizes that it is not designed to 
monitor or measure corporate performance.  Nevertheless, aware of the importance of 
                                                 
140 Ibid. at 19. 
141 Ibid. at 20. 
142 Sol Picciotto, “Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business”, 42 Colum J Transnat’l 
L 131, 142. 
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these issues, it has put some integrity measures in place.143  Businesses are required to 
communicate their progress in implementing the Global Compact principles, but the 
Global Compact cannot guarantee the accuracy of the reports and its website is currently 
requiring individuals to review communication on progress reports online.144  It would be 
best for the Global Compact to use professionals in its reviews.  However given that CSR 
is still in its infancy, there may not yet be a core number of such professionals suitable.  It 
is submitted this is an issue the Global Compact should consider.  It may well be that the 
sheer size of participants – there are over 4,000, volume of CSR work and apparent 
bureaucratic tendencies makes it simply too difficult to assess the effectiveness and impact 
of Global Compact on corporate behavior.  
The use of the company initiated codes such as Shell Business Principles; 
multi-stakeholder codes such as EITI, Voluntary Principles; and general codes such as the 
Global Compact show business regard CSR as important.  The factors necessary for 
considering the effectiveness of soft laws already mentioned when applied to the codes 
suggests some codes may be more effective than others.  For example, company initiated 
codes like the Shell Business Principles are subscribed to by a sole business group, 
therefore, the influence stakeholders may have is likely to be limited.  Indeed in Shell’s 
case more transparency is the watchword.  On the other hand, a multi-stakeholder code 
like the EITI may be more effective.  The EITI involves multiple party subscriptions and 
has the support of multiple institutions.  The goals are well suited to business in 
extractive industries and because it involves multiple parties, interested stakeholders may 
                                                 
143 See UN Global Compact, Notes on Integrity Measures online: UN 
<http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/integrity.html>. 
144 UN Global Compact, COP Review Project online: UN 
<http://www.unglobalcompact.org/COP/Review_Project.htmliew_Project.html>. 
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have more avenues for input.  However, there is the need for more financial and 
governmental support as well as country assessment.  
But, as can be seen from the Global Compact, which is a general code, a multiplicity 
of parties and institutions does not necessarily equate to more effectiveness.  Where 
transparency, monitoring and external audits are lacking or weak as is the case with almost 
every one of the codes discussed, self-policing measure will be increasingly inadequate 
and inefficient in attempts to ensure CSR.  These discussions raise valid questions about 
the effectiveness of codes as CSR tools. 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
Corporations increasingly have to consider other stakeholders.  CSR should no longer be 
considered only in the light of profit maximization.  It is perhaps fair to say corporations 
have broader responsibilities to society, particularly in the light of global changes to CSR.   
There is an increased awareness of the need for CSR considerations especially in matters 
involving big corporations who have adequate investment protection and little 
responsibility duties.  The global changes also show the legal possibilities and awareness 
for CSR and the role of different aspects of society.  The impact and consequences of 
disregarding multi-stakeholders can be huge.  CSR is more than hype and is necessary to 
ensure corporations behave in appropriate manners.  CSR involves rules, mandatory and 
voluntary.  These rules bring CSR into legal scholarship where the effectiveness of the 
law or prospects for enforcement can be examined. 
Universal standards are emerging for CSR including those identified in this study.  
Presently, soft laws play a very important role in enforcement and accountability.  
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However, soft laws are inadequate and in some circumstances ineffective.  There is the 
real need to strengthen corporate accountability mechanisms through the use of hard law 
which provide a better scope for ensuring effective compliance.  However, hard laws 
have serious enforcement issues of their own.  These will be examined in the next 
chapter. 
The emergence of universal standards buttresses the need for regulation to bind 
business.  Voluntary regulation is inadequate.  However, there cannot be a blanket 
regulation for CSR.  It is best to address CSR regulation in components such as 
anti-bribery, environmental, sustainable development and human rights, although there 
will be many overlaps.  The next chapter will deal more extensively with anti-corruption 
as a CSR universal standard.  Corruption and the law applicable to it, both current and 
emerging take CSR out of the ‘moral’ only expectation and firmly into the ‘legal’ as well 




ANTI-CORRUPTION AS A CSR STANDARD 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter two, the emergence of universal standards of CSR was raised.  In this 
chapter, the focus will be on “anti-corruption as a CSR standard”.  The increasing 
involvement of corporations in serious corporate corrupt scandals calls for tighter reign 
on corporate responsibility.  In the area of international business, allegations of corrupt 
payments made to foreign public officials are numerous.  This chapter will address 
some of such allegations.  These allegations put anti-corruption squarely within the 
CSR discourse.  Nevertheless, until quite recently, corruption matters were not 
typically discussed under CSR.  CSR was usually seen as voluntary rules which 
companies adhered to in order to appear responsible.  CSR typically did not address 
mandatory rules companies are subject to of which anti-corruption is notable. 
The choice of the term ‘anti-corruption as a CSR standard’ aims to address 
voluntary and mandatory rules impacting CSR.  An examination of anti-corruption 
regulation is a good illustration of the relevance of laws on CSR beyond arguments that 
laws have a role in ensuring compliance of CSR standards, typically seen as voluntary 
self-governance rules adopted by corporations.  In the area of anti-corruption, many 
binding laws require corporations to shun bribery and corruption.  They provide 
sanctions for the failure to comply.  This chapter will critically examine selected 
national laws in four selected countries to determine whether enforcement and/or 
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monitoring procedures are effective especially for transnational bribery.  The different 
approaches to corporate liability; lack of corporate liability for overseas bribery of 
foreign public officials; and lack of enforcement and monitoring of binding rules in 
some countries will be highlighted. 
This chapter will also address voluntary rules adopted by corporations illustrating 
corporate willingness to embrace CSR.  The chapter will critically examine selected 
voluntary initiatives adopted by MNCs in the extractive industry.  Generally, soft law 
initiatives are classified as ineffective in the CSR debate.  However, they remain the 
main source of regulation in this area.  It is therefore necessary to adopt a critical 
analysis of these initiatives in a contextualized setting as opposed to the abstract setting 
which is so prevalent now.  The impacts and effectiveness of these initiatives, 
suggestions for improvements and limitations of such rules will be examined.   
In this chapter, the focus will be on international corruption or transnational 
bribery.1  International corruption “takes place when the payer and the receiver are 
subject to the laws of different countries”.2  International corruption is rampant both in 
the developed and developing world.  Selected examples of international corruption 
scandals involving MNCs and other business will be discussed.   
On the whole, the study of anti-corruption as a CSR standard will provide CSR 
with an organized legal framework for determining what corporate responsibility 
involves.  There is the need to incorporate both mandatory and voluntary rules and for 
                                                 
1 The terms international corruption and transnational bribery will be used interchangeably.  See the 
introduction to this study for definitions of the terms. 
2 See George Moody-Stuart, “Corruption and its victims: Introductory Paper” online: 21st century     < 
http://www.21stcenturytrust.org/corrupt.doc>. 
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corporations to move towards binding implications which are enforceable for there 
truly to be a headway in the fight against anti-corruption.  Voluntary rules which are 
on the rise are proving inadequate to ensure corporate responsibility. 
 
3.2 WHAT IS CORRUPTION? 
In the foreword to the English Corruption Bill, Lord Falconer said “Corruption is 
potentially devastating.  If not kept in check, it has the potential to cause serious 
damage to government and business – indeed to every aspect of economic and social 
life”3  Previously, corruption was restricted to the perversion or destruction of integrity 
in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favour.  Now, corruption is an 
inducement by persons, public or private to show favour or act dishonestly or 
unfaithfully in the discharge of their duties.4  Corruption is usually associated with 
public officials and the performance of public duties influenced by bribery.  However, 
increasingly it is now accepted that the act of corruption may be applicable to both 
public and private individuals spanning beyond bribery. 
Transparency International defines corruption as the misuse of public power for 
private profit5 or the misuse of entrusted power for private gain.6  The Hong Kong 
Independent Commission against Corruption defines it simply as when an individual 
                                                 
3 See Amanda Pinto & Martin Evans, Corporate Criminal Liability, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), 
p 287. 
4 See Nicholls, Daniel et al, Corruption and Misuse of Public office (New York: OUP, 2006) para 1.02 – 
1.03 
5 See supra note 2 where Moody-Stuart notes that JJ Senturia in 1931 coined this definition of 
corruption.   
6 See Introduction, Transparency International Anti-Corruption Handbook (ACH): National Integrity 
System in Practice, online: TI <http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/ach/introduction.> 
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abuses his authority for personal gain at the expense of other people.7  Corruption 
includes bribery, embezzlement, concealment and laundering of proceeds, trading in 
influence.8   
Sources of corruption include procurement, campaign finance and poor financial 
management rules.9  Procurement as a source of corruption is relevant in international 
corruption. In many instances, companies in the bid to obtain government projects are 
usually involved in corrupt practices.  To mitigate this problem, many countries have 
procurement rules.  Campaign finance and poor financial management rules are more 
prominent in political corruption which is beyond the scope of this study.  
Corruption comes in many faces, shapes and sizes.   As one writer has said “The 
face of corruption is the dying grandmother who can’t get medication because her 
family can’t bribe the nurse.”10  Corruption can be petty or grand.  Grand corruption 
is ‘the misuse of public power by heads of states, ministers and top officials for private, 
pecuniary profit’.11  Grand corruption, at least in the developing world, is usually 
international because a purely domestic transaction seldom meets the criteria which 
                                                 
7 see ICAC, online: ICAC <http://www.icac.org.hk/eng/prevt/index.html>. 
8 See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, adopted by General Assembly, 31 October 2003, 
art 13 -31.  See supra note 4 para 1.04 which notes that the UNCAC does not define corruption but 
includes some of the offences listed as corrupt criminal offences and reflects the modern tendency to 
consider corruption beyond bribery.  
9 See W.Paatii Ofosu-Amaah, Raj Soopramanien and Kishor Uprety, Combating Corruption: A 
Comparative Review of Selected Legal Aspects of State Practice and Major International Initiatives, 
(Washington: World Bank, 1999) 
10 See Noticias Info, “UN gets First International Agreement” (15 December 2005) online: noticias info 
< http://www.noticias.info/archivo/2005/200512/20051215/20051215_128259.shtm> quoting Stuart 
Gilman, Head, Anti-corruption Unit, UNODC. 
11 George Moody-Stuart, Grand Corruption in Third World Development, (Oxford, WorldView 
Publishing, 1997) p 2. 
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enable grand corruption to flourish”.12  Grand corruption involves two main activities: 
bribe payments and the embezzlement and misappropriation of state assets.  The 
chapter will address the issue of bribe payments which can either be a direct payment in 
return for showing favour or payment of part of the proceeds of a contract granted as a 
result of the bribe, called a kickback”.13  The study will focus on bribery because it is 
“a widespread phenomenon in international business transactions including trade and 
investment, which raises serious moral and political concerns, undermines good 
governance and economic development, and distorts international competitive 
conditions.”14  Bribery raises issues of CSR amongst others. 
While the research emphatically does not condone petty corruption such as that 
faced by the grandmother cited above, the focus here will be on grand corruption, 
particularly the payment of bribes by MNCs to senior officials or ministers of state.      
It is believed that a focus on such grand corruption will effect changes which will 
greatly impact petty corruption and development particularly in sub-saharan African 
countries.  If corruption is dealt with at the top levels of government, the effects are 
likely to trickle down to the lower levels of governments. 
In 2004, the World Bank reported that an estimate of more than US 1 trillion, i.e 
US 1,000 billion was paid in bribes.  The figure of US 1 trillion was based on 2001-02 
                                                 
12 See supra note 2.  The criteria are size, immediacy of rewards and secrecy. 
13 See supra note 4 at 3.  
14 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Transactions, 
17 December, 1997, OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/BR(97) 20. 
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economic data when the world economy was at just over 30 trillion.15  The World 
Bank when measuring the cost of corruption focused on measuring the extent of bribes 
from the private sector (individuals and firms) to the public sector.  They obtained 
figures on bribes from worldwide surveys of enterprises, which asked questions about 
bribes paid for the operation of firms (licenses, regulation etc), as well as bribes paid to 
get favourable decisions on public procurement. 16  World Bank data and research 
showed how some powerful corporations exert undue influence on state institutions, 
laws, regulations and policies, often through illicit means – described as state capture.   
There is a multiplicity of evidence suggesting the involvement of MNCs and other 
businesses in the payment of foreign bribes.17  This evidence calls for enhanced efforts 
to address bribery which should come from private sector and public sector initiatives 
and actions.  The chapter will now analyze examples of international bribery cases 
involving MNCs which typically are payments by corporate officials to foreign public 
officials.  Many of such cases refer to sanctions levied by the US department of Justice 




                                                 
15 See The World Bank Group, ‘The Cost of Corruption’, 8 April 2004, online: World Bank < 
<http://web.worldbank.org>.  At a UN conference in December 2003, Daniel Kaufmann had told 
reporters that he cost of corruption represents 5% of the world economy or more than 1.5 trillion dollars 
a year, see Pedro de la Llata, “Cost of Corruption at 1.5 trillion a year”, ,Agence France-Presse, 2003. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See Iheanyi Nwanchukwu, “Corruption in multinationals: Expert calls for enhanced efforts”, Business 
Day, (14 June 2006).  Online: Business day <http://www.businessdayonline.com/?c=53&a=7041>. 
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3.3 MNCS AND INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION 
In a globalizing world economy, the problems of corruption are transnational. Corrupt 
networks are often created and nurtured with money from foreign investors, 
governments and companies.18  Although MNCs are vehicles of development, they are 
also harbingers of corruption.  They are chief participants in the supply side of 
corruption, giving bribes.  They are involved in making facilitation payments to public 
officials to grease the wheels for speedy receipt of contract awards.  Much has been 
written about whether they ‘grease’ or ‘sand’ the wheels.  They also make commission 
payments to third parties/agents in the process of obtaining contract awards.  The 
following examples will illustrate the activities of MNCs as chief participants in the 
supply side of corruption, through payments made to senior foreign public officials in 
the pursuit of lucrative contracts.  Such payments are mostly made through third party 
agents or intermediaries. 
 
3.3.1 Examples of International Corruption 
1. In October 2006, the US Department of Justice reported that Statoil ASA, 
headquartered in Norway and listed on the New York Stock Exchange in order to 
resolve pending criminal investigation, acknowledged making bribe payments to an 
Iranian official in order to secure valuable oil and gas rights in Iran.  Statoil violated 
the FCPA by making the corrupt payments and characterizing the bribes as consulting 
fees.  Statoil agreed to pay a $10.5 million penalty and entered into a three-year 
                                                 
18 See Transparency International news room, G8 summit 2005 in focus, online: Transparency 
International <http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2005/g8_summit/faq>. 
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deferred prosecution agreement. The circumstances involving the conduct was that in 
2001, Statoil developed contacts with an Iranian government official who was believed 
to have influence over the award of oil and gas contracts in Iran. 
Following a series of negotiations with the Iranian official in 2001 and 2002, Statoil 
entered into consulting contract with an offshore intermediary company. The purpose 
of that consulting contract which called for the payment of more than $15 million over 
11 years was to induce the Iranian official to use his influence to assist Statoil in 
obtaining a contract to develop portions of the South Pars field and to open doors to 
additional Iranian oil and gas projects in the future. Two bribe payments totaling more 
than $5 million were actually made by wire transfer through a New York bank account, 
and Statoil was awarded a South Pars development contract that was expected to yield 
millions of dollars in profit.  
The Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission inquiries 
concerned corrupt payments, false books and records, and inadequate internal controls. 
Statoil agreed to the appointment of an independent compliance consultant, who will 
review and periodically report on the company compliance during the three-year term 
of the agreement. If the company fulfills its obligations under the deferred prosecution 
agreement, after three years the criminal charges against it will be dismissed.19 
 
                                                 
19 See US Department of Justice, “US. Resolves probe Against Oil Company that bribed Iranian 
Official” (13 October 2006) online: USDOJ 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/October/06_crm_700.html>. 
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2. In January 2005, the US Department of Justice charged Monsanto, a global 
producer of agricultural products, for making an illegal payment to a senior Indonesian 
official for the approval and licenses necessary to sell its product in Indonesia and with 
falsely certifying the bribe as ‘consultant fees’ in the company’s book.  Prosecution 
was deferred for three years and Monsanto paid US$1million.20 
 
3. In July 2004, ABB Vetco Gray, Inc. and ABB Vetco Gray U.K, the US and UK 
subsidiaries of Swiss Compay, ABB Ltd. each pled guilty to FCPA violations in their 
pursuit of oil and gas construction contracts in Nigeria.  The companies had paid more 
than US$1million in bribes to Nigerian officials for confidential bid information and 
favourable recommendations. Officials of National Petroleum Investment Management 
Services, a Nigerian government agency that evaluated and approved potential bidders 
for contract work on oil exploration projects in Nigeria, including bidders seeking 
subcontracts with foreign oil and gas companies, were the recipients of the bribes. ABB 
Ltd., the parent company voluntarily disclosed the suspicious payment to the Justice 
Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Each subsidiary paid a 
criminal fine of US$5.25million.  The parent company also agreed to disgorge 
                                                 





US$6million in profits and to hire outside consultants to review its system of internal 
controls under civil fines.21 
 
4. In 2003, the United States, France and Nigeria, began investigations into 
accusations that a subsidiary of Halliburton, Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), paid 
$180 million in bribes in an effort to win a natural gas project contract.22  KBR owned 
25% of a joint venture, known as TSKJ, incorporated in Madeira, Portugal.  Other 
partners each with 25 % included Technip SA France, ENI SpA of Italy and Japan 
Gasoline Corporation23.  In 1994, TSKJ was interested in winning a bid to build a 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant in Nigeria.  In March 1995, Mr. Tessler, a British 
lawyer was hired as TSKJ’s agent.  Agreements were made to pay Tessler at least $160 
million to be put into Swiss and Monaco bank accounts. Tessler was known to have 
contacts with Nigerian government including the dictator at the time, General Sani 
Abacha.  In December 1995, TSKJ was awarded the LNG contract.  In 1999, TSKJ 
was awarded another contract to expand the construction of the LNG gas plant.   
The investigations began in France by the well known French Magistrate Renaud 
Van Ruymbeke who noted that the payments to Tessler which were termed ‘advisory 
fees’ were unjustified.  In the U.S, investigations were carried out by the Justice 
                                                 
21 Ibid. at 11.  See also US Department of Justice, “ABB Vetco Gray Inc. and ABB VEtco Gray UK Ltd. 
Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges”, online:USDOJ 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/July/04_crm_465.htm > dated 6 July 2004. 
22 See, Joel Brinkley, “Halliburton Likely to Be a Campaign Issue This Fall” New York Times (14 
February 2004) online: New York Times <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0214-06.htm>.  
23 CBS News, “Bribery Probe of Haliburton Unit” (5 February 2004) online: CBS News 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/02/13/national/main600275.shtml>.  
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Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission under the FCPA.  Under the 
FCPA, Halliburton may be liable for the alleged bribes paid by KBR if it authorized, 
participated or knowingly permitted such corrupt payments.  In Nigeria, the Senate 
voted to summon CEO of Haliburton, David Leslar, to answer questions on the alleged 
bribery investigations. It issued a report which recommended that Halliburton and 
TSKJ be disqualified from bidding on future government projects. It denounced what it 
called Halliburton's ‘hide-and-seek games’ to avoid questions from government 
investigators.24  
The Halliburton investigation has received wide media coverage in different parts 
of the world and is still ongoing.  In 2006, the Financial Times, UK reported that KBR 
is being investigated by Britain’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in connection with the 
alleged corrupt payments in Nigeria.25  In September 2006 and October 2007, the SEC 
and DOJ respectively requested Halliburton to enter into agreements to extend the 
statute of limitation with respect to the investigations.26  As recently as April 2008, 
Halliburton confirmed it was co-operating with SEC and DOJ investigations as well as 
investigations in France, Nigeria, Switzerland.  It also confirmed that the SFO is 
conducting investigations into the matter.27   
                                                 
24 See Halliburton Watch, Halliburton and Nigeria: A Chronology of Key Events in the Unfolding 
Bribery Scandal online: Halliburton Watch < 
http://www.halliburtonwatch.org/about_hal/nigeria_timeline.html>. 
25 See Michael Peel, “Probe into KBR Role in Nigerian Bribe Case, Financial Times (7 August 2006) 
26 See Excerpt from Halliburton’s 10-Q Sec Filing dated 25 April, 2008, online: SEC  
<http://sec.edgar-online.com/2008/04/25/0000045012-08-000242/Section7.asp> at 9. 
27 Ibid. at 10. 
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The investigations which initially started with allegations of the payment of 
USD180million have led to further investigations of allegations of other illicit 
payments.  For example, the services of an agent of KBR or Halliburton were 
suspended in connection with the Shell EA Project because possible improper conduct 
was discovered or alleged; or Halliburton and KBR were unable to confirm the agent’s 
compliance with applicable law and the code of business conduct.28   
The implications of a finding of FCPA violations in investigations of this 
magnitude would be huge.  In terms of monetary penalties, Halliburton has said as of 
31 March, 2008, “we are unable to estimate an amount of probable loss or range of 
possible loss related to these matters as it related to Halliburton directly”.29  With 
regards to KBR, Halliburton separated from it in 2007, but has provided KBR an 
indemnification in respect of the Nigerian Bribery Investigations.30  The estimated 
value of indemnification was put at USD190 million.31  The investigation could also 
result in a series of third-party claims against Halliburton.32 
 
5. In 1988, in return for a helicopter contract, the Belgium Socialist party took bribes 
from Augusta, an Italian helicopter producing company.  In 1995, the then Nato 
Secretary, Mr. Willy Claes, was questioned by police as he was the Belgian economic 
                                                 
28 Ibid. at 11. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. at 6. 
32 Ibid. at 11. 
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minister at the time of the bribes.33  In the late 1990s, numerous Socialist party 
members were involved in a trial exposing corrupt political and financial practices.34  
During the inquiry into the case, Etienne Mange, ex-treasurer for the Socialist party 
declared he received bribes from Dassault, a French company, in order to obtain the 
contract for anti-radar equipment to be installed on F-16  aeroplanes belonging to 
Belgian Military air force. 35  Interestingly, in 1997, Savona and Mezzanotte note that 
“neither the Italian nor French courts have, however, been able to prosecute the 
corruptors for the payment of these bribes …”36  This particular example shows that 
bribery occurs in both developed and developing countries.  It also shows how bribery 
was perceived in Europe prior to the development of and rise in global efforts to curb 
corruption.  Previously, in many parts of Europe, foreign bribery was not a crime.   
 
6. Another example which shows Europe’s prior perception of foreign bribery is the 
case of alleged payments made in the late 1980 and the early 90s by Elf the French oil 
company whilst it was still under state ownership.  The allegations concerned the 
keeping of a slush fund allegedly used to pay bribes via Swiss accounts to African 
leaders and to channel money to two main French political parties.  Commentators 
have pointed out that at the time of these payments, party funding rules were loose and 
                                                 
33 David Swan, “Claes/Corruption” Voice of America (6 October 1995) online: HRI  
<http://www.hri.org/news/usa/voa/1995/95-10-06_1.voa.html#05>. 




35 Supra note 1. 
36 Ibid. at 107. 
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paying bribes to foreign officials was legal and so the company may not have broken 
French law.37   The same cannot be said for bribery payments taking place now.  
France ratified the UNCAC in 2005 and foreign bribery payments are no longer legal. 
 
7. The recent case of Siemens which is battling revelations of alleged corruption and 
proven misconduct is a good example of the change in perceptions of foreign bribery.  
A Munich court recently held Siemens accountable and fined it for illegal conduct of 
giving bribes.  As with most of the other examples stated above, investigations are 
currently being carried out under the FCPA.  The US Securities and Exchange 
Commission is currently investigating whether Siemens employees paid 100s of 
million of Euros in bribes to win telecommunications and other contracts. Siemens is 
currently in talks with SEC to broker a settlement which will save the company paying 
fines which may reach an unprecedented US 2billion.38 
 The difference in outcome between the Elf saga and the Siemens saga can be 
reduced to the time when the alleged misconduct happened and the applicability of 
relevant foreign bribery laws.  The Elf saga happened when foreign bribery payments 
were still accepted as the norm in many states outside the U.S.  There were no 
allegations that French laws on foreign bribery were broken, indeed the case which 
brought the matter to light was in relation to a criminal trial for embezzlement by senior 
                                                 
37 Peter Gumbel, “Gushing Greenbacks”, Time Magazine (27 April 2003) online: Time 
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901030505-447190,00.html>. 
38 David Gow, “Siemens chairman appeals for leniency from US authorities over bribery scandal” 
Guardian Unlimited (24 January 2008). online: Guardian 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/jan/24/europe>. 
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officials of the company at the time.  The Siemens saga on the other hand, happened at 
a time when a wave of foreign anti-bribery sentiment was sweeping the globe.      
The above examples of transnational bribery show that it is still very rampant in 
international business and much still needs to be done to prevent it.  The above 
analysis has mainly focused on attempts to impose sanctions through the FCPA on 
erring companies.  This may suggest that mandatory rules provide more scope for 
corporate liability.  However, as will be seen from the section on the impact on 
mandatory rules, there is the need for a serious focus on improving effectiveness even 
where mandatory laws are applicable, especially in countries other than the United 
States.  For the present, the focus will now turn to the impact of voluntary rules.       
 
3.3.2 Accountability 
3.3.2.1 Selected Voluntary Rules 
There are many principles, guidelines and initiatives which are non-binding and 
voluntarily created to help business counter bribery and corruption.  The Global 
Compact discussed in chapter II urges business to work against corruption.  The 
initiatives which will be discussed here are multilateral agency codes geared towards 





3.3.2.1.1 Transparency International’s Business Principles for Countering 
Corruption (TI Business Principles). 
The TI Business Principles were facilitated by TI and Social Accountability 
International and developed in 2002.  Private sector companies, NGOs and trade 
unions were very useful and active in the development of the principles.  The aim of 
the TI principles is to ‘provide practical guidance for countering bribery, creating a 
level playing field and providing a long-term business advantage’.  The TI principles 
call for companies to have zero tolerance to bribery and a commitment to the 
implementation of an anti-bribery programme.  In November 2004, TI published a 
guidance document to help companies implement or review their anti-bribery 
programmes/practices. 39  
Like many of the initiatives which will be discussed in this chapter, the TI 
principles create awareness of the need to counter corruption in international business. 
However, it is very difficult to determine the impact of the TI Business Principles on 
companies.  The TI principles are simply a guide for companies to use in 
implementing their own anti-bribery programmes if they choose.  There is no way of 
gauging the number of companies using the principles.  There is no independent 
information on feedback from companies which have applied the principles to 
determine their effect.  Any information on feedback is gleaned from the social or 
sustainability reports of individual companies.  The efficacy of the principles is 
                                                 




therefore suspect.  There is no external mechanism for enforcing compliance.  The 
principles are seen as a valuable ‘content’ for the anti-corruption principle of the Global 
compact; starting point for implementation of a no-bribe policy by industry sectors; and 
as a potential pre-qualification requirement for bidders on internationally funded 
projects.40  In essence the principles cannot stand alone but rely on other principles to 
be impactful.   
 
3.3.2.1.2 World Economic Forum Partnering Against Corruption Principles for 
Countering Bribery (PACI Principles).   
The Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) was launched in partnership with 
TI and the Basel Institute on Governance in January 2004, at the WEF annual meeting.  
The WEF believes MNC have a particularly important role to play in upholding and 
advancing principles on human rights, labour, environmental and anti-corruption.  The 
aim of PACI was to rally business leaders, governments, civil servants and legislators 
behind the fight against corruption;41 as well as consolidate private sector efforts to 
fight bribery and corruption and shape the evolving regulatory framework.42  The 
PACI Principles are based on TI Business Principles and like the TI Business 
Principles, they call for a commitment to Zero tolerance policy towards bribery; and 
                                                 
40 D Nussbaum, “Strengthening Good Governance at the National Level”, UNCTAD Expert Meeting on 
Good Governance in Investment Promotion, Geneva, Switzerland. 
41 See World Economic Forum Newsletter, “The Fight against Corruption is a Global Priority” online: 
World Economic Forum 
<http://www.weforum.org/documents/Newsletter/105/nl_1_05_en_seite6.html>. 
42 See World Economic Forum , “What is the role of Business in advancing economic and development 
and social progress?” online: World Economic Forum 
<http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/index.htm>. 
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development of a practical and effective implementation programme by companies.  
They also create awareness to corruption issues facing international business.  
Unlike the TI Principles, the PACI principles need to be adopted by companies.  
As of June 2008, the WEF website lists 140 signatory companies to the PACI.  The 
need for adoption by companies suggests there would be a better scope for 
accountability than is available with the TI Business principles.  The PACI requires 
companies to submit a self-assessment within two years of adoption.  However, the 
self assessments are not publicly available on the PACI website and it is therefore 
uncertain when and if companies provide the assessments.  The website simply states 
it will publish signatory company status with respect to stages reached at the end of 
2007.  It also notes that a PACI version of the TI Self-Evaluation model is under 
development.43  External verification or third party certification is optional and the 
achievers survey recently carried out by PACI suggests that companies do not use 
external accountability mechanism.  To illustrate the point, a survey involving 61 
PACI companies, only 24% had external verification of their anti-corruption 
programmes.44 
It is submitted that the ability of PACI to compel corporate responsibility is 
questionable because of the involvement of its members in corruption related 
investigations and prosecutions.  Since the PACI principles were developed, a number 
of its founding members and/or their subsidiaries have been under investigations and/or 
                                                 
43 See online: WEF 
<http://www.weforum.org/fweblive/groups/public/documents/wef_media/PACI3stage.jpg>. 
44 See online: WEF 
<http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/paci/HighlightingAchieversSurvey/index.htm>. 
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prosecutions for corrupt practices.45  In July 2004, two subsidiaries of ABB Ltd each 
pled guilty to FCPA violations in connection with their pursuit of oil and gas 
construction contracts in Nigeria.46  In October 2006, the USDOJ reported that Statoil 
acknowledged making bribe payments to an Iranian official in order to secure valuable 
oil and gas rights in Iran.47   
The effectiveness of PACI is also questionable because of the failure of adoption 
by companies involved in its evolution.  A number of companies involved in its 
evolution are not PACI members.  A 2005 WEF newsletter listed Chevron Texaco as a 
first signatory of the PACI.48  However, the current table of signatories does not 
include Chevron Texaco.49  Cheveron Texaco was involved in the evolution of the 
PACI, but is not yet a member of PACI.50  Japan National Oil Corporation and Saudi 
Aramco are two other companies involved in its evolution,51 yet reluctant to sign the 
principles.  These companies were part of fourteen Multi-industry and multi-regional 
PACI task force involved in the overall Process of the PACI Principles.52  Further, 
there were ten Engineering and Construction member companies involved in the 
                                                 
45 ABB Ltd and Statoil were among the first signatories to the PACI principles in January 2004, see also 
supra note 41. 
46 See discussions on “Examples of International Corruption “above, p 73ff.  See also supra note 21. 
47 United States Department of Justice “US Resolves Probe against Oil Company that Bribed Iranian 
Official” online: USDOJ <http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/October/06_crm_700.html>.  
48 See supra note 41. 
49 See online: WEF <http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/paci/Signatories/index.htm>. 
50 World Economic Forum , “Partnering Against Corruption Principles for Countering Bribery” online: 
WEF < http://www.weforum.org/pdf/paci/principles.pdf>. 
51 Ibid. 
52 The other eleven are signatories namely, ABB; Alcan; Eskom; Fluor Corporation; Hochtief; Newmont 
Mining Corporation; Occidental Petroleum Corporation; Pakistan State Oil Company; PETRONAS; 
Skanska; Statoil Group. 
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derivation process of the PACI Principles.53  One of them, The Morganti Group is not 
listed as a PACI signatory.54  The failure to adopt the principles by such companies 
coupled with the inability or threat of serious implications raises doubts about the 
ability of PACI to widely compel corporate responsibility against corruption.  
The TI principles and PACI illustrate rather well the partnership which can take 
place between soft law initiatives and hard laws in the CSR agenda.  They are useful 
tool for fighting corruption.  They create awareness of the need for companies to have 
a zero tolerance to bribery and to develop anti-corruption programmes.  Whether 
companies are actually able to have a zero tolerance to bribery is questionable.  The 
failure of the TI principles to ensure implementation of anti-bribery policies makes it 
inadequate to curb corruption.  Although the PACI requires more commitments, there 
are doubts about it ability to compel CSR against corruption.  Anti-bribery laws with 
adequate and effective enforcement have the potential to ensure compliance.   
Currently, international anti-bribery laws mainly lack adequate enforcement 
mechanisms and cannot curb bribery by itself.  Overseas bribery by companies is still 
very prevalent despite the existence of international anti-bribery laws criminalizing this 
practice.55  Corruption is still a huge global issue.56  Therefore, effective use of both 
                                                 
53 Supra note 50. 
54 See World Economic Forum online: WEF 
<http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/paci/Signatories/index.htm>. The other nine members are 
ABB; AMEC; Fluor Corporation; Halcrow Group, Hilti Corporation; Hochtief; Obayahsi Corporation; 
Skanska; SNC-Lavalian International. 
55 Transparency International, “Leading Exporters Undermine Development with Dirty Business 
Overseas” online: TI < http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2006/bpi_2006>. 
56 Control Risks , “International Business Attitudes to Corruption: Survey”, online: control risks < 
http://www.control-risks.com/PDF/corruption_survey_2006_V3.pdf>. 
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soft law initiatives and hard law can compel compliance and ensure CSR against 
corruption.    
 
3.3.2.1.3 International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conduct and 
Recommendations for Combating Extortion and Bribery (The ICC Rules).   
The ICC Rules are a self-regulation tool57 first published in 1977 and later revised in 
1996 and 1999.  In 2005, the ICC Rules were further revised. 58  The need to fight 
extortion, solicitation and private to private corruption were integrity issues brought to 
light in the 2005 revised rules.59  However, this study’s focus is on the ICC’s stance 
against the supply side of bribery which MNCs are guilty of.  In this respect, like the 
other editions of the Rules, the 2005 edition do not have direct legal effect, but rather 
constitute good commercial practice.  They call for enterprises to conform to the 
relevant laws and regulations of the countries in which they are established and in 
which they operate, and observe both the letter and spirit of these Rules of conduct.60  
The Rules require among others, enterprises to prohibit bribery and extortion at all 
                                                 
57 See International Chamber of Commerce, “Policy and Business Practice: Anti-corruption – ICC tools 
for Self -Regulation’ online: ICC < http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/anticorruption/id870/index.html>. 
58 See International Chamber of Commerce, “Combating Extortion and Bribery: ICC Rules of Conduct 
and Recommendations”  2005 Edition, online: ICC 
<http://www.icc.se/policy/mutor/iccrules2005.pdf>.  
59 The 2005 Edition define Extortion or Solicitation as the demand of a bribe, whether or not coupled 
with a threat if the demand is refused.  In the Rules, bribery includes extortion.   




times and in any form; implement corporate policies and codes; and ensure 
compliance.61  
The ICC’s belief that business operates most effectively with minimum 
government intervention inspires its many voluntary codes,62 including the ICC Rules.  
The ICC’s stance on the fight against corruption is shaped by its Anti-corruption 
commission.  The commission encourages self-regulation by enterprises in 
confronting issues of extortion and bribery and provides business input into 
international initiatives to fight corruption.63  The ICC has published a corporate 
practices manual which aims to provide detailed practical guidance for compliance 
with the ICC rules and OECD Convention.64   
While the ICC has made many complimentary moves to curb bribery in 
international business, the main criticism here against the ICC is the voluntary nature of 
its rules contrasted with its call for business to comply with laws in countries in which 
they operate as well as obey the letter and spirit of the Rules.  The letter and spirit of 
the Rules is for companies to prohibit bribery and extortion at all times and in all 
forms.65  However, if companies do not observe the rules, nothing can be done.  It is 
left for governments to enforce anti-corruption laws.  This suggests that the 
enforcement of anti-corruption is the business of national governments and the 
                                                 
61 See Ibid. 1, 7 and 9 of the rules. 
62 See International Chamber of Commerce, “What is ICC?” online: ICC 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/id93/index.html >.  
63 See International Chamber of Commerce, “Policy and Business Practice: Anti-corruption” online: 
ICC < http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/anticorruption/>.  
64 See Francois Vincke & Fritz Heimann eds., Fighting Corruption: A corporate Practices Manual 
(France: ICC Publication 652, 2003). 
65 See supra note 58. 
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international community.  Where national governments do not have effective laws, 
then anti-corruption is unlikely to be prohibited or eradicated.   
However, on the face of it, the ICC believes ‘Enterprises continue to have – and in 
future will probably more than ever have – a pivotal role in determining the integrity of 
business conduct’.  Yet, they believe ‘[s]elf-regulation within the enterprise is the 
surest way to be certain of maximum compliance’.66  It is argued that in matters of 
international corruption, which concern ICC gravely, effective national laws may even 
be insufficient.  This is because international corruption necessarily involves 
corruption on transnational levels, i.e corruption in more than one state, affecting 
different laws.  Thus, national governments would need to have overreaching or 
extraterritorial laws.  But, even then, such laws can only be applicable to their 
nationals or national security interests.  Therefore, while it is accepted that the 
eradication of corruption lie mainly with governments and the international 
community, in view of the complexities such eradication/prohibition face, companies 
are urged to willingly accept the ICC rules on a binding basis.   
The ICC should consider sanctions for corporations that do not comply with its 
principles.  The ICC is a powerful body capable of implementing change in the 
corporate world.  An acceptance of ICC rules on a binding basis by companies would 
at the very least suggest corporate seriousness in the pursuit of a less corrupt global 
world.  While it is accepted that this seems highly impossible, given the ICC’s stance 
on self-regulation and the fact that such acceptance will probably have problems of its 
                                                 
66 See supra note 64. 
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own.  For instance universal application of acceptance of a binding basis will be 
difficult and enforcement mechanisms will need to be put in place to ensure 
compliance.  It is still noteworthy to include arguments for the need for a binding basis 
of the ICC rules in a discussion on corruption and corporate social responsibility. 
On the whole, despite the popularity and prevalence of non-binding rules for 
curbing corruption in international business, it has been shown that non-binding rules 
by themselves are inadequate and ineffective to ensure corporate responsibility for 
corrupt practices.  The study will now address the issue of mandatory or binding rules 
to see what impact it has on anti-corruption as a CSR standard and what needs to be 
done to improve effectiveness. 
 
3.3.2.2 Selected Mandatory Criminal Rules 
Binding rules for corruption typically aim to criminalize bribery.  In this study, such 
binding rules will be divided into domestic/extraterritorial laws and international laws.  
This chapter will address domestic/extraterritorial laws, focusing on four selected 
countries, namely - United Kingdom, United States, Nigeria and Singapore.  The aim 
is three fold.  The first is to examine the different approaches of each country to 
corporate criminal liability for bribery of both domestic and foreign public officials.  
The second is to examine the different approaches to extra-territorial transnational 
bribery laws involving MNCs headquartered in the state and foreign public officials 
where applicable.  The third aim is to examine the effectiveness of enforcement 
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mechanisms in place to ensure compliance with the domestic/extraterritorial law.  The 
subsequent chapter will address international law concerns. 
In analyzing the different approaches to corporate liability and transnational 
bribery, the features of any state law which are preferable will be highlighted.  Of the 
four selected countries, the United States is the most active in holding corporations 
liable for corruption.  While all four selected countries have domestic provisions for 
corporate criminal responsibility for the bribery of domestic public officials, not all 
four countries actually hold corporations guilty when involved in such crimes. For 
example, in the UK, a reason for the lack of corporate responsibility for corrupt crimes 
is the problem of a concept of ‘corporate criminal responsibility’ as opposed to 
‘individual criminal responsibility’ creates.   
With regard to corporate criminal liability for overseas or foreign bribery, not all of 
the four selected countries have overseas bribery laws applicable to companies.  The 
UK and US have overseas bribery laws for legal persons, including corporations.  
Singapore has overseas bribery laws for its citizens alone, but it is not clear whether this 
applies to legal persons and Nigeria does not have overseas bribery laws for companies.  
Even in countries where there are extra-territorial laws applicable to companies, such as 
the UK, there is still a very low record of corporate investigations and prosecutions for 
violations of the extra-territorial anti-bribery laws.  A reason for this may be the lack 
of political will power to regulate activities which occur outside the Home State.  The 
cost of such investigations or prosecutions may be another factor preventing a rise in 
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number of such investigations or prosecutions.  The study will now address the 
different laws in more detail. 
 
3.3.2.2.1 United Kingdom 
A company incorporated in the UK may be found liable for corruption.67  English law 
recognizes a variety of legal persons, all of whom are distinct from their members and 
may become involved in corrupt transactions either as offenders or as victims.68    
Corporations can be convicted of common law and statutory offences including 
offences requiring mens rea.69   
Corporations can be held liable for corruption under the common law offence of 
bribery and four main Acts.  The common law offence of bribery is the receiving or 
offering of any undue reward by or to any person whatsoever, in a public office, in 
order to influence his behaviour in office, and incline him to an act contrary to the 
known rules of honesty and integrity.70   The four main Acts71 are namely: 
(1) The Public Bodies Corrupt Act 1889 which makes the active or passive bribery 
of a member, officer or servant of a public body, a criminal offence;72 
                                                 
67 See supra note 4, para 2.82-2.83.  
68 Ibid.  Legal persons include public and private companies, limited liability partnerships, and 
European Economic Interest Groupings, see ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See J.W. Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime, 12th ed, (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964) p 381.  For a 
detailed analysis on the common law offence of bribery, see ibid. at para 2.07 ff.   
71 The first three acts listed are commonly known as the Prevention of Corruption Acts in the UK.  The 
fourth act applies to extraterritorial corrupt practices.    
72 See Amanda Pinto & Martin Evans, Corporate Criminal Liability, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) 
p 289-292. Active bribery refers to the offering or giving, while passive bribery refers to the soliciting or 
receiving of bribes, see also supra note 4 at para 2.05.  
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(2) The Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 extends to agents the offences created 
by the 1889 Act in relation to public officers;73 and deals with both public and 
private sector corruption;74 
(3) The Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 adds to the 1906 act by imposing a 
presumption of corruption in the case of public bodies.  If a person gives 
money, gift or other consideration to an employee of a public office, the money, 
gift or consideration shall be presumed corrupt unless the accused proves 
otherwise;75   
(4) The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA), includes 
legislation on bribery and corruption. 76   It is extra-territorial in nature, 
strengthening the law on international corruption.  It came into force on 14 
February 2002 and aims to deter UK companies and nationals from committing 
acts of bribery overseas thereby implementing the OECD Convention on 
Corruption.  The act ensures that any common law offence of bribery, offences 
under section 1 of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 and the first 
two offences under section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 are 
corrupt offences under the act.77  The act also ensures that under the common 
law offence of bribery, the public officer who receives or is offered the bribe 
                                                 
73 See Pinto ibid. at 293-296. 
74 See supra note 4 at para 2.31 -2.32.  
75 ibid at 295.  See s.2 Prevention of Corruption Act 1916.  See also OECD, “Steps Taken by the 
United Kingdom to Implement and Enforce the Convention on Combating Bribery and Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, online: OECD <www.oecd.org>. 
76 See part 12 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001. 
77 Ibid., s.109. 
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need not be connected to the UK and that the public body could be outside the 
UK.78   The presumption of corruption found in the Prevention of Corruption 
Act 1916 does not apply to this act.79   
In 1998, a law commission report recommended that the common law offence of 
bribery and the Prevention of Corruption Acts should be replaced by a modern statute.80  
A Corruption Bill was published in draft on 24 March 2003.  On 17 July 2003, the 
Joint Committee of both Houses produced a report in consideration of the bill.81  The 
draft Bill is meant to replace the existing UK law on corruption.     
Under the existing UK law, in order to hold a company liable for corruptly offering 
or paying a bribe under the 1889 or 1906 Acts, the prosecution must prove that the 
company officer involved had the necessary status and authority to make his acts the 
acts of the company.82  This principle is known as the identification doctrine and it 
seems to be derived from the House of Lords case of Tesco Supermarket Ltd v Natrass 
where Lord Reid said 
“A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent 
and he has hands to carry out his intentions.  A corporation has none of these: it 
must act through living persons, though not always one or the same person.  Then 
the person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company.  He is acting as the 
company and his mind which directs his acts is the mind of the company…He is an 
                                                 
78 Ibid., s.108. 
79 Ibid., s.110. 
80 See Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption (Law Com No 248), 1998. 
81 See HL Paper 157; HC 705. 
82 See Pinto supra note 72 at 296.  The authors cite R v Andrews Weatherfoil Ltd (1972) 56 
Cr.App.R.31 as authority. 
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embodiment of the company or, one could say, he hears and speaks through the 
persona of the company, within his appropriate sphere, and his mind is the mind of 
the company.  If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of the company.”83   
It is argued that the same principle is likely to hold for corporate liability under the 
ATCSA which deals with overseas bribery; and that if that is the case the problems 
associated with this doctrine will be magnified in cases involving transnational bribery. 
There has been much debate about the suitability of the identification doctrine to 
attribution of acts of bribery by legal persons, especially where large corporations are 
concerned.84  The UK law does not allow for aggregation of the states of minds of 
different people in the company85 and there have been calls for the need for UK law to 
consider this approach especially where large corporations are concerned.  Nicholls et 
al have pointed out that  
“there had been a history of disquiet as to the director/controlling mind test and 
ongoing requests for government to come up with an alternative.  In the context of 
transnational bribery, in particular, it has to be recognized that the common law test 
                                                 
83 [1972] A.C 153 at 170 (House of Lords). 
84 See Jonathan Clough & Carmel Mulhern, The Prosecution of Corporations, (Melbourne: OUP, 2002) 
90 ff.  For discussions on corporate criminal liability, see Jenifer Ross, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: 
One form or many forms?’ (1999) The Juridical Review, 49; Matthew Goode, Corporate Criminal 
Liability, Environmental Crime, online: 
AIC<http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/proceedings/26/goode.pdf>. 
85 See UK: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating 
Bribery in International Business Transactions, 17 March 2005, para 200.  
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does not permit the creation of a corporate intent by simply aggregating the states 
of mind of more than one person within the corporation”.86   
Another doctrine related to the identification doctrine which has been proposed to deal 
with the impasse caused by an application of the identification doctrine is the Meridian 
test.87  The meridian test aims to broaden the identification doctrine by holding that the 
rule of attribution should be a matter of interpretation or construction of the relevant 
substantive rule; i.e attribution should depend upon the purposes of the provisions 
creating the relevant offences.  However, the application of this test to bribery offences 
has been questioned88 and it is unlikely to be adopted in the UK for bribery offences. 
 So far the chapter has dealt with the problems prosecuting bodies will face in 
attempts to hold corporations liable.  As noted in the ‘Selected Criminal Rules’ section 
in this chapter, this is one of the reasons why corporations are not held accountable for 
corruptly giving bribes.  The process of singling out person(s) whose acts constitute 
the acts of the company and can be said to be the mind of the company in big MNCs is 
bound to be problematic.  Corporate decision making in such cases is complex and 
does not only involve the top tier or management.  The decisions which gave rise to the 
corrupt giving may be initiated at lower levels of management and/or employees.  The 
identification theory is more suited to the small company or partnership and ill-suited to 
the MNCs.   
                                                 
86 See supra note 4 at para 10.74. 
87 The Meridian test was set forth in the Privy Council case of Meridian Global Funds Asia Ltd v 
Securities Commission, [1952] 2 AC 500. 
88 See supra note 84 at paras 198-199. 
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In any case, the U.K government is yet to show a serious interest in curbing 
overseas bribery.  From 1997 – 2004, seven years spanning the period during which 
the UK signed the OECD anti-bribery convention and passed the ATCSA to enable 
prosecutions to be brought against UK nationals and companies for overseas 
corruption, no company or individual was prosecuted.89  Further only two out of 
twenty allegations of overseas bribery were under formal investigation.90   The UK 
laws are not very effective because the failure to prosecute is not as a result of a lack of 
allegations but as a result of a lack of political will and allocation of relevant resources. 
Since 2004, there has been an increase in the number of full investigations (19), but 
there have only been two prosecutions.91  In June 2005, then Secretary of State for 
Home Department reported 41 allegations of overseas corruption. 92   Of the 41 
allegations, the majority were for corruption taking place in Africa with 15 reports held 
by the criminal Intelligence Service.  However, there were also allegations of 
corruption taking place in Europe (11 reports), Middle East (5 reports) and South Asia 
(4 reports), North America (3 reports) amongst others.93 The Secretary of State for the 
                                                 
89 Susan Hawley and Andrew Philips, “Bribery Begins at Home: If Africa is to Overcome Corruption the 
West will have to clean up its own act” The Guardian (6 October 2004) online < Guardian 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1320519,00.html>. 
90 Ibid.  
91 See OECD, supra note 75. 
92 See House of Common Hansard Written Answers to Question: Overseas Corruption, 20 June 2005: 
Column 767w online: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/cm050620/text/50620w31.htm#50620
w31.html_spnew6. 
93 The other countries with allegations held by the criminal intelligenc service include Latin America 
(two reports), the Carribean (two reports) and the Pacific (one report). 
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Home Department also noted there were 44 referrals on the ATCSA register. 94  
Nevertheless, the 2005 phase 2 report of the UK on implementation of the OECD 
Anti-bribery Convention expressed surprise at the absence of prosecutions for foreign 
bribery in the UK since the country signed the convention.95  Possible reasons cited for 
the absence included the need to present a relatively high amount of evidence to 
commence an investigation and limited resources for investigation.96   
In June 2006, 35 overseas bribery allegations were vetted to see if there was 
sufficient evidence to open a case, 13 active investigations were carried out in England 
and Wales, with one active investigation in Scotland.97  However, it is interesting to 
note that in the same month, the International Herald Tribune reported an executive 
director of Transparency International as saying that the UK did not have a single 
prosecution of foreign bribers.98  A good example of the UK’s lack of political will in 
prosecuting companies for overseas bribery can be seen in the 2006 decision of the SFO 
to stop investigations into bribery investigations involving BAE and Saudi Arabia 
                                                 
94 See Overseas Corruption, 20 Jun 2005: Column 767w online: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/cm050620/text/50620w31.htm#50620
w31.html_spnew6>.  Of the reports from Africa, none were from North Africa. 
95 See OECD Observer, “Testing the Convention” dated April 2007.  Online OECD < 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/2161/Testing_the_convention.html>. 
96 Ibid. 




98 See Eric Sylvers, “Developed nations faulted over firm foreign bribers” International Herald Tribune 
(27 June 2006) online: IHT < http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/27/business/bribe.php>. 
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senior officials. 99   The SFO had launched investigations into BAE's £43 billion 
Al-Yamamah arms deal with Saudi Arabia in 1985, which provided Tornado and Hawk 
jets plus other military equipment.100  Senior Saudi public officials and members of 
Saudi Royalty have been implicated in the investigations. There were accusations that 
the head of the Saudi National Security Council, son of the crown prince, took more 
than £1 billion in secret payments from BAE.101  The SFO claimed it dropped the 
investigations because of a fear of threats to national security.   
In 2007, two NGOs – the Corner House and Campaign against Arms Trade 
launched a judicial review into the SFOs decision claiming the investigation was 
tainted by Government concerns about trade with Saudi Arabia and diplomatic 
considerations rather than national security issues; and the discontinuance was illegal 
under the OECD anti-bribery convention.102   In April 2008, the English High Court 
ruled that the Government and SFO unlawfully submitted to threats that there would be 
consequences to national interests if the investigations were not dropped. 103  In the 
light of the High Court’s decision, the SFO was granted leave to appeal to the House of 
                                                 
99 David Leigh and Rob Evans, “National Interest Halts Arms Corruption Inquiry” The Guardian (15 
December 2006) online: Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/dec/15/saudiarabia.armstrade>. 
100 See also John Aston and Cathy Gordon, “Saudi Bribery Probe decision overturned” The Indepenent, 
UK (10 April 2008) online: Independent 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/saudi-bribery-probe-decision-overturned-807201.
html>. 
101 David Leigh and Rob Evans, “BAE accused of secretly Paying £1Billion to Saudi Prince”, The 
Guardian ( June 2007) online: Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/07/bae1.>  See 
also ibid. 
102 See UK Anti-Corruption Forum Newsletter, UK News - Major bribery investigation halted by UK 
Government, No. 5 2007, online: Anticorruption forum < 
http://www.anticorruptionforum.org.uk/acf/news/publications/newsletters/feb07/feb07.pdf>. 
103 See Frances Gibb and PhilipWebster, “High Court rules that the halt to BAE investigation was 
‘unlawful’ a threat to British Jusitce”, Times online (11 April 2008).  See supra note 102. 
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Lords.  In a July 2008 ruling, the House of Lords overturned the High Court’s 
decision.  It ruled that the SFO director acted lawfully in stopping the investigation 
when faced with a threat to national security.  It also held that the UK courts did not 
have to determine whether the OECD convention was complied with.104.. 
On the whole, it would appear that while theoretically a company can be held liable 
for the common law offence of bribery and the statutory offences listed above, there are 
no substantial examples of cases involving corporate liability for corruption.105  There 
are a number of factors contributing to this which include the difficulties in convicting 
legal persons for foreign bribery, complexity of existing law, lack of adequate 
resources and the use of national interest considerations.  Indeed, a GRECO report 
notes it is rare for legal persons to be prosecuted for offences such as corruption in 
England.106  The need for enactment of a new foreign bribery law and broadening of 
liability of legal persons for foreign bribery are issues the OECD working group will be 





                                                 
104 See R (on the application of Corner House Research and Others (Respondents) v Director of the 
Serious Fraud Office (Appellant) (Criminal Appeal from Her Majesty’s High Court of Justice) [2008] 
UKHL 60. 
105 See Pinto supra note 72.  See also supra note 4. 
106 GRECO Evaluation Report on the UK 2nd Evaluation Round, Strasbourg, 30 September 2004, para 89 
107 The Phase 2 bis review will include an on-site visit which needs to be conducted by March 2008. The 
report of the review was adopted on 16 October 2008.  See OECD, United Kingdom: Phase 2 : 
Follow-up Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2 Recommendations, 21 June 2007. 
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3.3.2.2.2 United States 
A U.S company may be found liable for domestic bribery under Title 18 of the United 
States Code (USC), § 201.  This section deals with bribery of public officials and 
witnesses.  The definition of ‘public official’ is very broad and includes member of 
congress, delegate, Resident Commissioner, officer or employee acting on behalf of the 
US department, agency or branch of government.108  § 201 (b) refers to ‘whoever 
directly or indirectly’ and makes the giving, offering, promising anything of value to 
any public official – with intent (A) to influence any official act; or (B) to influence 
such public official to commit, or collude in or allow any fraud or make opportunity for 
any fraud; or (C) to induce such public official to do or omit to do any act in violation of 
the lawful duty of such official or person, a crime punishable by a fine, imprisonment, 
or both and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust or profit under 
the United States.109  The USC provides that the word ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ includes 
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies and joint stock 
companies as well as individuals.110 
 In the United States of America v. Apex Distributing Company, Inc., Albert A 
Finer, Hubert O’Reilly111, the defendants, Apex Distributing Company and Albert A 
were denied grounds to dismiss an indictment on several counts including defrauding 
                                                 
108 See Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, 1962 (18 USCS § 201 (a)). 
109 See Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, 1962 (18 USCS § 201 (b)). 
110 General Provisions, 1947 (1 USC § 1).  See Response of the United States to the Phase 1 
Questionnaire DAFFE/IME/BR(98)8/ADD1/FINAL dated 30 October 1998, online: USDOJ < 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/firstqu.htm> question 2 on Responsibility of Legal Person.  
See also United States: Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 Recommendation, Article 
2 Responsibility of Legal Persons, online OECD <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/50/2390377.pdf >. 
111 Crim No 6516, USDC for the district of Rhode Island 148 F.Supp 365; 1957 U.S Dist. LEXIS 4029. 
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the United States of and concerning its governmental function and right to administer 
the business and affairs of the United States Navy, ‘free from unlawful impairment, 
corruption, improper influence, dishonesty and fraud’.  The company was also found 
to have committed certain offenses against the United States including the crime of 
bribery in violation of 18 USC § 201.   
 In the United States, a corporation would be held liable for bribery domestic or 
foreign, if any of its employees commits the crime as stated in the applicable 
anti-bribery laws.  Therefore, the United States’ approach to corporate criminal 
liability avoids the complexities present in the United Kingdom’s approach to the same.  
In the United States, corporations will generally be held liable for the unlawful acts of 
its officers, employees and agents under a respondeat superior theory. 112   The 
employee must be acting within the scope of his or her duties and for the benefit of the 
corporation.  The company will not be liable for limited exception of acts that are truly 
outside the employee's assigned duties or which are contrary to the corporation's 
interests, e.g., where the corporation is the victim rather than the beneficiary of the 
employee's unlawful conduct. 113  
Unlike the United Kingdom, the United States holds corporations criminally liable 
for the act of any corporate employee.  The employee need not be a high level 
executive.  However, the relevance of a high level executive being involved is crucial 
at the sanctioning stage. Participation, acquiescence, knowledge, or authorization by 
higher level employees or officers, are relevant factors in the determination of 
                                                 
112 Supra note 111, question 2 on Responsibility of Legal Persons. 
113 Ibid. 
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appropriate sanctions.  Under the applicable sentencing guidelines, higher fines may 
be imposed when a corporation's management participates in or fails to take appropriate 
steps to prevent unlawful conduct.”114 
 The simplicity with which corporations can be held criminally liable, the effective 
laws and good enforcement systems which have been consciously put in place make the 
U.S a model for effective anti-bribery laws.  With regards to overseas bribery, the U.S 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act115 is the most significant statute relating to corporate 
criminal responsibility for corruption. It implements the OECD Convention.   
The FCPA has anti-bribery and accounting provisions. The anti-bribery provisions 
prohibit U.S companies conducting business with foreign government entities and 
government officials from bribing such foreign officials to obtain or retain business.116  
The anti-bribery provisions also apply to individuals, firms, officer, director, employee, 
or agent of a firm and any stockholder acting on behalf of a firm.   
 The jurisdiction for corporate liability is either territorial or national and applies to 
issuers and domestic concerns.117  Since 1998, foreign companies and nationals which 
cause, directly or through agents, an act in furtherance of the corrupt payment to take 
place within the territory of the US, are subject to FCPA territorial jurisdiction.  If such 
                                                 
114 Ibid.   
115 See 1977 (15 USCS § 78dd-1, et seq.). 
116 For a discussion of the Act, see United States Department of Justice text on Foreign Corrupt 
Practices: Anti-bribery Provisions online: USDOJ 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/text/dojdocb.htm>.   
117 An issuer is a corporation that has issued securities registered in the U.S or required to file periodic 
reports with the SEC, while a domestic concern is a corporation which has its principal place of business 
in the U.S, or which is organized under the laws of a state of the United States. 
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liability is proved, a fine of up to $2,000,000 may be imposed on the corporation.118  
Two affirmative defenses under the FCPA excluding liability are (1) defense that the 
payment was lawful under the written laws of the foreign country or (2) the money was 
spent as part of demonstrating a product or performing a contractual obligation. 
There are numerous examples of FCPA prosecutions. The 2004 case of United States v. 
Kay,119 is a good example because it illustrates an actual prosecution for violations of 
FCPA by an issuer/domestic concern to a foreign public official.  It also gives a 
detailed analysis of FCPA’s legislative history,120 and clarifies that the US senate and 
congress meant the FCPA to prohibit payments towards obtaining or retaining business 
and not just government contracts.121  In the case, Kay and Murphy, officials of 
American Rice, Inc. were charged with violating the FCPA.  It was alleged that they 
bribed Haitian officials to understate customs duties and sales taxes on rice shipped to 
Haiti.  The reason for the conduct was to help American Rice Inc, obtain and retain 
business.  The issue was whether, if proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the conduct of 
the defendants was sufficient to constitute an offence under the FCPA.  The U.S Court 
of Appeal held such bribes could (but do not necessarily) come within the ambit of the 
statute.  It also held that the business nexus element of the FCPA does not go to the 
core of criminality of that statute.  In this case, the business nexus was the link between 
                                                 
118 See supra note 116, section 78f on penalties. 
119 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004). 
120 Ibid. at 746-761. 
121 Ibid. at 748. 
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In theory, corporations which commit a corrupt act can be held criminally liable in 
Singapore. 123   The Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) 124  is the main statute 
governing liability for corruption.  It extends to all persons including corporations, 
where the offence is committed in Singapore.125  The PCA itself does not define 
‘person’.  However, section 10 of the Penal Code provides that a person includes any 
company or association or body of persons whether incorporated or not.126   
Sections 5, 6 and 37 of the PCA sets out the offences and sanctions on bribery and 
covers the passive and active bribery committed by private or public sector individuals 
in Singapore and by Singaporeans in another country.127  In this regard the act is 
therefore very broad.  This chapter will be concerned with offences committed by 
corporations seeking to influence public officials in the carrying out of their public 
functions; or in their pursuit of government contracts. 
                                                 
122 Ibid at 741. 
123 Kala Anandrajah, “Anti-Corruption Laws and Regulation: Singapore” (2002) 36 Asia Bus. L. Rev. 
25.  The PCA itself does not define ‘person’.  However, section 10 of the Penal Code provides that a 
person includes any company or association or body of persons whether incorporated or not (Penal Code, 
Cap 224, 1985 Rev. Ed. 
124 Prevention of Corruption Act, Cap 241, 1993 Rev. Ed. 
125 Supra note 124. 
126 Prevention of Corruption Act, Cap 241, 1993 Rev. Ed. 
127 See  Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific: Action Plan Stocktaking for 2002-2003, 
Singapore - Pillar II: Strengthening Anti-Bribery Actions and Promoting Integrity in Business Operation, 
online: OECD <http://www1.oecd.org/daf/asiacom/AP/Singapore.htm>.  
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Section 5 of the PCA makes it an offence punishable by a fine not exceeding 
100,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or both for any person to 
(a) corruptly solicit or receive, agree to receive for himself or another or (b) corruptly 
give, promise or offer to any person any gratification as an inducement to or reward for, 
or otherwise on account of (i) any person doing or forbearing to do anything in respect 
of any matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or proposed; or (ii) any member, officer 
or servant of a public body doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter 
or transaction whatsoever, actual or proposed, in which such public body is 
concerned.128   
 Section 6 makes it an offence for any agent to corruptly accept or obtain or agree to 
accept or attempt to obtain, from any person any gratification as an inducement or 
reward for doing or forebearing to do any act in relation to his principal’s affairs or 
business; 129  and for any person to corruptly give or agree to give or offer any 
gratification to any agent as inducement or reward for doing or forebearing to do any 
act in relation to his principal’s affairs or business, or for showing or forebearing to 
show favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal’s affairs or 
business;130   
For sections 5 and 6, where the offence was committed for a contract or proposal 
for a contract with the Government, department or public body, the maximum penalty 
is increased from five to seven years, but the maximum fine is still $100,000 and the 
                                                 
128 Sec 5, Prevention of Corruption Act, Cap 241. 
129 Ibid., sec 6(a). 
130 Ibid., sec 6(b). 
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person may be liable to a fine, imprisonment or both.131  The act also provides for a 
presumption of corruption in situations where a gratification has been paid to a person 
in the employment of the Government, department or public body by a person or agent 
who seeks to deal with the Government, department or public body.132   
With regard to the extra-territoriality provisions for corruption, Sec 37 makes it a 
crime for a Singapore citizen to bribe any person (including foreign official) within or 
outside Singapore. 133  In PP v Taw Cheng Kong, Taw a Singapore citizen, working 
for the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte Ltd based in Hong Kong 
received a bribe from a person working for Rockefeller & Co Inc. New York 
(Rockefeller).  There were no suggestions in the case Rockefeller was involved. Yong 
Pung How CJ, as he then was said “[t]he language of s 37(1) was very wide, and the 
section was capable of capturing all corrupt acts by Singapore citizens outside 
Singapore, regardless of whether such corrupt acts had consequences within the 
borders of Singapore or not”.134  In essence, this section provides for extraterritorial 
reach of Singapore, albeit in relation only to its citizens; it is not clear if the reach 
includes legal persons such as corporations.  
The Singapore Act is unique and different from the UK135 and US act because it 
                                                 
131 Iibd., sec 7. 
132 Ibid., sec 8. 
133 See Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR 410 [Kong].  See also US Department of 
State, 2005 Investment Climate Statement: Singapore pertaining to corruption, online: US Dept of State 
< http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2005/42111.htm>.  
134 See Kong, ibid. at para 64. 
135 No detailed comparisons with the UK acts will be attempted in light of the complexities with that Act 
which has necessitated a Draft Bill for a new corruption act.  Furthermore, there is no English equivalent 
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applies to any person giving a reward or inducement to any other person on account 
firstly of any person and secondly on account of public officials.  It appears that the 
person receiving the reward may not necessarily pass the benefit to the public official.  
Sec 201 (b) of the US act on the other hand refers to giving of anything of value to a 
public official.  As a result the aim of the Singapore act is to address all possible forms 
of corruption, not merely public corruption as is the case with the US act.  
Furthermore, the change in prison penalty from five to seven years without a 
corresponding change in the maximum fine of $100,000 irrespective of whether the 
bribe is for obtaining government contracts or for other forms of corruption addressed 
in the act suggest the act is not really geared towards corporate criminal liability.  This 
is because a prison sentence is not the most appropriate form of deterrence for a 
corporation.  Moreover, if the maximum fine is compared to the maximum fine which 
an issuer or domestic concern in the US may receive amounting to USD 2,000,000, it is 
at least arguable that the Singapore Act may not be effective to deter guilty companies.  
Based on the ADB/OECD findings (ADB findings) on Curbing Corruption in 
Public Procurement in Asia and the Pacific, Singapore does not appear to hold legal 
persons criminally liable for corruption.  It seems to be the guilty individual who is 
held responsible.136  Further, the few publicized cases of public sector corruption 
                                                                                                                                            
of some sections of the PCA such as section 5 (b) (i).  See Tan Boon Gin, The Law on Corruption in 
Singapore (Singapore: Singapore Academy of Law, 2007). 
136 See Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement in Asia and the Pacific, Online: adb < 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Public-Procurement-Asia-Pacific/part01-03.pdf>. 
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involving senior public officials do not indicate that the corporations alleged to have 
been involved in the corrupt giving were held responsible.137   
The ADB findings show economic sanctions in the form of civil liability for 
damages and debarment seem to be the incentives which prevent companies from 
taking part in corrupt practices.138  It cites as examples, Singapore’s stance of allowing 
the procuring entity to terminate the contract and sue the supplier for damages or 
Singapore’s stance of debarring from eligibility for public contracts for a certain period 
of time, usually five year.139  In 1996, five MNCs, namely Marubeni Corporation and 
Tomen Corporation of Japan, Siemens AG of Germany, Pirelli Cables of Italy and 
BICC Cables PLC of Britain were banned for five years from competing for 
government tenders following a corruption enquiry.140 The companies were alleged to 
have bribed a senior official of the Public Utilities Board through a consultant in 
exchange for privileged information on projects by the board.  The senior official was 
charged, but the companies were not.141  A writer has commented that ‘the Singapore 
Government if so inclined can sue in its own courts, the companies it debarred for the 
                                                 
137 For examples, see the cases of Wee Toon Boon v Public Prosecutor, [1975 -1977] SLR 498; Lee 
Kuan Yew v Jeyaretnam JB (no 1) [1990] SLR 688 which made substantial reference to the corruption 
investigations surrounding Teh Cheang Wan who committed suicide before he could be prosecuted in 
court.   
138 See supra note 137 at 19.  The publication states the findings of the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption 
Initiative for Asia and the Pacific’s 2005-2006 thematic review on curbing corruption in public 
procurement. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Five foreign companies barred from Singapore government contracts” 
Japan Economic Newswire (14 February 1996); “Singapore bars Marubeni, Tomen from gov't contracts” 
(14 February 1996). 
141 See Choy Hon Tim v PP, MA 378/95/01 in Sentencing Practice in the Subordinate Courts 2nd Edition 
(Singapore: LexisNexis, 2003), Ch 26.  This would be an example of Singapore’s approach to foreign 
corporate corruption.  
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amount of bribes given to its officials’.  The basis for suing the argument goes is on the 
common law concept of fiduciary facilitators illustrated in Selangor United Rubber 
Estates v Craddock (No.3) that equity will regard someone who knowingly participates 
in another’s breach of trust as a trustee. 142  The writer goes on ‘[t]hus it will not be 
difficult to fit within well recognized principles of law, a duty imposed on exporting 
companies not to induce agents – ministers and other high officials – to breach his duty 
of honesty’.143   
Debarment is a two-edged sword - it might deter corruption, but could also be part 
of a corrupt scheme of competitors or corrupt officials to extort bribes or to eliminate 
honest competitors, especially if the conditions for debarment are not clearly 
specified. 144   However in the case of Singapore, debarment deters corporate 
corruption.  Singapore is generally regarded as a country with a low level of corruption 
record, usually at the top of the list of least corrupt countries in the world.145  Andrew 
Phang in his book, ‘The Development of Singapore Law’ notes that Singapore is one of 
the few countries in the world which has successfully combated corruption, having 
reduced it to a bare, oft-times non-existent state.  He goes on say amongst the 
Association of South East Nations, Singapore has been the most successful in its fight 
against corruption.  He attributes a lot of the success for this low level of corruption to 
                                                 
142 See Austin Pulle, “Corruption in Transantional Contracts: Can it be stopped?” (1996) 12 Asia Bus. L 
Rev 19. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Supra note 137. 
145 See Transparency International’s Annual Corruption Perception Index from 1995 to 2006.  Online: 
TI <http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/global/cpi>. 
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the work of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) and the PCA.146  The 
CPIB was established in 1952 as an independent body responsible for the investigation 
and prevention of corruption in the public and private sectors of Singapore.147  The 
CPIB falls directly under the Prime Minister’s office148 and is headed by a director who 
is directly responsible to the Prime Minister. 
Other acts relevant to corruption in Singapore include the Penal Code,149 and the 
Prevention of Corruption, Drug Trafficking and other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of 
Benefits) Act150.  The Penal Code is concerned with offences committed by public 
servants or offences relating to the taking of gratification to influence a public 
servant.151  In essence, it addresses the demand side of corruption.  It does not address 
the supply side which MNCs are guilty of.  The sanctions under the Penal Code are not 
as severe as those under the PCA.  Under the Prevention of Corruption, Drug 
Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap 65A), 
                                                 
146 Andrew Phang Boon Leong, The Development of Singapore Law: Historical and Socio-Legal 
Perspectives (Singapore: Butterworths, 1990) pp 238-239. 
147 See CPIB, online: CPIB <www.cpib.gov.sg>. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Cap 224, 1985 Rev. Ed. 
150 Cap 65A, 2000 Rev. Ed. 
151 Supra note 150.  Section 161 makes it an offence punishable by three years imprisonment or fine or 
both for a public servant to take a gratification, other than legal remuneration, in respect of an official act.  
Sec 162 makes it an offence punishable by three years imprisonment for ‘whoever’ to take a gratification 
by corruption or illegal means to influence a public servant.  Section 163 makes it an offence punishable 
by one year imprisonment or fine or both for whoever to take a gratification for the exercise of personal 
influence on a public servant; while section 165 makes it an offence punishable by two years or fine or 
both for a public servant to obtain any valuable thing, without consideration from a person concerned in 
any proceeding or business transacted by such public servant. 
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section 44 and 47 are considered serious offences. 152  What constitutes a serious 
offence other than sections 44 and 47 are listed under the second schedule of cap 65a 
and includes offences under the Penal Code pertaining to a public servant taking a 
gratification, other than legal remuneration (Cap. 224, sec 161), taking a gratification in 
order, by corrupt or illegal means, to influence a public servant (cap 224, sec 162) and 
punishment for abetment by public servant of the offences above defined (cap 224, sec 
164).  Serious offence also includes offences under sections 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 29, 30 and 
31 of the Prevention of Corruption Acts (cap 241).   
 
3.3.2.2.4 Nigeria 
In Nigeria, a corporation can be held criminally liable for corrupt practices.  The 
relevant act is the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act enacted in 2000 
(Corrupt Practices Act).153 The Act criminalizes a wide range of corrupt practices 
including bribery, fraud and other related offences.154  It applies to both public 
officials and private persons and is very broad in its scope.  The act covers not only 
corrupt dealings relating to public officers and public institutions, but also strictly 
private dealings between private businesses 155  "Person" in the act includes a natural 
                                                 
152 Supra note 151.  Section 44 makes it an offence to assist another to retain benefits from criminal 
conduct.  Section 47 makes it an offence to conceal or transfer benefits of criminal conduct.  Section 2 
states that criminal conduct includes doing or being concerned in a serious offence. 
153 See 2000 Act No 5. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.  
154 Ibid., Sec 2 , 8–26 dealing with offences and Penalties under the act. 
155 See Olakunle Olagoke, “The Extra-Territorial Scope of the Anti-Corruption Legislation in Nigeria” 
(2004) 38 Int’l Law. 71 at 78. 
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person, a juristic person or any body of persons corporate or incorporate.156  The 
offences of giving gratification through agents and bribery of public officials are two 
offences under the act corporations are likely to be guilty of.  Accordingly, they will 
be the focus in this chapter.157 
Section 9 (1) of the Corrupt Practices Act provides any person who corruptly (a) 
gives, confers or procures any property or benefit of any kind to, on or for a public 
officer or to, on or for any other person; or (b) promises or offers to give, confers, 
procure or attempt to procure any property or benefit of any kind to, on or for a public 
officer or any other person, on account of any such act, omission, favour or disfavour 
to be done or shown by the public officer is guilty of an offence of official corruption 
and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for seven (7) years.   
Section 9(2) provides that if in any proceedings for an offence under this section it 
is proved that any property or benefit of any kind, or any promise thereof, was given to 
a public officer or some other person at the instance of a public officer, by a person 
(a) holding or seeking to obtain a contract, licence, permit, employment or anything 
whatsoever from a Government department, public body or other organisation or 
institution in which that public officer is serving as such, or (b)  concerned or likely to 
be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted, pending or likely to be 
transacted before or by that public officer or a government department, public body or 
other organisation or institution in which that public officer is serving as such, or 
(c) acting on behalf of or relative to such a person, the property, benefit or promise 
                                                 
156 Supra note 154, section 2. 
157 Ibid., secs 9 and 21 respectively. 
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shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been given corruptly on account 
of such a past or future act, omission, favour or disfavour as is mentioned in section 
9(1) and (2). 
  Sec 18 provides that any person who offers to any public officer, or being a public 
officer solicits, counsels or accepts any gratification as an inducement or a reward for 
(a) voting or abstaining from voting at any meeting of the public body in favour or 
against any measure, resolution or question submitted to the public body; 
(b) performing or abstaining from performing or aiding in procuring, expediting, 
delaying, hindering or preventing the performance of any official act; (c) aiding in 
procuring or preventing the passing of any vote or the granting of any contract, award, 
recognition or advantage in favour of any person; or (d) showing or forbearing to show 
any favour or disfavour in his capacity as such officer shall, notwithstanding that the 
officer did not have the power, right or opportunity so to do, or that the inducement or 
reward was not in relation to the affairs of the public body, be guilty of an offence and 
shall on conviction be liable to five (5) years imprisonment with hard labour. 
 The liability for sections 9 is seven years imprisonment while that for section 18 is 
five years with hard labour.  It is interesting to note that although corporations can be 
held liable, imprisonment which is not suitable for corporate liability is the only 
sentence available for a guilty party.  It is argued that the Nigerian law in order to 
address corrupt giving by corporations needs to amend the laws to include appropriate 
fines and make a distinction between fines to be paid by an individual and fines to be 
paid by a body corporate found guilty of sections 9 and 18 for instance.  They would 
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be the need to address corporate liability for other offences under the act, but the focus 
here is on the two offences mentioned. 
The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) was established by the 
Corrupt Practices Act.158 Its responsibilities include investigating corruption reports 
and where appropriate prosecuting offenders.159  Other responsibilities are examining, 
reviewing and enforcing the correction of corruption prone systems and educating and 
enlightening the public on corruption. 160  The Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) is another Nigerian commission which fights anti-corruption 
amongst other economic and financial crimes.  It was created in 2002 to fight the 
Advance Fee Fraud, a fax or e-mail scam popularly known as "419 fraud," and other 
crimes related to business and the economy.161   
There have been reports of many high profile public official probes into corruption 
by the EFCC and the ICPC implicating MNCs.162  In 2003, the ICPC announced that 
it was probing top government officials for allegedly accepting bribes from a French 
firm, Sagem SA.  Five people, including then Labor Minister Hussaini Zannuwa 
Akwanga and two other former ministers, were charged in December 2003 with taking 
bribes from Sagem, which won a US$214 million contract to produce national identity 
                                                 
158 Ibid., sec 3.  
159 Ibid., sec 6 (a).    
160 See ibid., sections 6 (b) to 6(f). 
161 See Tayo Odunlami, Nigeria Corruption Notebook, online: Global intergrity 
<http://www.globalintegrity.org/2004/country.aspx?cc=ng&act=notebook>. 
162 For a recent example, see EFCC News, “Siemens: Yar’Adua orders probe of €10m scandal, 
online:EFCC 
<http://www.efccnigeria.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=33&Itemid=34>.  See 
also Nigeria’s probe into Halliburton discussed above at p 76 ff. 
 119
cards. 163 At the time the trial was brought, the Sagem trial of the government officials 
was the highest profile case brought three years after the ICPC was established.164  In 
June 2004, the case was withdrawn by the ICPC with the ICPC stating it may file fresh 
charges.  Almost five years after the initial charge was withdrawn, there have been no 
fresh charges filed against the ministers and others alleged to have been involved in the 
scandal.165  It is unknown if any high level cases of corrupt public officials have been 
prosecuted by the ICPC. 
A more recent example of probes by the ICPC and EFCC is that involving the 
alleged payment of 10 million Euros bribe by Siemens to ex-Nigerian public officials.  
In October 2007, a German court fined Siemens 210 million Euros for paying bribes to 
obtain contracts.166  Investigations carried out by Siemens uncovered more than 1.3 
billion Euros in suspicious payments of which 10 million Euros was said to have been 
paid to Nigerian ministers.167   The findings of the German court prompted the 
Nigerian government to launch investigations into the matter, with the ICPC 
summoning many officials for questioning.168   In December 2007, the Nigerian 
government announced that it was revoking its last contract with Siemens for the 
supply of circuit breakers and other power generation accessories as a first step 
                                                 
163 See BBC News, “Nigeria Ministers on Bribe Charge” (30 December, 2003), online: BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3356807.stm>. 
164 Ibid. 
165 See Musa Simon Reef, “Grange: What Prospects for Anti-Corruption?” Daily Trust (30 March 2008) 
online: daily trust < http://news.dailytrust.com/content/view/3189/28/>. 
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towards blacklisting Siemens.  All dealings with Siemens were also suspended 
pending the probe into allegations of the 10 million Euros bribe payments.169  
The discussions so far have pointed to Nigeria’s attempts to curb public corruption.  
It is argued that Nigeria’s focus appears to be on weeding out public corruption.  
Although it has laws applicable to companies, there are not applicable sentences 
relevant for corporations; reports of high level corruption charges tend to focus on the 
public official.  Nigeria is not concerned much with punishing those who provide the 
supply side to public corruption – the MNCs, rather it seeks to punish the corrupt 
domestic public officials who accept bribes.  Nigerian’s stance on suspending 
dealings with Siemens and revocation of the 128.4 million naira contract in protest of 
bribery allegations is an example of the weak demonstration of political will.  If the 
Siemens allegations are true, the bribes paid would have amounted to more than 1 
billion naira.  In this light, a revocation of a mere 128.4 million naira contract seems 
abysmal.  Perhaps a better approach would have been attempts to prosecute Siemens 
for involvement in the bribe paying under applicable Nigerian laws subject to any 
limitations.  In order to do this, there may be a need to review the Corrupt Practices 
Act as it relates to companies. 
A 2004 Global Integrity Research on Nigeria and anti-corruption laws reported 
that Nigeria has many laws criminalizing corruption but lacked the political will to 
implement the laws.170  It is agreed that Nigeria indeed has many laws dealing with 
                                                 
169 Felix Onuah, “Nigeria to Backlist Siemens after Bribery Scandal” African Reuters (6 December 
2007), online: Reuters <http://africa.reuters.com/business/news/usnBAN624142.html>. 
170 Supra note 162. 
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corruption.  Nigeria also has many bodies designated to fight corruption such as the 
EFCC, ICPC, and Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB).  The CCB was set up to act as a 
check on the conduct of public officers.  The CCB receives declarations of assets by 
public officers and it has powers to refer breach of the code of conduct to the Code of 
Conduct Tribunal. 171  However, it is submitted that in light of the recent attempts to 
curb corruption which can be seen in the work of the ICPC and EFCC and declarations 
by Nigerian government, Nigeria’s political will to fight corruption is emerging but 
attempts for now are primarily focused on past and current senior public officials.       
On the issue of extra-territorial laws, the Corrupt Practices Act has extra-territorial 
effect in relation to investigation and liability for offences listed under the act.172  Sec 
66 (1) provides that citizens and permanent residents of Nigeria may be guilty of 
offences under the act even if the offence is committed outside Nigeria.  Sec 66 (3) 
gives the ICPC power to engage the services of Interpol and the like to assist in tracing 
properties and dealing with cross border crimes.173  However, the extra-territorial 
scope of the act may be unclear.174 
With regard to extra-territorial laws for foreign bribery of public officials, Nigeria 
does not appear to have extraterritorial laws preventing payment of bribes to foreign 
public officials by either natural or legal persons.  This may be because of the 
historical background to the enactment of extra-territorial laws on foreign bribery 
which resulted as a result of the Watergate scandals and several other disclosures of 
                                                 
171 Ibid. 
172 Supra note 156 at 71, 78.   
173 For more on extra-territorial laws for corruption in Nigeria, see ibid.   
174 Ibid. at 84. 
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large illicit payments by US firms.175  Thus, perhaps extra-territorial foreign bribery 
laws are seen as laws relevant for MNCs headquartered in developed countries 
carrying out corporate practices in other developed and developing countries.   
 
3.3.2.3 Usefulness of Extraterritorial Laws for Overseas Bribery 
The usefulness of extraterritorial laws for overseas bribery has been questioned.  
Many writers have argued that such extra-territorial laws are overreaching.  Steven 
Salbu in his articles176 about the FCPA questions the logic behind extraterritorial 
criminalization of bribery in general.  He believes global heterogeneity is so 
compelling that the most perfectly formulated extraterritorial legislation would be 
crude and unwieldy.  He says this global heterogeneity taints efforts to proscribe acts 
of bribery abroad.  He believes there is a political peril of cross-national hostility 
attributable to “officious and overreaching legislation across national border.177  He 
promotes the use of strong domestic anti-bribery legislation and enforcement through 
persuasion as opposed to extraterritorial legislation.178  Salbu admits that it can be 
argued that extraterritorially applied legislation is necessary to expunge global 
corruption, but this underestimates the power of persuasion, light-handed diplomacy 
                                                 
175 Jeffrey P. Bialos & Gregory Husisian, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Coping with Corruption in 
Transitional Economies (New York: Oceana Publications Inc.,1997) p 2. 
176 Steven R Salbu, “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Economy” (1999) 20 Mich. 
J. Int’l L. 419;  See also Steven Salbu, “Bribery in the Global Market: A critical Analysis of the Foreign 
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177 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Glbal economy, Ibid. at 421. 
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and dialogue in the information era.179 
With due respect to Salbu, it is argued that changing global perceptions to 
corruption and global efforts to curb corruption see the usefulness of extra-territorial 
laws.  The series of articles by Salbu referred to were all published between 1997 and 
1998.  In a decade, there have been considerable changes to the approach towards 
international bribery.  Extra-territorial laws are not officious or overreaching because 
they apply to nationals of an enforcing state (or persons with connection) and help curb 
corruption which is a global goal.   
Moreover, where matters of international bribery are concerned, and senior public 
officials and governments are often involved, the effectiveness of domestic legislation 
and or enforcement to combat such bribery is at best highly questionable and at worst 
slim.  It appears Salbu did not give considerable thought to developing countries 
where international bribery is most prevalent and the domestic laws or enforcement 
procedures are inadequate or ineffective to counter this phenomenon.  Persuasion and 
the emergence of a civil society which he promotes are highly commendable, but 
inadequate.  
To illustrate the point, in the developing world, countries with extractive 
industries often breed corruption.  In the 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria’s oil sector was the 
major source of foreign exchange, generating more than 90% of the foreign exchange 
                                                 
179 Ibid at 445. 
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earnings.180  Oil boom from the 70s led to government corruption, uneven distribution 
of wealth and political crises.181  The prevalence of corruption led to many domestic 
laws in Nigeria punishing corruption.  Needless to say, corruption is still rampant in 
the country and the domestic laws appear to be ineffective and enforcement is highly 
problematic.   
From 1999 to 2007, ex- President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo attempted to 
curb the country of corruption.  This led to the enactment of the Corrupt Practices Act 
in 2000 and re-enactment of the Economic and Financial Crimes Establishment Act 
(EFC Act) in 2004.  The re-enactment of the EFC Act brought the EFCC into 
existence.  The EFCC aims to promote a policy platform of accountability and 
transparency.  Since its inception and till the period of September 2006, the EFCC has 
prosecuted about 88 people and recovered assets and cash over US 5billion.182   
As a result of the attempts of the Nigerian government, perhaps, now it may 
even be said that Nigeria has an ‘independent’ enforcing body and domestic laws 
preventing corrupt practices.  Nevertheless, the use of domestic law for curbing 
overseas bribery would be inadequate because domestic laws in Nigeria tend to focus 
on the demand side of bribery.   Rarely, are the laws applied towards the supply side. 
MNCS are guilty of being chief participants in supply side bribery.  Through the use of 
                                                 
180 See Markus Brumer and Walter Suntinger, “Human Rights in Selected Developing countries: 
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extra-territorial applications of bribery laws, MNCs can be more effectively held 
accountable for corrupt practices they carry out in other countries especially developing 
countries with inadequate or ineffective laws.  
In any event, arguments such as Salbu’s suggest the need to consider other 
methods of corporate liability for corruption.  The subsequent chapter will consider 
international law attempts both emerging and settled which aim to ensure corporate 
responsibility for corrupt practices.  
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
Anti-corruption is a CSR standard, the fulfillment of which entails the use of voluntary 
and mandatory rules.  In this chapter, the focus has been on international corruption 
involving international business and payment of bribes to foreign public officials. 
International corruption knows no boundary.  It is rampant in the developed and 
developing world.   
However, most patterns suggest international corruption most likely involves 
payment of bribes in emerging or transitional markets by MNCs in pursuit of business 
contracts.    These payments are distributed in the hands of a few creating instability, 
conflicts and injustice for the majority of the citizens in affected countries.  The 
impacts of corruption in developing countries are well documented, and as a result, 
there is a pressing need to improve or revamp the mechanisms currently in place to 
dissuade corruption. 
 126
From the perspective of corporate responsibility, there is the need to examine 
voluntary and mandatory rules applicable for curbing corruption.  Voluntary or 
non-binding rules which are the preferred norms are clearly inadequate and ineffective 
for holding corporations responsible for corrupt giving.  Mandatory or binding rules 
provide better scope for corporate responsibility.  However, as shown from the 
selected countries’ current domestic laws – domestic laws are inadequate to deal with 
international corruption not because of a lack of applicable laws but because of the 
problems of enforcement and or a focus on the demand side of bribery. 
Extraterritorial laws are therefore useful tools in combating corruption because 
they typically aim to address liability for the supply side of bribery.  Nevertheless, 
extra-territorial laws have detractors and are not universal.  The US FCPA is the most 
effective extra-territorial legislation and even then it has its limitations.  It applies to 
US corporations only leaving the possibility for other MNCs to still engage in corrupt 
practices.  It was for the adverse effects such possibility would have on the US 
corporations that the US extensively lobbied for international conventions which would 
apply to other corporations.  The UK ATCSA is not as effective and demonstrates the 
UK’s lack of political will to address international corruption despite contrary rhetoric. 
The Singapore PCA’s extra-territorial reach is applicable to acts of corruption 
carried out by Singapore citizens outside Singapore.  However, it is not very clear if 
the reach includes legal persons.  Moreover, Singapore’s style is not to criminally hold 
corporations responsible for corruption.  The Nigerian Corrupt Practices Act’s 
extra-territorial reach is applicable for corrupt offences listed in the act.  It does not 
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extend to criminality for overseas bribery of foreign public officials by Nigerian 
nationals including corporations. 
The examination of these laws demonstrates the inadequacy of domestic 
criminal laws to address international corruption; and improvements necessary for 
effective corporate responsibility for international corruption.  The next chapter will 





INTERNATIONAL LAW, ANTI-CORRUPTION AND CSR 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter three, voluntary rules and domestic mandatory rules for holding 
corporations responsible for corrupt practices were examined.  The inadequacy of 
such rules for corporate responsibility was highlighted.  In this chapter, the adequacy 
of international laws to hold corporations responsible for corrupt practices will be 
examined.  The inadequacy of domestic rules to hold corporations responsible calls 
for a re-thinking of the adequacy of international law to hold corporations responsible.  
This is because current international law primarily relies on states to implement and 
enforce anti-corruption laws which would be binding and effective on corporations.   
There are numerous multilateral treaties enacted to address the problem of 
corruption.  The chapter will examine five treaties, classified into regional and 
multi-regional laws.  The regional laws are the Inter-American Convention; Council 
of Europe Criminal Law Convention and AU Convention.  The multi-regional laws 
are the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and UNCAC.  The focus will be on the 
approach of such treaties to transnational bribery and the grounds of jurisdiction for 
prosecuting the crime of transnational bribery.   
There has been extensive discourse on attempts to hold corporations responsible 
for violations of international law norms through civil liability.  These attempts occur 
through domestic courts.  The discussions in chapter two on international legal action 
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for corporate violations of international law norms are examples of such attempts.1  In 
2001, a class action lawsuit was filed in the United States by five holocaust victims 
against International Business Machines for allegedly aiding and abetting crimes 
against humanity and violations of human rights.2   
There have also been calls for direct corporate responsibility for violation of 
international law norms, especially in the area of human rights.  The Draft Norms 
already discussed in chapter two is an example of an attempt to address such calls.  As 
will be recalled from discussion on the Draft Norms, there has equally been strong 
criticisms of such calls.  One aspect of the call for direct corporate responsibility 
which seems uncontroversial is that which relates to international crimes such as 
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity (Core Crimes).3  The 
consensus of distinguished experts is that corporations can be held responsible for 
violations of such core crimes.4   
Therefore, it may be said that International Criminal Law has paved the way for 
direct corporate responsibility.  It recognizes that corporations can be held criminally 
                                                        
1 See the US ACTA cases discussed in chapter 2 in the context of corporate violations of international 
human rights norms. 
2 See Grossman et al v. IBM, Class action compliant filed in US District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York, 11 February 2001, online: CMHT <http://www.cmht.com/pdfs/ibm.pdf>.  See also Cohen, 
Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C Files Class Action Lawsuit against IBM, 11 February, 2001, online: 
CMHT <http://www.cmht.com/cases_cwibm1.php>.  The action was later dismissed in order to speed 
the implementation of the German Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future," making 
payments to the millions of victims of Nazi persecution, see IBM Holocaust Case to be Voluntarily 
Dismissed, online: CMHT <http://www.cmht.com/cases_cwibm2.php>.  For more on the holocaust 
cases and implications for corporations, see Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium 2001, “Fifty Years in the 
Making: World War II Reparation and Restitution Claims” (2002) 20 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 
3 Ward N. Ferdinandusse, Direct application of international criminal law in national courts (NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) where the term core crimes was used. 
4 See comments of the SRSG referred to in chapter 2. 
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responsible for violation of the core crimes, albeit still only through domestic 
jurisdictions.  Currently, no international court addresses corporate responsibility 
even for ‘serious’ international crimes.  Corporate responsibility in international law 
for other international crimes is primarily recognized indirectly – through state 
mechanisms put in place to enforce relevant laws and soft law initiatives.   
This chapter will review the approach of current international law towards 
corporate liability.  International corruption is a crime different in characteristics from 
the core crimes for which direct corporate responsibility is now being recognized, 
nevertheless, it will be argued that direct corporate responsibility is equally relevant for 
international corruption.  The failure of States to hold corporations liable for the 
international crime of corruption calls for direct corporate responsibility.  The 
possibility and implications of making corporations directly responsible under 
international law for the crime of corruption, particularly transnational bribery will be 
explored.  It must be said that the state-centric structure of international law militates 
against the evolution of an international regime of corporate responsibility and 
liability. 
 
4.2 THE CURB OF INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION 
The curb of international corruption gained momentum in the 1990s when the U.S 
Clinton Administration stepped up efforts to seek multilateral action on foreign corrupt 
payments because of the belief by many US corporations that the FCPA put them at a 
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disadvantage in comparison to their counterparts in other developed countries.5  The 
success of the FCPA in deterring corruption through the increased use of civil and 
criminal prosecutions has been discussed in chapter three.6  Some criticisms of the 
FCPA were also addressed in chapter three.  Other criticisms will be addressed in this 
chapter.7 
The efforts of the U.S administration in rallying support for a multilateral treaty 
against foreign bribery was successful when the OECD in 1994 issued 
recommendations to its members to criminalize foreign bribery because it distorts 
international competitiveness and all countries share a responsibility in combating 
bribery in international business transactions.  In 1997, the OECD adopted the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions.8 
Regional efforts to curb corruption carried out by the Organization of American 
States and African Union dealt more with corruption in the performance of public 
functions and acts of corruption specifically related to such performance.  The focus 
                                                        
5 See the Introduction to Jeffrey P. Bialos & Gregory Hussian, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Coping with Corruption in Transitional Economies, (New York: Ocean Publications Inc., 1997).  For 
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(1994) 2 Tulane Journal of Int’l Comp. L 289 at 302ff.  
6 For some successes of the FCPA, see chapter 3 “Examples of International Corruption.”  For general 
reviews on the FCPA, see Daniel Pines, “Amending the FCPA to include a Private Right of Action” 
(1994) 82 Cal L. Rev 185.  See also Diane P. Caggiano, “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The case 
for Multilateral Cooperation” 1999 New England International and Comparative Law Annual, online: < 
http://www.nesl.edu/intljournal/vol5/caggiano.htm>. 
7 For some criticisms of the FCPA, see chapter 3 “Usefulness of Extra-territorial laws”.  See also 
discussions below in this chapter on the OECD WGB review of the FCPA.   
8 OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/BR(97) 20. 
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of these efforts was not on transnational bribery involving corporations.  A regional 
effort which did address such transnational bribery was the Council of Europe 
Conventions; however these conventions have a geographical limitation which further 
limits their scope. 
Until at least the negotiations for the adoption of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption, it seemed the developed world saw corruption as primarily a 
barrier to trade.9  On the adoption of the UNCAC by the General Assembly, former 
secretary-general of the UN Kofi Anan said corruption undermines democracy and the 
rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of 
life and allows organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to 
flourish.10  The preamble to the United Nations Convention against Corruption notes 
concerns about the seriousness of problems and threats posed by corruption to the 
stability and security of societies, undermining the institutions and values of 
democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and 
the rule of law.  This clearly suggests corruption is more than a barrier to trade.  
Corruption has serious negative impacts for many aspects of societal life.  
The study will now examine in more detail selected regional and multi-regional 
laws in place to combat corruption in international business transactions.  Identifying 
                                                        
9 In a statement attributed to Mickey Kantor, a former US Trade Representative and Commerce 
Secretary, it was said that U.S businesses cite bribery, corruption and the lack of transparency in 
government procurement as among the most difficult barriers they confront in the real world.  See 
Bialos, supra note 5.  
10 See the Secretary-General's Statement on the Adoption by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption, New York, 31 October 2003.  online: UN 
<http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=602>. 
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the efficient aspects of such laws and addressing the pitfalls would go a long way in 
eradicating international corruption. 
 
4.2.1 Regional laws 
4.2.1.1 The Organization of American States Inter-American Convention against 
Corruption (Inter-American Convention) 
The Inter-American Convention is the first regional convention on corruption.  The 
Inter-American was adopted on 29 March 1996 in Caracas, Venezuela. The 
Convention entered into force on 6 March 1997 in accordance with Article XXV of the 
treaty. 11  As of July 2008, all the acting members of the OAS except Barbados have 
either ratified or acceded to the convention.12  
The Inter-American Convention’s objective is to (a) promote and strengthen the 
development by each of the State Parties of the mechanisms needed to prevent, detect, 
punish and eradicate corruption and (b) promote, facilitate and regulate co-operation 
among the State Parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent, 
detect, punish and eradicate corruption in the performance of public functions and acts 
of corruption specifically related to such performance.13 
 
                                                        
11 OAS Doc B-58.  Article XXV states “This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day 
following the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification.  For each State ratifying or 
acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the second instrument of ratification, the Convention 
shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or 
accession.”  
12 For most current information on ratification and ascension, see online: OAS 
<http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html>. 
13 See Art. II of the Inter-American Convention. 
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The Inter-American Convention is applicable to a list of corrupt acts stated in 
Article VI.  This includes the act of passive and active bribery.14  Transnational 
bribery is only an act of corruption among States that have established it as an offence.  
States which have not established transnational bribery as an offence are only required 
to provide assistance and co-operation with respect to the offence.15  It is argued that 
transnational bribery should have been included in the list of corrupt acts which all 
State Parties should have been required to adopt legislative or other measures to 
establish as a criminal offence.16  Transnational bribery is a serious deterrent to 
anti-corruption measures which should be tackled aggressively by all states.
 Unfortunately, the only reference to deterrence of transnational bribery applicable 
to all State Parties is found in Article III which deals with preventive measures States 
should consider.  Article III (10) states  
“Deterrents to the bribery of domestic and foreign government officials, such as 
mechanisms to ensure that publicly held companies and other types of associations 
maintain books and records which, in reasonable detail, accurately reflect the 
acquisition and disposition of assets, and have sufficient internal accounting 
                                                        
14 See Art. VI (1) (a) states  “The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a government 
official or a person who performs public functions, of any article of monetary value, or other benefit, 
such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage for himself or for another person or entity, in exchange for 
any act or omission in the performance of his public functions” and Art VI(1) (b) states “The offering or 
granting, directly or indirectly, to a government official or a person who performs public functions, of 
any article of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage for himself or 
for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his public 
functions”. 
15 See Art. VIII of the Inter-American Convention. 
16 Art. VII states that the acts of corruption listed in art VI are the acts requiring legislative or other 
measures. 
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controls to enable their officers to detect corrupt acts.”17 
While such measures are useful, they by themselves are unlikely to deter corruption. 
There is the need to address accounting and transparency mechanisms to combat 
corruption as well as the need to criminalize transnational bribery across all State 
Parties.  Many treaties enacted after the Inter-American Convention with the 
exception of the African Union Convention requires States to make transnational 
bribery a criminal offence.  On the whole, it appears the Inter-American Convention 
does not effectively deal with the issue of curbing transnational bribery.   
A commonly cited criticism of the Inter-American Convention relates to its late 
reference to monitoring and follow-up.  It appears these important acts were not 
considered until 2001 when the Mechanism for Follow-up on the Implementation of 
the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (MESICIC) was established.18  
The MESICIC is an instrument that allows the Member States of the OAS who have 
ratified the Convention to promote its implementation and follow up on the 
commitments agreed to in the Convention.  It also facilitates technical cooperation 
activities; the exchange of information, experiences and best practices; and the 
harmonization of legislation.19   
The MESICIC comprises two bodies: the Conference of the States Parties and the 
                                                        
17 See Art. III of the Inter-American Convention, Para 10. 
18 See Plan of Action at 3rd Summit of the Americas, Quebec city, Canada , April 2001 which called for 
the establishment of a follow-up mechanism.  Online: Summits of the Americas 
<http://www.summit-americas.org/Quebec-Democracy/democracy-eng.htm>.  MESICIC is the 
Spanish acronym.  In May 2001, MESICIC was established at a conference of the State Parties in 
Argentina.  See online: OAS <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/followup_corr_arg.htm>. 
19 See OAS, secretariat for Legal Affairs, online: OAS 
<http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/mesicic_intro_en.htm>. 
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Committee of Experts. The Conference of States Parties is made up of representatives 
of all the states and has the authority and general responsibility for implementing the 
Mechanism, while the Committee of Experts is made up of experts appointed by each 
State Party and is the body responsible for the technical analysis of how States 
implement the Convention.20  In June 2006, the Committee of Experts produced a 
first hemispheric report on the progress against corruption in the countries of the OAS.  
The Committee selected specific provisions of the Inter-American Convention for this 
first round of reviews, namely Articles III (1), (2), (4), (9) and 11; XIV and XV111.21  
Article III (10) of the Inter-American Convention which deals with measures for 
deterrence of bribery of domestic and foreign government officials through the use of 
proper accounting and auditing mechanisms by companies and other associations was 
not a focus of the Committee of Experts.  As a result, it is unsurprising that deterrents 
to transnational bribery were not addressed in the report.  This is unfortunate.  It is 
submitted that the opportunity to evaluate useful information which would have been 
provided by twenty eight Member States 22  on their approach to deterrence of 
transnational bribery through the use of proper accounting was missed.  It is hoped 
that considerations of Article III (10) measures would be made in subsequent progress 
reports.  
 
                                                        
20 See MESICIC Hemispheric Report: First Round Review, Committee of Experts, online: OAS  
< http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/mec_ron1_inf_hemis_en.doc>. 
21 Ibid. 
22 See Press release, Reports Presented on Efforts to Fight Corruption and Drugs, (6 June 2006) online: 
OAS < http://www.oea.org/oaspage/press_releases/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-009AG36>. 
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4.2.1.2 Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption23  
The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption was adopted on 4 
November 1998 by the Council of Ministers.  It opened for signature in January 1999 
in Strasbourg and entered into force on 1 July 2002. As of October 2008, it had 40 
ratifications from the 47 member states of the Council of Europe.24  Although the 
convention is open to non-member states, Belarus is the only non-member state party 
which has ratified the convention.  Mexico and the U.S which have observer status 
have signed but not ratified the convention.25  
The objective of the convention is to criminalize specific forms of corruption.  
The criminal convention does not define corruption.26  The forms of corruption 
include, but are not limited to active and passive bribery of domestic public officials;27 
foreign public officials;28 bribery of officials of international organizations;29 and 
bribery in the private sector.  This makes the convention broader in scope compared to 
                                                        
23 See Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No: 173.  The Council of Europe has both Civil 
and Criminal Law Conventions.  The chapter will be concerned with the Criminal Law Convention 
simply because the Civil Law Convention deals with rules of civil litigation victims of corruption can 
use to sue.  This Civil Law Convention is mentioned in chapter 5.  
24 Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, San Mario and Ukraine have signed the convention but have not yet 
ratified the convention.  Leichtenstein has neither signed nor ratified the convention.  For most current 
information on ratification and ascension, see online: COE < 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=173&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG>. 
25 Ibid.  Belarus is a country applying for membership to the Council of Europe.  However, the special 
guest status of Belarus has been suspended because of lack of respect for human rights and democratic 
principles, see online: COE  
< http://www.coe.int/T/e/com/about_coe/member_states/e_Belarus.asp>. 
26 However, the explanatory notes states “Even if no common definition has yet been found by the 
international community to describe corruption as such, everyone seems at least to agree that certain 
political, social or commercial practices are corrupt”. See supra note 23. 
27 Articles 2 and 3, Criminal Law Convention. 
28 Article 5, Criminal Law Convention. 
29 Article 9, Criminal Law Convention. 
 138
the Inter-American Convention.  The Convention also goes further than the 
Inter-American Convention because it makes transnational bribery a punishable crime 
which all State Parties are required to criminalize through legislative and other 
measures under its domestic law.   
State Parties are also required to ensure that sanctions for natural and legal persons 
are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.30  Legal persons may be held liable for 
criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.31  State Parties are 
required to adopt legislative and other measures to establish jurisdiction for crimes by 
way of territorial or nationality principles subject to reservations.32 
The convention specifically deals with corporate liability.  It requires State 
Parties to adopt measures to ensure legal persons33 can be held liable for active bribery.  
Any natural person acting individually or as part of an organ of the legal person with a 
leading position based on power of representation of the legal person; or authority to 
take decisions on behalf of the legal person; or authority to exercise control within the 
legal person can make the legal person liable.34  This form of liability is similar to the 
identification doctrine in the U.K which has been the subject of much criticism.35  
However, an extra provision in the convention provides that a legal person can also be 
held liable for the lack of supervision or control of a natural person which has made the 
                                                        
30 See Article 19(1), Criminal Law Convention. 
31 See Article 19 (2), Criminal Law Convention. 
32 See Article 17, Criminal Law Convention. 
33 Article 1(d) defines legal person as any entity having such status under the applicable national law, 
except for States or other public bodies in the exercise of State authority and for public international 
organizations. 
34 See Artilce 18(1), Criminal Law Convention. 
35 See chapter 3 of the study for discussions on the identification doctrine for corporate liability. 
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commission of the criminal offence possible.36  This provision can be seen as an 
additional measure to ensure corporate liability.  The application of this provision by 
State Parties would be useful and is therefore welcome. 
 Monitoring and follow-up is ensured by the Group of States against Corruption 
(GRECO).37  GRECO is currently made up of 46 member states.  Membership is not 
limited to Council of Europe member states and presently, the United States along with 
the 45 Council of Europe States are members.  GRECO is a body called to monitor, 
through a process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure, the observance of the 
guiding principles in the fight against corruption and the implementation of 
international legal instruments adopted in pursuance of the Programme of Action 
against Corruption.38  GRECO has completed two evaluation rounds and is currently 
on the third.39   
The Criminal Law Convention addresses transnational bribery better than the 
Inter-American Convention.  Unlike Inter-American Convention, GRECO has 
addressed the theme of legal persons and corruption.  It will be recalled, that it has 
been argued that the Inter-American Convention needs to consider making 
                                                        
36 See Article 18 (2), Criminal Law Convention. 
37 See Article 24, Criminal Law Convention. 
38 See Explanatory Notes, Introduction, Criminal Law Convention, Criminal Law Convention, online: 
COE < http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/173.htm>. 
39 See Council of Europe, How does GRECO work, online: COE <http://www.coe.int>.  GRECO’s 
first round evaluations dealt with the extent of immunities of public officials from arrest, prosecution etc 
and took place between 2000 and 2002.  The second round is more relevant to this study.  It dealt with 
the prevention and detection of corruption in public administration and the prevention of legal persons 
from being used as shields for corruption – 5th Guiding Principle against Corruption.  It took place 
between 2003 and 2006.  The third round was launched in January 2007 and addresses incrimination 
provided for in the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and transparency of party funding. 
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transnational bribery a crime applicable to all.  The Criminal Law Convention 
recognizes corporate liability and addresses many of the issues relevant for corporate 
liability.  It requires States to address transnational bribery.  However, because the 
parties to the convention are made up of European states, there are geographical limits 
to the applicability of the convention and arguably its effectiveness. 
More importantly, like other regional and international conventions dealing with 
corporate liability for corruption and transnational bribery, it relies on the State Parties 
to adopt legislative measures to comply with the convention.  The question is whether 
such State legislative measures are proving effective in the anti-corruption fight. Are 
States effectively addressing the issue of corporate liability and transnational bribery?  
The discussions in chapter three of the study suggest that some States are not 
addressing the problem adequately. 
  
4.2.1.3 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU 
Convention)40   
The AU Convention is a relatively new regional convention on corruption.  It was 
adopted on 11 July 2003 in Maputo, Mozambique.  It entered into force on 5 August 
2006.41  Of the 53 member states of the African Union (AU), the AU convention has 
                                                        
40 43 ILM 5 (2004). For a discussion on the African Union Anti-corruption Convention, see Nsogurua J. 
Udombana, “Fighting Corruption Seriously? Africa’s Anti-Corruption Convention” (2003) 7 Sing. J. 
I.C.L 447. 
41 Art.23 (2) states the convention will enter into force thirty days after the date of the deposit of the 
fifteenth instrument of ratification or accession. 
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received 43 signatories and 27 ratifications.42  It is interesting to note that almost half 
of the African states constituting the African Union have not ratified the convention.  
This is rather unfortunate, especially when it is apparent that corruption is endemic in 
many African states. 
The convention’s objectives are multi-fold.  The Convention aims to promote and 
strengthen the development of mechanisms to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate 
corruption and related offences in the public and private sector in African states.  It 
also aims to facilitate and regulate cooperation to ensure the effectiveness of measures 
and actions used in the fight against corruption; and coordinate and harmonize member 
state policies and legislation to combat corruption.43   
The convention is applicable to a list of corrupt acts.  These include active and 
passive bribery of public officials and private sector; illicit benefits obtained by public 
officials; illegal diversion of public property by public officials; and the use or 
concealment of proceeds derived from any of the acts.44  The acts relate to public and 
private sector corruption.  With regard to bribery of foreign public officials, the 
convention is silent.  One observer notes:  
                                                        
42 See African Union, List of Countries which have signed or ratified the Convention, online: AU 
<http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/treaties.htm>.  Countries which have 
ratified the convention are Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Ethopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Libya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Niger, 
Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
43 See articles 2(1), (2) and (3) of the AU Convention.  Two other objectives stated in the convention 
are to promote socio-economic development by removing obstacles to human rights and to establish 
conditions to foster transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs – Articles 2(4) 
and (5). 
44 See article 4 of the AU Convention.  These include active and passive bribery of public officials and 
private sector; illicit benefits obtained by public officials; illegal diversion of public property by public 
officials; and the use or concealment of proceeds derived from any of the acts referred to in article 4. 
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“[t]he Convention might be contemplating such further acts of corruption like the 
bribery of foreign public officials by large multinational corporations (MNCs).  
The Convention ought to have dealt specifically with this, because the offering of 
bribes to foreign public officials, including officials of public international 
organizations, is at the root of many corrupt administrations in Africa.  Such 
corrupt practices usually are intended to retain business or other undue advantage 
in relation to the conduct of international business, including the provision of 
international aid.”45 
The AU Convention needs to address the problem of transnational bribery and 
corporate liability in its aim to deter corruption.  It is worthwhile to note that article 
22(5) (e) of the Convention requires the advisory board on corruption to collect 
information and analyze the conduct and behavior of MNCs operating in Africa.  This 
information is then to be disseminated to national authorities designated under article 
18(1).  However, at present the impact of article 22(5) (e) on transnational bribery and 
corporate liability cannot be appreciated.  This is because it does not appear that an 
advisory board on corruption as been elected as yet.  
Article 22 of the Convention states an advisory board on corruption shall be 
established within the African Union.46  The board is to be made up of 11 members 
elected by the Executive council.47  Appointment to the board will be for a period of 
two years, renewable once.48  It is not clear whether the advisory board is functioning 
                                                        
45 Udombana, supra note 40 at 464-465. 
46 See article 22(1) of the AU Convention. 
47 See article 22(2) of the AU Convention. 
48 See article 22(4) of the AU Convention. 
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effectively.  In a March 2008 reminder sent by the AU commission to member states 
of the Convention, the election of members of the advisory board was deferred from 
January 2008 to June/July 2008 because of a failure of member states to submit 
sufficient number of candidates.49  It is not known if the election took place during the 
13th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council which took place in Sharm El-Sheikh, 
Egypt.50 
The Convention requires State Parties to communicate to the board within a year 
of the coming into force of the instrument, their progress in implementing the 
Convention.  Thereafter, State Parties are required to ensure national anti-corruption 
authorities report to the board at least once a year.51  Without the election of the 
advisory board, it is unlikely that State Parties will be able to fulfill these requirements.  
This failure puts the whole monitoring and follow-up process of the AU convention 
into question.  Follow-up and monitoring is very important in the effectiveness of any 
treaty or regulation and the AU commission needs to pay serious attention to this issue.  
On a more general note, the overall effectiveness of the convention is yet to be seen as 
it has just recently entered into force.   
 So far, it appears that regional laws are not very effective against transnational 
                                                        
49 See Reminder to Ministries of Foreign Affairs of all member States of the African Union (24 March 
2008) reference: BC/OLC/24.12/22708.Vol.VIII.  See also past events/news for verbal notes on the 
elections scheduled for June/July 2008, online: AU  
< http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/index/archive1_April_2008.htm>. 
50 In a draft agenda dated 30 May 2008, the election of advisory board on corruption is not listed as an 
item.  See Draft Agenda of the Executive Council at the 11th AU Summit, online: AU 
<http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2008/june/summit/summit.htm>.  No reference is 
found on the AU website to suggest the election took place. 
51 See article 22(7) of the AU Convention. 
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bribery.  The Inter-American and the AU conventions discussed above do not address 
this phenomenon.  The Council of Europe convention which does is limited by 
geography.    Furthermore, even countries which have ratified the Council of Europe 
Convention may have significant issues with implementation.  For example, the UK 
which has ratified the convention has significant issues with the implementation of its 
corruption laws for corporate liability.52  The study will now consider the impact of 
treaties which can be said to be more international in nature because they span many 
regions of the world. 
 
4.2.2 Multi-Regional Laws 
4.2.2.1 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention) 
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was adopted on 27 November 1997 by the 
negotiating conference consisting of twenty nine OECD member states and five 
non-member States.53  The Convention was signed on 17 December 1997 and entered 
into force on 15 February 1999.54    As of 12 March 2008, 37 countries have 
                                                        
52 See chapter 3 for examples of UK issues relating to corporate liability for corruption. 
53 The five non-member states were Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile and Slovak Republic.  Slovak 
Republic became an OECD member in December 2000 bringing the number of OECD states to 30.  
The twenty nine member states at the negotiation conference were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iclenad, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 




ratification status.55  
The OECD anti-bribery convention aims to end bribery in international business 
transactions by requesting State Parties to take measures to establish the crime of 
bribery of a foreign public official56.  The Convention deals with the “active bribery” 
or “supply side” of corruption which is the offering of bribes by natural or legal 
persons to foreign public officials in international business transactions. 57   The 
Convention stipulates that bribes of foreign public officials shall be punishable by 
‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties’ but where the legal system 
of a party does not recognize criminal responsibility for legal persons, non-criminal 
sanctions may be used.58  Jurisdiction is by way of the generally accepted territorial 
                                                        
55 For most current information on ratification and ascension, see online: OECD 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf >.  Estonia, Slovenia and South Africa are three 
other non-member states that have ratified the convention. 
56 The offences set out in articles 1(1) and (2) of the convention constitute the crime of bribery of public 
official.  Article 1(1) states  
Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence 
under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other 
advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official 
or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance 
of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of 
international business. 
Article 1(2) states  
Each Party shall take any measures necessary to establish that complicity in, including incitement, 
aiding and abetting, or authorisation of an act of bribery of a foreign public official shall be a 
criminal offence. Attempt and conspiracy to bribe a foreign public official shall be criminal 
offences to the same extent as attempt and conspiracy to bribe a public official of that Party. 
57 See Article 2 of the OECD Anti-bribery convention.  See also Angel Gurria, “OECD fights 
Corruption” online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/51/37418910.pdf > 2006.  See also the 
Commentaries on the Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international 
business transactions, online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org>.  
58 See art 3(1) & (2) of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
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and nationality principles.59 
Monitoring and follow-up for implementation of the convention is vested in the 
OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions (WGB).60  
The working group is composed of government officials from all countries committed 
to implementing the anti-corruption instruments. Such officials are typically from the 
ministries of Justice or Economics and Finance. The working group monitors 
implementation of the convention and related recommendations.  It also examines 
specific issues relating to bribery in International Business Transactions and engages in 
outreach events to broaden awareness of the Convention and its objectives.61   
The working group’s monitoring and implementation involves two evaluative 
phases which are peer-reviewed.  Phase 1 began in April 1999 and involves an 
examination of the relevant laws and secondary legal sources of each party to 
determine whether they conform to the requirements under the convention.  Phase 2 
focuses on application laws in practice.62  Of the 37 State Parties to the OECD who 
are required to comply with the evaluative phases, the focus here will be on two 
member states – the United Kingdom and the United States.63   
                                                        
59 See art. 4 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.  Article 4 also states where two or more parties 
have jurisdiction on an alleged offence, the parties shall consult ‘with a view to determining the most 
appropriate jurisdiction. 
60 See art. 12 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
61 See OECD Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, “Participation in the OECD Working group on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions and the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions” DAFFE/IME/BR/WD(99)30/Rev2.  
62 OECD Policy Brief, “The Fight Against Bribery and Corruption” September 2000 online: OECD 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/6/1918235.pdf >. 
63 The domestic and extraterritorial laws of both states were discussed in chapter 3. 
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The working group’s phase 1 evaluative report showed that the applicability of 
UK laws to the OECD convention was uncertain.  The UK common law and statutory 
offences did not expressly apply to foreign bribery.  There was no reported case where 
the common law applied to foreign bribery and only one reported case where statutory 
offences were cited in relation to foreign bribery.  Jurisdiction was limited to bribery 
acts which partly took place within the UK.64  This led to a phase Ibis report which 
showed improvements by the UK to strengthen compliance with the Convention.  In 
2001, the UK implemented Part 12 of the ATCSA which clarified the application of 
UK laws to foreign bribery and introduced nationality jurisdiction.65   
However, there are still issues which the working group has recommended that the 
UK look into.  This includes addressing the uncertainties of the UK law language as 
to determining which category of public officials are covered by which offence.66  
There are also uncertainties as to whether the UK laws conform to article 1(1) of the 
convention.67  Article 1(1) of the convention covers the offering, promising and 
giving.  The U.K common law on the other hand refers to offering of undue award 
with no reference to giving or promising.  Article 1(1) also covers ‘any undue 
pecuniary or other advantage.  The U.K laws have different definitions applicable for 
                                                        
64 See U.K: Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 Recommendation Phase 1 Bis 
Report released 3 March 2003, online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/50/2498215.pdf>. 
65 Ibid.  Nationality jurisdiction means any U.K national or company or other entity incorporated under 
U.K law can now be prosecuted in the courts of England, Wales and Northern Ireland for bribery even 
no part of the offence took place in the U.K. 
66 Ibid at 14 ff.  For instance, the working group raised the question whether under U.K law, public 
international organisations will be regarded as public authorities for the purpose of statutory definitions 
and whether agents and officials of such organisations will be regarded as occupying public office. 
67 Ibid.     
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common law and or statutory law.  It is hoped that these issues will be addressed when 
the UK corruption laws are revamped.   
The working group has also stated that it will examine as part of UK phase 2 
evaluation, whether the law officer’s consent which is required for prosecution of a 
bribery offence under UK statutory law is an obstacle to effective implementation of 
the convention, particularly article 5.68  The working group believes the exercise by 
prosecutors of discretion based on public interest and in the exercise by the attorney 
general or solicitor general (law officers) of the right to grant or withhold consent to 
prosecute may be in breach of article 5.  In the phase 2 reports, the UK Attorney 
General stated that none of the considerations prohibited by article 5 would be taken to 
into account as public interest factors not to prosecute.  Nevertheless, the working 
group has called for more awareness by relevant agencies and offices of Law officer of 
the U.K’s commitment to article 5 of the convention.69  
An interesting case to note here is the judicial review brought by Corner House 
and others in relation to the BAE corruption case.70  The case has been discussed in 
chapter three under UK criminal rules.  The aspect of the case relevant here relates to 
the UK’s compliance with article 5 of the OECD Anti-bribery Convention.  In the 
                                                        
68 Article 5 states investigation and prosecution “shall not be influenced by 
considerations of national economic interest, the potential effect upon relations with another State or the 
identity of the natural or legal persons involved”.   
69 See U.K: Phase 2, Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendations on Combating 
Bribery in International Business Transactions, 17 March 2005, Para 171, online: OECD 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/32/34599062.pdf>. 
70 R (on the application of Corner House Research and Others) (Respondents) v Director of the Serious 
Fraud Office (Appellant) (Criminal Appeal from Her Majesty’s High Court of Justice) [2008] UKHL 60 
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case, the director of the SFO had declared publicly that he was acting in accordance 
with article 5.  However, the director said he did not believe his decision to terminate 
the investigations which was based on national security was in breach of article 5 of 
the OECD.  He went on to say that even if his decision had been incompatible with 
article 5, he would still have discontinued the investigation.  The House of Lords 
declined to address the problematic problems of interpretation for these reasons given 
by the director.71 
 One of the grounds on which the claimants challenged the director’s decision was 
that the director had mis-interpreted article 5 of the OECD convention.  The 
claimants’ argued that the director’s decision was taken because of the potential effect 
of the investigation upon relations with another state.  Therefore, the ground upon 
which the decision was taken was contrary to the prohibition in article 5.  The 
defendant argued that the court had no jurisdiction to interpret or apply article 5 
because the convention is an international instrument which does not form part of 
English law.72  
The high court held that in the instant case, because the director chose to justify 
the decision by invoking compatibility with the convention, the court could review the 
legality of the director’s decision under ordinary domestic law principles.  Further, the 
court held that it could interpret the convention because the UK had enforced sec 109 
of the ATCSA in compliance with the UK’s obligation under article 1 of the OECD 
                                                        
71 Ibid at para 47 
72 See The Queen on the Application of Corner House Research and Campaign Against Arms Trade 
(Claimants) v The Director of the Serious Fraud Office (defendant) and BAE Systems PLC (Interested 
Party) [2008] EWHC 714, paras 49, 105 and 106. 
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convention.  The court felt the exercise of discretion whether to continue to 
investigate or prosecute in a manner which undermines the very purpose for which the 
offence was created is a matter susceptible to the review of the courts.  The court then 
went on to consider the approach to be taken for interpretation.  However, the high 
court decided a ruling on the interpretation of article 5 was not necessary as it had 
concluded that under conventional domestic law principle, the director’s decision was 
unlawful.  The court concluded it was up to the OECD working group to determine 
the interpretation of article 5.73  The House of Lords affirmed the decision of the high 
court that it was up to the WGB to determine the interpretation of article 5.  The 
House of Lords opined it was questionable for the court to interpret an unincorporated 
provision which had no judicial authority.74 
The phase 2 follow-up report also notes that the UK has yet failed to replace 
existing statutory requirement for Attorney General’s consent with a requirement for 
the consent of the public prosecutor or a nominated deputy despite public 
announcements to the effect.  Statements that the director of the serious frauds office 
will also be given consent have also not been acted upon.75 
With regards to the U.S evaluation process, the working group stated that the 
amendments to the FCPA carried out in 1998 generally implements the standards set by 
the OECD convention. 76   However, there are limited problem areas in which 
                                                        
73 Ibid. at paras 119 , 120, 121, 130, 153 and 154. 
74 Supra note 70 at paras 44, 45 and 46. 
75 See U.K: Phase 2, Follow-up Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2 Recommendations, 21 
June 2007, Para 11, online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/13/38962457.pdf>. 
76 See U.S Phase 1, Review of the Implementation of the Convention and 1997 recommendations, 
(April 1999) pg 21, online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/50/2390377.pdf>. 
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recommendations have been made to the US.  These include the need to clarify that 
the offence of offering, giving or promising bribes is in order to obtain or retain 
business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business.  The 
working group felt that the way the FCPA dealt with the issue of ‘other advantage’ 
which comes before ‘obtaining or retaining business’ may give rise to problems in the 
prosecution of offences.77  Calls were also made for clear statements identifying the 
criteria applied in determining the priorities of the Department of Justice and Securities 
Exchange Commission in carrying out FCPA prosecutions.   
Other issues which the working group seeks to follow up include that relating to 
the offence of bribery for foreign public officials where foreign official directs benefits 
to third parties and the question - whether directors, officers or employees of state 
controlled enterprises are also classified as public officials is on the list for follow-up.78  
                                                        
77 Ibid at 22.  Article 1(1) of the Convention requires State Parties to establish as a criminal offence 
under its laws for any person to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage.  The 
FCPA makes it an offence for any issuer or domestic concern to make use of the mails or any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or 
authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving 
of anything of value to 
 (1) any foreign official for purposes of 
(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such 
foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing 
any improper advantage; or 
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality 
thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, 
in order to assist such person in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any 
person. See §78dd-1 and§78dd-2 of the FCPA, online: 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/statute.html>. 
78 See Compilation of Recommendations made in the Phase 2 Reports on the Application of the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
and the 1997 Recommendations on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, July 
2007, pg 118, online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/45/38939143.pdf>. 
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There are also questions whether the Nationality jurisdiction which give the US 
authority to hold U.S national and businesses liable for foreign bribery acts committed 
abroad is effective in the fight against bribery of foreign public officials.79 
On the whole, the working group’s approach to monitoring and follow-up needs to 
be commended.  The process is systematic and transparent.  Reports of state parties 
and actions of the working group are easily accessible and where necessary critical of 
the lapses in national implementing laws.  This is unlike the AU convention which is 
yet to establish a functioning advisory board responsible for monitoring and 
follow-up.80 
Nevertheless, there have doubts raised - whether transnational laws such as the US 
anti-corruption legislation and the OECD anti-bribery convention are leading to higher 
standards of corporate conduct among foreign investors. 81   Susan Hawley has 
suggested three reasons why the OECD has had so little impact.  The first reason is 
the lack of prosecutions.  Hawley noted that with the exception of the US, no 
company in any OECD country has been prosecuted for or convicted of bribery since 
the Convention came into effect.82  There is much validity in this reason.  At least in 
                                                        
79 Ibid. 
80 See discussions in this chapter under the AU Convention and references to the Advisory Board. 
81 Susan Hawley, “Turning a Blind Eye: Corruption and the UK Export Credits Guarantee”, Corner 
House, December 2003.  See Hawley’s reference to Joel Hellman, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufman, 
“Are Foreign Investors and Multinational engaging in Corrupt Practices in Transition Economies? 
Transition , May,- June – July 2000, p 6 where the authors refers to a World bank survey which shows 
that foreign investors with overseas headquarters are most likely to pay public procurement kickbacks 
than domestic firms with no FDI or transnational firms headquartered in a host country, thus challenging 
the efficacy of transnational anti-bribery conventions and laws or self-imposed codes of conduct, online: 
World Bank <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/fdi_trans_0800.pdf>.  See also Susan 
Hawley, “Underwriting Bribery Export Credit Agencies and Corruption”, Corner House 2003. 
82 Hawley, Turning a Blind Eye, Ibid. 
 153
the United Kingdom, no company has been convicted of bribery since the OECD 
Convention came into effect.83  
The second reason has to do with slow monitoring of implementation.  Hawley 
noted that the OECD was meant to have reviewed the effectiveness of state parties 
implementing legislation by 2005 and opined it would take up to 2010 at the earliest 
before all the signatories have been assessed.84  Hawley was writing in 2003.   Now, 
in 2008 with the benefit of hindsight, it seems that with regards to monitoring, the 
phase 1 assessment has been speedy with the all 37 countries reviewed.   Although 
Phase 2 has not been so speedy,85 this understandably may be because Phase 2 requires 
more work.  Work carried out during Phase 2 reviews include comprehensive written 
questionnaires, months of preliminary research and a week’s visit to the country being 
evaluated.86  The working group has reported that year 2008 will mark the end of 
phase 2 reviews for all current state parties.87   
Hawley’s third reason is the omission of anti-bribery laws to deal with the 
problems of corporate liability for acts of agents and subsidiaries.  This reason, 
Hawley sees as the main reason why the OECD has such little impact.88  Like the first 
                                                        
83 See Chapter 3 of the study and discussions on the UK approach to enforcement, see also supra note 
69 at para 249. 
84 Ibid. 
85 The only State left to be reviewed in Phase 2 is South Africa which joined the convention in 2007.  
See Country Reports on the Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the 1997 
Revised Recommendation, online: OECD <www.oecd.org>. 
86 See OECD Working Group on Bribery, Annual Report 2006, online: OECD  
< http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/29/38865251.pdf>. 
87 Ibid.  At the time of the report there were 36 State parties, South Africa had not joined the 
convention.  It is yet to be seen whether the review for South Africa will be completed in that time  
88 Supra note 81. 
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reason, this reason still has much validity.  Corporate liability for acts of foreign 
subsidiaries is problematic because the issue of how to deal with foreign subsidiaries is 
linked to how countries deal with notions of corporate responsibility in their national 
company laws.89  The different approach of countries when determining jurisdiction 
for acts of foreign subsidiaries is also a concern which might hamper effective 
implementation and lead to uneven application of the Convention.90 
The OECD convention states the common elements of the offence of bribery as - 
the offer, promise or giving of any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether 
directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a 
third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the 
performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper 
advantage in the conduct of international business. 91   This would suggest that 
measures taken by state parties should include criminalizing indirect bribery through 
intermediaries such as agents and foreign subsidiaries.  
In 1997, six days before the OECD convention was adopted, the decision of the 
council concerning further work on combating bribery in international business 
transactions included amongst others the need for the WGB to examine on a priority 
basis the role of foreign subsidiaries in bribery transactions with a view to reporting 
conclusions at the 1999 OECD council meeting.92  The WGB through a series of 
                                                        
89 See Report by the CIME: implementation of the Convention of the Bribery in International Bribery 
Transactions and the 1997 Revised Recommendation, Official use, C/Min(99)5. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Article 1(1) of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
92 See Decision of the Council concerning further work on Combating Bribery in International Business 
transactions, 11 December, 1997 c(97)240/Final. 
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questionnaires asked state parties what action they would take against a corporate 
headquarters if it ‘authorised’; ‘should have known’; ‘knows’ or ‘had knowledge’ of 
the bribery transactions.  Majority of the countries had no problem holding the 
corporate headquarters liable if it authorized the bribery as there would be sufficient 
territorial link. However, if the corporation headquarters had no knowledge, they could 
not hold it liable.93 
As regards ‘should have known’ or ‘knows’, many of the states said it depended 
on whether the state had a concept of corporate responsibility which could hold the 
corporation headquarters liable for civil law offences such as breach of duty, gross 
negligence, or reckless disregard of legal provisions concerning corporate 
organisations and control of parent companies over their subsidiaries.  For those 
countries with criminal corporate liability, in order to find the headquarters liable, the 
offences of complicity or conspiracy had to be applicable.  However some states 
replied that they could not hold the headquarters liable because the act of bribery 
occurred in a foreign jurisdiction.94 
 The WGB noted that experience with the implementation of the Convention might 
clarify the extent to which this problem would require further action.95  Indeed, 
implementation of the convention and the continuing work of the WGB are clarifying 
the extent of the problem.  For example, in the US, if the act of the foreign subsidiary 
occurred outside the US, FCPA would not apply except the parent company authorized, 
                                                        
93 Supra note 89, paras 34 and 36. 
94 Ibid. at para 35. 
95 Ibid. at para 40. 
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directed or controlled foreign subsidiary or a finding of reckless disregard is possible.96 
In the case of the UK, the phase 2 report of 2005 notes if a wholly owned foreign 
subsidiary of a UK company is the offender, the UK parent company would not 
generally be liable.  There would be the need to show direction or authorization by a 
directing mind which as will be recalled has been highly criticized.97  The WGB has 
recommended that the UK broaden the level of persons engaging the criminal liability 
of legal persons for foreign bribery.98  This recommendation has been re-iterated in 
the 2007 phase 2 follow-up report.99   
Indeed, the WGB has decided to conduct a supplementary review of the UK Phase 
2 follow-up report focused on progress in enacting a new foreign bribery law and in 
broadening the liability of companies for foreign bribery.100 Therefore, while it is 
accepted that a major reason why the OECD has had so little impact is because of the 
omission of anti-bribery laws to hold companies responsible for acts of agents and 
subsidiaries abroad, a careful analysis of the work of the WGB points to the fact that 
this reason cannot be isolated from the approach of countries to corporate liability.  
The OECD convention requirement that states solely determine legislative measures 
for holding corporations liable needs to be reviewed.  The commentary to the OECD 
convention emphasizes the functional equivalence which the convention seeks to 
                                                        
96 United States: Phase 2, Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendations on 
Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, October 2002, Para 17, online: OECD 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/19/1962084.pdf>. 
97 Supra note 69, para 203. 
98 Ibid., para 206.  
99 Supra note 75. 
100 Ibid. 
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assure in that it does not require uniformity or changes in fundamental principles of a 
Party’s legal system.   
Nevertheless, it is argued that the requirement that States solely determine 
legislative and enforcement measures for corporate liability needs some commonality 
because of the diversity of State parties approach in determining corporate liability, 
criminal or otherwise.  Another reason is the difficulties of holding parent companies 
responsible for acts of foreign subsidiaries.  Finally, some degree of commonality is 
required because countries are generally reluctant to hold companies responsible for 
foreign bribery.  Just as the definition of bribery has common elements, article 2 
which deals with the responsibility of legal persons needs some common elements.  It 
is interesting to note that the OECD Secretary General, Angel Gurria in his opening 
remarks at the WGB in January 2007 mentioned the intention of the WGB to review 
the anti-bribery instruments – the convention and related recommendations.  No 
doubt, it is hoped this important omission in the instruments will be given full 
consideration.101 
 
4.2.2.2 The UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)102   
The UNCAC is the clearest indication to date that the international community is 
serious in its fight against corruption, not simply as it affects international trade but its 
effect on other aspects of international life.  It is perhaps the first truly binding 
                                                        
101  Opening Remarks by Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General, Working Group on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions, 16 January 2007.  Online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org >. 
102 U.N Doc A. Res/58/4. 
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international treaty to address corruption.  The UNCAC was adopted on 31 October 
2003 and entered into force on 14 December 2005.   As at September 2008, it has 140 
signatories and 126 ratifications.103   
The convention aims to prevent and combat corruption efficiently and effectively 
on a global scale.  It also aims to ensure international co-operation and technical 
assistance in the anticorruption fight; and promote integrity, accountability and proper 
management of public affairs and public property.104  It is divided into eight chapters 
including Preventive measures (Chapter II); Criminalization and law enforcement 
(Chapter III); International cooperation (Chapter IV); and Asset recovery (Chapter V).  
The thrust of this section will be concerned with Chapters II and III in relation to 
corporations. 
The Preventive measures include anti-corruption policies and practices.105 Article 
5(3) requires the State Party to endeavour to establish and promote effective practices 
aimed at the prevention of corruption; and periodically evaluate relevant legal 
instruments and administrative measures with a view to determining their adequacy to 
prevent and fight corruption.  This measure needs to be taken more seriously by State 
Parties.  It is questionable whether States actually evaluate their legal instruments and 
                                                        
103 For most current information on ratification and ascension, see online: UNODC 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html>. 
104 See chapter 1, article 1 of the UNCAC. 
105 See chapter II, article 5 of the UNCAC.  Other preventive measures are the use of anti-corruption 
bodies to prevent corruption (article 6); proper adoption and maintenance of public sector (article 7); 
code of conducts for public officials (article 8); public procurement and management of public finances 
(article 9); public reporting (article 10); measures relating to judiciary and prosecution services (article 
11); prevention of private sector corruption (article 12); participation of society (article 13); and 
prevention of money-laundering (article 14). 
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administrative measures to determine if they are adequate in the anti-corruption fight.  
For instance, the United Kingdom which is a member of the UNCAC needs not only to 
evaluate its legal instruments but revamp it to make it more adequate and efficient in 
curbing corruption.  
State Parties are also required to take measures to prevent corruption involving the 
private sector by enhancing accounting and auditing standards using civil, 
administrative or criminal penalties where necessary to ensure compliance.106  Tax 
deductibility for bribes is disallowed.107  The application of the UNCAC to private 
sector corruption and the discouragement of tax deductions for bribes confirm the 
approach of the international community to eradicate corruption in all sectors. 
Chapter III of the UNCAC criminalizes certain offences.  This include the 
bribery of national public officials, foreign public officials or officials of public 
international organization which State Parties are required to adopt legislative and 
other measures to establish.108 State Parties are also required to establish liability of 
legal persons (corporations) for participation in any offence established with the 
convention.  Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative.  In particular, 
legal persons held liable are to be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
                                                        
106 See chapter II, article 12(1) of the UNCAC. 
107 See chapter II, article 12(4) of the UNCAC. 
108 See chapter III, articles 15 and 16 of the UNCAC.  Other offences which should be criminalized 
include embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official (article 17); 
intentional laundering of proceeds of crime (article 23); intentional obstruction of justice (article 25).  
Offences which State Parties should consider criminalizing include trading in influence (article 18); 
abuse of functions by public official (article 19); illicit enrichment (article 20); bribery in the private 
sector (article 21); and embezzlement of property in the private sector (article 22). 
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criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.109   
Similar to the OECD convention, State parties have jurisdiction over the offences 
established mainly by way of the more common forms of jurisdiction, namely 
territorial and nationality jurisdictions. 110   The convention also notes that the 
convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a 
State Party in accordance with its domestic law.111 
Like the OECD anti-bribery convention and the Council of Europe Criminal 
Convention, the UNCAC has great potential to be a useful tool in ensuring corporate 
responsibility or liability for corporate corrupt practices.  However, the strong 
emphasis on legislative measures and enforcement emanating from domestic law 
creates strong hurdles in the fight against corruption.  The discussions already 
presented in relation to corporate liability of legal persons under the OECD convention 
are applicable to the UNCAC and will not be repeated here. 
So far, the discussions have focused on the curb of international corruption 
through the use of regional and multi-regional laws heavily dependent on domestic law, 
including extra-territorial laws for enforcement.112  No doubt, while domestic law if 
effective remains by far the most suitable means for these purposes, there is the need to 
look at international law, particularly when domestic law is ineffective.  With this in 
mind, the study will now consider the merits for and against direct corporate 
responsibility under international law, particularly the possibility of having direct 
                                                        
109 See chapter III, article 26 of the UNCAC. 
110 See chapter III, article 42 of the UNCAC. 
111 See chapter III, art. 42 (6) of the UNCAC. 
112 For discussions on extra-territorial laws, see chapter 3 of the study. 
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corporate responsibility for transnational bribery transactions.  
 
4.3 DIRECT CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Under the international human rights discourse, there have been recent writings about 
the suitability or not of direct corporate responsibility for human rights violations.113  
Many of these writing were in the light of the Draft Norms which were hailed to be a 
useful statement of the scope of human rights obligations on private companies.  
Chapter II of this study has discussed the Draft norms and findings of the SRSG in 
relation to this issue.   
In sum, the SRSG reported that in the area of corporate responsibility for 
international crimes and accountability, there is a gradual extension of liability to 
companies for international crimes under domestic jurisdiction but reflecting 
international standards.  However, in other areas of human rights, direct legal 
responsibility is greatly debatable.  The future development of corporate 
responsibility for human rights will emanate from the use of soft law standards and 
initiatives.114  
Regardless of these conclusions in the SRSG report, the need for direct (legal) 
corporate responsibility for human rights abuses has never been more urgent, 
                                                        
113 See Carlos M Vasquez, “Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under International Law” 
(2005) 43 Colum J. Transnat’l L. 927; Larry Cata Backer, “Multinational Corporations, Transnational 
Law: The United Nation’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger 
of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law” (2006) 37 Colum. H.R.L.Rev. 287. 
114 See chapter 2 of the study. 
 162
particularly with regard to developing countries where rules are either non-existent or 
unenforceable.  In such situations, the host state is unlikely to hold the corporations 
responsible.  Soft law standards and initiatives which are constantly been promoted as 
a cure are generally inadequate and ineffective.115   
Some have argued that home state of MNCs should exert control over the 
activities of their corporate nationals operating overseas.  Sornarajah believes home 
states of MNCs have responsibilities to ensure their corporate nationals do not act to 
the detriment of their host states while abroad.116  He argues for an extension of the 
law on state responsibility to hold home states responsible for not preventing MNCs 
from engaging in corporate misconduct in international law.117  Currently, it does not 
appear that home states can be held responsible for failing to ensure their corporate 
nationals behave responsibly, at least in the area of corruption.  
The central argument here is that when host states and home states are ineffective 
in holding corporations responsible for violations of international law, arguments for 
direct corporate responsibility in international law become necessary.  A problem this 
line of argument faces is that international law is state-centred and holds States 
responsible for violations of international law.  Traditionally, States were the primary 
duty bearers in international law.  They had legal personality and so could enforce 
rights and duties under international law.  Later, it became accepted for international 
organizations such as the United Nations to have legal personality under international 
                                                        
115 See chapters 2 and 3 of the study for discussions on soft laws and their inadequacies. 
116 M. Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004 ), p 184 
117 Ibid. at 189, 200 
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law as well.  However, this recognition has not been extended to corporations. 
International law recognizes corporations as objects of international law, rather 
than as subjects with full legal personality.  The limited personality corporations 
currently have is in the area of foreign investment law by virtue of the international 
centre for settlement of investment disputes (ICSID).  The ICSID gives MNCs legal 
personality to bring arbitration cases.  For the most part, the legal personality of 
corporations and other non-state actors is still suspect in international law, although it 
is increasingly becoming clear that corporations and other entities such as 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are worthy of limited personality in 
international law.   
The argument has gone thus that direct corporate responsibility would have 
serious consequences because it would admit the need to make corporations the 
subjects of international law.  A counter argument is that corporations need not be 
given full legal personality.  States may choose to enter into multilateral treaties 
which clearly maps out what corporations should be responsible for and ways to 
enforce such responsibility. Effective enforcement would include such treaties 
recognizing that MNCs have limited capacity for responsibility matters and allowing 
international organizations or NGOs with recognized status and limited capacity to 
report erring corporations before specialized agencies or bring cases in specialized 
courts.  The big hurdles will be convincing States to recognize such capacity in 
clearly defined situations involving corporate responsibility and to sign such treaties.  
The role any NGO with recognized status would play must be carefully scrutinized so 
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as to address the problems of NGO authority, legitimacy and regulatory capture in 
international law.   
So far the discussion has centred on how corporations could obtain limited legal 
personality for corporate responsibility in international law.  Now the focus will shift 
specifically to corporate responsibility for international corruption in international law.  
Is there a strong case for direct corporate responsibility in international corruption 
cases?  The involvement of corporations in bribery is more straightforward, than say 
their involvement in human rights, but does this fact make the case for direct corporate 
responsibility stronger?  Many treaties dealing with international corruption such as 
the OECD and UNCAC require States to hold legal persons guilty of bribery liable 
through civil, criminal or administrative measures.  However, many states fail to hold 
corporations liable.  This begs the question - if states are not addressing their 
responsibility to ensure corporate liability, is there a valid argument for direct 
corporate responsibility under international law?  How will such direct responsibility 
be addressed and applied?  
One argument could be that responsibility should come via emerging international 
criminal law.  At first glance, arguments that responsibility should come via 
international criminal law seems contradictory because international law focuses on 
individual responsibility, while the aim here is to find ‘corporate responsibility’.  
International criminal law is the accumulation of international legal norms on 
individual criminal responsibility. 118   Individuals have duties not to commit 
                                                        
118 Supra note 3 at 174. 
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international crimes. 119   A famous quote from a Judgment of the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg says “Crimes against international law are committed 
by men, not by abstract entities, only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provision of international law be enforced.”120 
On closer scrutiny however, it becomes clear that corporate responsibility in 
international criminal law is now being recognized, albeit such recognition is limited 
to ‘serious’ international crimes.   The basis for this scrutiny stems from an 
examination of the proposals attempting to give the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
jurisdiction over legal persons.  The ICC has jurisdiction over natural persons and 
concerns the most serious crimes and criminals which generally include leaders, 
organizers and instigators.121   
At the Rome conference, proposals that the ICC also exercise jurisdiction over 
corporate bodies were seriously considered, but in the end, the proposals were not 
implemented.  During the ICC deliberations, the whole notion of ‘corporate’ criminal 
responsibility was simply ‘alien’ raising issues of complementarity.  The different 
approach of States to corporate criminal liability was particularly problematic.122  
                                                        
119 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, (Oxford: Oxford University 
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Some States did not even have a domestic concept of corporate criminal liability and 
so for such States, a notion of international corporate criminal liability would be 
difficult.  Other procedural issues raised by corporate responsibility related to assets 
and third party rights.123 
Although the ICC does not have jurisdiction over legal persons, there has been talk 
about the prospects of holding corporations liable for complicity in human rights 
crimes by the ICC.  The Rome Statute of the ICC makes officers and employees of 
private companies who facilitate aid or abet a crime covered by the court criminally 
liable.124  However, as yet, in international law, corporate criminal responsibility has 
not been extended to the corporation as a whole entity. 125   Clapham believes 
corporations may have duties similar to individuals under international criminal law as 
they ‘have enough legal capacity to enjoy rights and duties on the international 
stage.126   
Nevertheless, the relevance of corporate criminal liability for international crimes 
albeit in domestic jurisdictions is now being recognized.  The use of international 
criminal law against corporations is not dependent on an amendment to the ICC statute.  
Clapham argues this branch of international law is already applicable against 
corporations, even if jurisdiction is limited for the moment to domestic courts.127  An 
international crime is considered to be an offence whose repression compels 
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international dimensions.128  They typically include crimes against peace, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. These crimes fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC.  A 
characteristic of such crimes is the gravity with which they are viewed as heinous or 
repugnant.  Schabas notes that the crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction are 
‘international’ not so much because international co-operation is needed for their 
repression, but because their heinous nature elevates them to a level where they are of 
concern to the international community.129 
There are other international crimes which are still only investigated and tried 
through domestic courts.  These include corruption, money laundering, drug 
trafficking, offences against the environment, fraud and tax offences, organized crime, 
maritime and aviation security offences and terrorism.130  There is anticipation that 
certain of the listed international crimes may be included in the ambit of the ICC or 
other specialized international court which could be established with jurisdiction over 
particular international crimes not covered by the ICC.131 
 The raises the question - does the justifications for extending direct corporate 
liability to international crimes such as crimes against humanity holds for the offence 
of international corruption?  In other words is the crime of international corruption so 
serious as to warrant direct corporate responsibility in international law?  The simple 
answer is that there is no reason why international corruption should not be seen as a 
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serious crime.  As one author has said “It is obvious that bribery of foreign public 
officials has been finally recognized as a contemporary scourge, an international 
offence being a threat to commerce, stability and the enjoyment of human rights”132  
However, it is one thing for international corruption to be seen as a serious crime and 
another for it to command international responsibility concerns such as liability of 
legal persons by international institutions or universal jurisdiction. 
Precedent shows that international corruption has not been equated to jus cogens 
norms which must be protected by international law institutions and mechanisms.  It 
cannot yet be said that the offence of international corruption is seen as so heinous or 
repugnant that international law itself would want to punish it directly.  Punishment 
for the time being is left to States with territorial or national links.  The international 
crime of corruption presently requires enforcement by domestic courts.  Such crimes 
do not fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC and it seems unlikely that they will in the 
near future. The ICC deals with a different category of international crimes, such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression.   
Therefore, it is unlikely that corporations would be held directly responsible in 
international law for international corruption through international criminal law.  
Moreover as the writers of the International Criminal Law Deskbook succinctly put it 
"the present international criminal law regime is focused on and directed towards, 
domestic criminal courts – and no amount of wishful thinking will make it different in 
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the future”.133 
A more appropriate comparison on the approach international law should take 
towards international corruption is perhaps a comparison with new international 
crimes such as terrorism, money laundering and drug trafficking.  These are all 
serious international crimes which are tried domestically through national courts.  In 
summary, individual criminal responsibility and corporate criminal responsibility for 
‘serious’ crimes such as crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
are being recognized in international criminal law.  Many such crimes come before 
domestic courts.  The ICC deals with a different type of crimes and is currently 
limited to individual criminal responsibility. The international crime of corruption, like 
many other crimes does not qualify as such crimes and needs to be enforced through 
domestic jurisdiction.   
The following sections will seek to establish ways direct corporate responsibility 
could be addressed and applied. 
 
4.3.1 Model of International Corporate Responsibility 
There have been many attempts to address international corporate responsibility. 
Many such attempts focus on civil liability claims brought under domestic courts, 
albeit for violations of international norms.134 Others focus on myriad of soft law 
initiatives which aim to hold corporations responsible.  The focus here is on a model 
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of international corporate responsibility law which recognizes that corporations have 
limited international personality in clearly identified responsibility matters.  Such 
matters include those pertaining to international corruption and human rights.  The 
need for State consent or practice for the success of any such law is unquestionable.   
In essence, direct corporate responsibility would really only be possible if States 
can be convinced of the need to reach agreements or carry out practices directly 
imposing responsibility on corporations.  A failure of States to reach such 
agreements or practice is at the core of the reason why corporations cannot be held 
directly responsible under international law.135 
Such a model would need to devise a means for attributing corporate liability.  It 
would be concerned with questions such as - whose acts would constitute 
responsibility for the corporation.   This has proved to be a challenge for some 
domestic laws and would continue to be a challenge in international law, unless it is 
effectively dealt with.  In chapter three, the disquiet with the U.K common law 
doctrine of identification for corporate criminal liability was discussed extensively. 
The UK approach is seen as unsatisfactory and other common law jurisdictions such as 
Canada and New Zealand are working out formulations of the attribution test. 
Canada criminalizes on the basis that a senior person with policy or operational 
authority commits an offence personally; or has the necessary intent and directs the 
affairs of the corporation in order that lower level employees carry out the illegal act; 
or fails to take action to stop criminal conduct of which he/she is aware or willfully 
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blind.136  New Zealand asks whether the natural person in question has real control on 
behalf of the legal person over the activities which relate to the alleged offence.137 
Chapter three also highlighted the US approach which follows the theory of 
imputation which holds corporations vicariously liable for acts and intents of its 
employees acting on behalf of the corporation which are then imputed to the 
corporation. 138   It is argued that when international law considers corporate 
responsibility, it is perhaps best to use the controlling mind doctrine or a variant of that 
doctrine.  Such an approach may be better suited for corporate responsibility in 
international law because it would target senior officials in line with individual 
responsibility for international crimes which targets senior states officials.139  It is 
worthwhile to note the WGB recommendations to the UK in which the real need to 
extend the group of people to which the doctrine applies has been highlighted.   
Such a model would also need to deal with the thorny issue of corporate 
responsibility for acts of subsidiaries.  Subsidiaries and agents play an important role 
in the crime of international corruption.  An oft cited 1997 survey by the Control 
Risks Group found 56% of European companies and 70% of US companies 
occasionally used middle men such as agents, joint ventures partners or subsidiaries to 
make corrupt payments.  Of these companies, 44% of the European firms and 22% of 
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the US firms admitted to using agents regularly.140  The OECD convention’s omission 
of this issue has been cited as a major weakness of the convention.  The previous 
discussions under the OECD convention relating to this issue are relevant for 
addressing these problems of subsidiaries at the international level. 
Finally, such a model would need to address enforcement.  The first call would 
typically be through States with territorial or national links.  However, where such 
States fail to enforce, enforcement could be through specialized agencies to which 
IGOs or recognized NGOs can take erring corporations.  The need to create such 
agencies stem from the need for international corporate responsibility in the sense of 
the international community demanding responsibility and creating avenues to ensure 
such responsibility.   
The question may be asked – why create such a model of international corporate 
responsibility?  Why not argue for the creation of universal jurisdiction in relation to 
such crimes so that domestic courts can impose liability?  The answer is that the 
numerous international laws on corruption, specifically deal with jurisdiction.  Such 
jurisdiction typically tends to be territorial or national in nature.  It is unlikely States 
would be willing to accept the need for universal jurisdiction where there is no 
territorial or national link. 
Sornarajah has argued that States are under a duty to ensure that they punish 
international crimes, especially jus cogens norms.141  He continues that where States 
refuse to prevent the violation of international law norms, such States should loose its 
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right of diplomatic protection of its nationals.142 This chapter is concerned with the 
situation where States fail to enforce the duty of ensuring corporations comply with 
international corruption norms via the effect on the erring corporations.  Current 
international law practice does not suggest that States without links to the crime will 
prosecute the nationals of the disobeying State.  Moreover, States seem to have 
adequate problems addressing international corruption even in situations where there 
are clear territorial or national links.  
In the area of civil liability, domestic courts may be more willing to exercise 
extra-territorial jurisdictions.  An interesting recent parallel is the prevention of child 
sex tourism.  Here a duty is created to proscribe the behaviour through national laws.  
Scott has raised the question “if Australia began to allow civil suits against Japanese 
corporate sex-tour operators organizing trips to Bangkok or Phuket, would Japan or 
Thailand accept this as a reasonable exercise of extra-territorial jurisdicition?”143  The 
answer is not so clear cut.  Precedent shows that that all treaties to date addressing 
corruption do not advocate universal jurisdiction for such crimes.  Universal 
jurisdiction tends to apply for jus cogens norms of which international corruption is not 
one.   
Moreover, the complexity of some of the issues which would need to be addressed 
on a transnational or international level may make it more appropriate for IGOs or 
NGOs to bring the case before a specialized agency created to deal with such issues. 
However, the use of non-state actors such as NGOs as ‘Police’ is not without critical 
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questions particularly in relation to the basis of their authority and legitimacy to 
‘police’ MNCs and the possibility of regulatory capture by such NGOs.  The term 
NGO is frequently used interchangeably with Civil Society Organization (CSO) but it 
is important to note there is a difference.  The term NGO was first coined in 1945 to 
denote groups and organizations with consultative status with the UN’s main body, the 
Economic and Social Council and its subisidiary bodies (with the explicit exclusion of 
the UN General Assembly, Security Council and the International Court of Justice).  
NGO indicates organizations that are not part of the state machinery.   
CSO more aptly refers to any organization that is not public and the category of 
organizations under this term is broader than NGO.144  Richter adds that the term 
‘civil society organization’ crept into UN policy documents as part of the governance 
discourse and is rarely distinguished between citizen and business groups.  Today, 
‘NGOs’ or ‘CSOs’ cover a range of groups and organizations including business 
interest organizations.  Calls have been made to exclude the business sector from the 
category of CSOs.145  It would seem unreasonable to heed such calls in a discussion 
on the need to hold corporations directly responsible for international corruption.  
However, there is the need to streamline organizations that would be recognized to 
‘police’ MNCs. 
There is also the need to address the authority and legitimacy of such streamlined 
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NGOs.  NGOs do not have international legal personality.  Early attempts to develop 
international law on NGO recognition have proved futile.146  Nevertheless, authority 
for NGO action in taking erring MNCs before specialized courts or agencies may be 
based on the approach in human rights law.   
The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights allows States, individuals, 
and NGOs with observer status to summit communications alleging a violation of the 
African Charter.  For example, in the well publicized Ogoni case, the legal 
communication to the African Commission on Human and People’s Right was jointly 
submitted by the Centre for Economic and Social Rights, which is US based and the 
Economic Rights Action Centre, a Nigeria based human rights organization on behalf 
of the victims of human rights violations.   
The protocol of the African Court on Human and People’s Right gives NGOs 
recognized by the African Union standing to institute cases directly, provided that at 
the time of ratifying of the Protocol or thereafter, the State at issue has made a 
declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court to hear such cases.147  This can be 
distinguished form the European court of Human Rights which only allows an NGO to 
bring a case if the NGO itself claims to be a victim.148   
Likewise, avenues would be created whereby streamlined NGOs can institute a 
case against a MNC provided state parties accept the jurisdiction of the specialized 
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court.  The key to such authority is in State consent or practice.  The engagement of 
NGOs in the review and promotion of state compliance with international obligations 
and monitoring of human rights, humanitarian and environmental law is now 
common.149  NGO engagement may be extended to other areas of international law 
including corporate compliance.   
Rory Sullivan notes the debate on business and human rights has broader 
implications as one set of non-state actors (NGOs) work to define norms and legal 
obligations for another set of non-state actors (Companies), with limited involvement 
of government.  He adds “this contest of influences, which is duplicated in many 
other corporate social responsibility debates, is likely to be an ever more common 
approach to the development of soft, and probably hard, international law 
obligations”.150    
One other important aspect of NGOs and their authority to police MNCs which 
needs to be addressed concerns the question of regulatory capture.  It has been noted 
that corporate interests and NGOs try to capture the emergence of new binding 
standards of corporate responsibility by being involved in the drafting and adopting of 
non-binding codes and guidelines.151  Many have raised the point that NGOs are 
unaccountable bodies exercising influential power and sometimes not working in the 
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best interest of the society, but are subject to their own agendas.  These are legitimate 
concerns which require awareness.  It is hoped the streamlining of recognized NGOs 
may go some way in countering such arguments. 
 
4.3.2 Unintended Consequences of International Corporate Responsibility 
So far, the model of international corporate responsibility has left little to be said for 
the role of States in enforcement.  Where States fail to enforce the laws, the model 
requires IGOs and NGOs to bring erring corporations before specialized agencies.  
Such a model may therefore create unintended consequences whereby States can free 
ride on corporate responsibility.  It cannot be overemphasized that international 
corporate responsibility is not meant to take the place of State responsibility.   
Rather, international corporate responsibility will ensure that corporations are held 
responsible in situations were States will not or cannot enforce the laws.  There is a 
valid argument for holding corporations responsible other that through the 
non-complying State.  However, this does not diminish the facts that States still have 
the responsibility in international law to ensure international law norms are observed, 
including responsibility for failure to ensure corporations behave responsibly.  It 
simply means that State responsibility and international corporate responsibility will 
be recognized in international law.   
The area of international corruption is a good illustration of how this argument 
works.  Many States do not prosecute guilty corporations for manifold reasons.  
Where the bribery occurs overseas the desire to prosecute is less enticing.  The 
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application of extra-territorial overseas bribery laws have not been as effective as 
desired.152  The cost and length such prosecutions may incur is a critical reason why 
countries may not prosecute guilty parties.153  The well publicized Lesotho Highland 
Water Project trials which held many foreign corporations responsible for bribery154 
illustrate the immense cost of prosecuting bribery especially foreign bribery.   
The Lesotho government, aware of the costs requested international community 
assistance. 155  Although the World Bank, other development and commercial banks, 
EU and several government representatives promised such financial assistance, it was 
reported that the financial assistance never materialized.  Lesotho, a very poor African 
country had to undertake the trials on its scarce resources.  Commentators have 
pointed out the punitive effect such undertakings may have on a country like Lesotho, 
which is poor with scarce resources. 
Without the commendable political will of the Lesotho government which was 
determined to prosecute the case, the trials may never have materialized.  It is 
possible that should such corruption occur in other poor countries, the insurmountable 
cost of prosecution may deter trials.  While the Lesotho trials are a victory for 
advocating corporate responsibility through state enforcement, the reality is that many 
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poor States in the same situation may be unwilling to go the extra mile.   
Hence the need for international corporate responsibility which allows 
corporations to be brought to trial through IGOs and streamlined NGOs which may 
have the means for raising required support for the trials.  Furthermore, the 
specialized agencies would have required skills to address the complex issues which 
would arise and be funded by international community support.  This would distribute 
the burden of providing financial assistance amongst a large pool of States all invested 
in eradicating corruption.    
Critics might say - how does one then distinguish between a State which is free 
riding and a State which cannot or will not comply?  The answer though somewhat 
superficial is that in many instances a free riding State would have the mechanisms in 
place to hold corporations responsible, but simply chooses for various reasons not 
enforce corporate responsibility.  On the other hand, the State which cannot or will not 
hold corporations responsible may fail to do so because of a genuine lack of resources 
or as a result of government involvement in corruption and bad governance. 
When States refuse to hold corporations responsible for reasons other than 
corruption and bad governance, should they be put in the category of free riding states?  
Free riding or not, there is a valid argument for direct corporate responsibility in 
international law which uses international institutions to defray the cost and length of 
prosecutions which may be too burdensome for one country.  Such responsibility 
would also be appreciative of the limitations of developing countries with limited 
resources or corrupt governments to address international corruption.  
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Some States may have justifiable fears of a race to the bottom or poor resources to 
create and enforce laws.  The race to the bottom implies that States competing for 
foreign investment capital from MNCs will provide lax regulatory standards especially 
in the area of environmental and labour laws in order to attract prospective investors or 
for fear that the capital they desire will be transferred to a more favourable state.156   
In the case of international corruption, it has been noted that developing countries 
have come under pressure from the international community to drop investigations into 
allegations of corruption by OECD companies.  An example which has been given is 
that of Pakistan in 1998, when there were pressures for it to stop allegations into the 
Hubco Power plant saga.157  Hawley has cited the argument that litigation against 
OECD countries will deter foreign investment as a reason why developing countries do 
not prosecute for bribery.158  On the other hand, issues of a race to the bottom may not 
be very important where anti-corruption laws are concerned.  This is because many 
countries have anti-corruption laws.  However, the problem with this line of reasoning 
is that not many countries enforce their extra-territorial anti-corruption laws for foreign 
bribery. Thus, creating a situation whereby corporations operating outside the 
jurisdiction may not be held accountable for international corruption misconduct.  
The U.K in particular is a country which comes to mind.   
A more substantial reason why issues of a race to the bottom may not be very 
important is because numerous scholars have doubted the existence of a race to the 
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bottom amidst claims by many that it exists.159  The study will not go into the merits 
or not of such claims.  The point of adducing fears of a race to the bottom here is to 
highlight the fact that a call for direct corporate responsibility in international law may 
prevent a race to the bottom by creating avenues whereby the guilty MNCs would not 
be able to run to a more ‘conducive’ environment.  This is because most environments 
would take bribery seriously and the corporations would know there was serious 
mechanisms to enforce the laws which are not limited to the under-resourced country 
to cite an example.  
Another unintended consequence may be the perceived uncertainty international 
corporate responsibility would bring to international law.  In response to this, suffice 
it that the study does not argue for a complete revamp of international law.  Rather, it 
asserts that State consent is required for direct corporate responsibility and there are 
justifiable reasons which should compel States to consent.  The propositions 
presented here would work under a state-centred approach to international law and so 
the perceived uncertainty may be more apparent than real.  Under a state-centred 
approach to international law, the primary sources of international law - treaty law and 
customary law would still be needed for corporate responsibility.   
The chances of direct responsibility of MNCs for international crimes such as 
international corruption being included in customary international law is very slim 
because major powers in international law cannot agree on the need and parameters for 
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such responsibility.  For a custom to be accepted and recognized in international law, 
it must have concurrence of the major powers in that particular field. Customary 
international law is thus established by virtue of a pattern of claim, absence of protests 
by States particularly interested in the matter at hand and acquiescence by other 
States.160  Principles involved in custom must be obligatory and express an opinion 
juris.   
Currently, the principles in international law which arguably fall under customary 
international law are pretty rigid. They include most sections of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.161  The acceptance and recognition under customary 
international law of the need for direct corporate responsibility will be difficult.  
Different countries have different expectations and the reality is that the need for direct 
responsibility is most obvious when considering developing countries.  Therefore, it 
would be difficult to generate support of a large number of diverse states and to 
ascertain whether a new rule has emerged.162  The study argues for a change in States’ 
perception that State responsibility is adequate because such perception ignores the 
situation in reality that States cannot or will not enforce anti-corruption laws. 
Treaty law on the other hand provides a better chance because treaties are usually 
between States participating to bind themselves legally to act in a particular way or to 
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set up particular relations between themselves.  As a general rule, international 
treaties provide a source of law only for contracting States.  Nations that have not 
signed, ratified or acceded to a treaty are not obliged to its terms unless the treaty 
codifies or constitutes customary International Law.163   
Currently in international law, there are no relevant multilateral treaties regulating 
MNCs directly.  The ICSID to date is the only convention directly relevant to MNCs.  
Nevertheless, the use of the ICSID is limited as it is merely a procedural convention, 
setting up machinery for the settlement of investment disputes through arbitration 
between States and foreign investors.  States should sign treaties which would directly 
hold corporations responsible.  The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
is precedent for this argument – it holds individuals responsible for violations of 
egregious crimes, even though the parties to the treaty are States.  The dilemma is 
overcoming States reluctance to sign such treaties. 
Many States prefer to hold on to the traditional notion that State responsibility is 
adequate.  They also fear their sovereignty being eroded.  State sovereignty is a basic 
principle of international law which gives a State power to rule over matters 
considered to be within its internal sphere of national jurisdiction.  Article 2(7) of the 
UN Charter states: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
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state or shall require the Members to submit such maters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII164 
International corruption cuts across internal affairs and requires international 
interventions.  The need for more international interventions in curbing corruption is 
now widely accepted.  Many multilateral treaties such as the OECD and the UNCAC 
address the need for international co-operation to prevent and control corruption.  The 
UNCAC also calls for active participation of civil society.165  
Where States will not or cannot ensure international law obligations are fulfilled, it 
does not lie proper for them to adduce state sovereignty.  Reasons for such State 
failure typically include corruption, bad governance, fear of race to bottom and 
genuine inability due to poor resources.  One other reason States may fail to enforce 
corporate responsibility may be because of the impact this would have on the 
sovereignty of another country.  This fear of impinging on the sovereignty of another 
state appears unjustified because international law in many instances puts mechanisms 
in place to ensure this is not the case.  Most extra-territorial laws respect the principles 
of jurisdiction and cannot apply directly to nationals of a sovereign state.  The 
UNCAC requires State parties to carry out their obligations under the convention in a 
manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity and 
that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.166 
                                                        
164 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945. 
165 See chapter 2, article 13 of the UNCAC. 
166 See chapter I, article 4 of the UNCAC. 
 185
4.3.3 Summary 
A valid question may be why have international corporate responsibility law?  An 
analogy for a reason may be gleaned from international criminal law which arose as a 
result of the need to hold individuals responsible for violations of humanitarian law.  
Similarly, in international law there is the need to hold corporations responsible for 
violations of human rights, corruption and environmental laws.  The issue lies in 
whether responsibility should remain as State responsibility or whether international 
direct responsibility should be recognized.   
The main debates addressed in this section of the study are three fold.  1) 
Whether corporations should be given legal personality which accords them with 
rights and duties under international law; 2) Whether ‘corporate’ liability and its 
inherent problems should be extended to international law; and 3) Whether corporate 
responsibility will impact State responsibility and State sovereignty negatively.  
International law would need to address these issues for the smooth development of 
this model of international corporate responsibility law.   
A note of caution needs to be sounded that just like international criminal law, the 
aim of this model of international corporate responsibility should be to make States 
aware of their responsibilities to fulfill the international laws they ascribe to.  In the 
area of anti-corruption which is the immediate concern here, a high number of States 
are parties to multilateral treaties on corruption.  There is therefore much scope for 
States to fulfill their international law responsibilities.  Unfortunately, States are not 
rising to the responsibility. 
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Finally, it must be said that while the model discussed is highly desirable, it may 
not materialize because of the deep rooted traditions of State sovereignty over matters 
deemed purely domestic.  It may be felt that corporate responsibility matters rightly 
belong in the sphere of domestic law.  Corporations are creations of States and so 
should be regulated by States.  However, the chapter has sought to show that broad 




Some transnational laws on bribery project the view that measures ensuring 
transparency and accountability of corporate books and records will deter bribery of 
foreign or domestic public officials.  While such measures would go a long way in 
combating bribery, by themselves, they are insufficient.   There is the need to add to 
these measures, legislative measures which criminalize the act of bribery with 
appropriate sanctions.  One such measure that has repeatedly been encountered in this 
chapter is through the use of domestic legislative measures which establish 
transnational bribery as a criminal offence punishable by criminal or non-criminal 
sanctions.   
In chapter three, the hiccups which such domestic or extra-territorial laws face 
were discussed extensively.  In this chapter, the adequacy of international laws to hold 
corporations responsible was examined.  Any law regional or multi-regional which 
aims to ensure corporate responsibility solely through domestic laws will face the same 
 187
hiccups – problem of enforcement.  The possibility and considerations necessary for 
direct corporate responsibility for international corruption were therefore considered.   
The arguments for direct corporate responsibility veered from the well trodden 
part of universal jurisdiction, State enforcement and responsibility for accomplishing 
international law.   Rather, the arguments focused on the need for international law to 
respond to the failure of States to enforce international legal norms via the impact such 
a response will have on corporate responsibility.   
On the whole, international law primarily works through State intervention.  
Direct corporate responsibility in relation to international crimes is highly 
unconventional and would require State consent to be developed.  The issues raised in 
this chapter would need to be given further consideration in future attempts to regulate 




CIVIL REMEDIES, ANTI-CORRUPTION AND CSR 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Most writings on attempts to curb corruption focus on criminal law enforcement.  In 
many countries, corruption is a crime.  Previous chapters in this study have discussed 
domestic, extra-territorial and international laws geared towards criminal enforcement 
for transnational bribery.  There is the need for scholarship on the impact of civil law 
remedies as deterrents against international corruption.  Criminal enforcement is 
inadequate to curb corruption and may not be the most suitable form of deterrence.  
Moreover, it is generally accepted that curbing corruption involves a multi-faceted 
approach.  The aim of this chapter is to address other legal measures useful in the 
fight against corruption, particularly civil law enforcement. 
  There have been calls for a closer examination of the use of non-criminal legal 
tools, including private rights of actions to complement the work of public prosecutors 
in the fight against corruption.1  Attempts have been made to examine civil law 
impacts on corruption.2  This chapter will explore the use of civil law remedies as an 
avenue for curbing corruption in the context of CSR.  It will focus on cases brought 
by or against corporations, thus addressing CSR issues.   
                                                 
1 See Alejandro Posadas, “Combating Corruption under International Law” (2000) 10 Duke J. Comp. & 
Int’l L. 345. 
2 Alan Berg, “Bribery-Transaction Validity and Other Civil Law Implications” 2001 L.M.C.L.Q 27. 
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Civil law enforcement occurs when private parties bring disputes for resolution 
before a court of law or arbitration tribunal.  The discussions in this chapter will focus 
on enforceability of international contracts tainted by illegality, particularly contracts 
tainted by bribery.  It will also focus on the development of private rights of actions 
for damages by victims of corruption.  The thrust of the chapter will be to examine (1) 
decisions of English domestic courts in enforcing awards granted by arbitral tribunals 
where defendant contends the underlying contract is illegal and contrary to public 
policy; (2) decisions of international commercial arbitrations which have dealt with the 
validity of contracts tainted by bribery and (3) decisions of English or US courts in 
civil suits brought by competing bidders alleging bribery and claiming damages.  An 
analysis of the decisions of the courts and tribunals is useful for determining the 
impacts of civil law remedies in the anti-corruption fight.   
 
5.2 CORRUPTION AND THE ENFORCEABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL 
CONTRACTS 
When a contract is tainted by illegality3, the enforceability of such a contract is subject 
to public policy considerations.4  Public policy is difficult to define.  However, for 
public policy to come into play there must be some element of illegality or element that 
enforcement of the contract would be clearly injurious to public good or offensive to 
                                                 
3 In English law, an illegal transaction is one which involves the commission of a legal wrong in its 
formation, purpose or performance or conduct which is otherwise contrary to public policy.  See Law 
Commission, Illegal Transactions: The Effect of Illegality on Contracts and Trusts, Consultation Paper 
No 154 at 2. 
4 See G.H Treitel, The Law of Contract, (Gloucester: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003).  Treitel notes that the 
unenforceability of illegal contracts rests on overriding grounds of public interest, p 481.    
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the ordinary reasonable and fully informed person.5  In many countries, the bribery of 
domestic and foreign public official to obtain business is a crime and therefore illegal.  
Any contract which arises from such payments would be tainted with illegality and 
unenforceable.   
Illegality is a complex subject in contract law, but for the purposes of this study, 
discussions on illegality are limited to allegations of bribery in international contracts.  
The context in which the issue will be addressed is firstly in relation to enforcement of 
arbitral tribunal awards in domestic courts in situations where the contract’s governing 
law is different from the law of the place of enforcement.  Discussions on 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards tainted with bribery will be limited to 
enforcement of such awards in England.  Secondly, the issue will be addressed in 
relation to the approach of arbitral tribunals in the determination of the validity of 
contracts tainted by illegality. 
 
5.2.1 Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Tainted with Bribery 
To put the issue in context, if an arbitral tribunal’s award is to be enforced in English 
courts, but the defendant contends enforcement on the grounds that the underlying 
contract is illegal and therefore contrary to public policy, what is the position of the 
English courts?  The answer would depend on a number of factors. 
First it is important to stress that in these situations, the courts are concerned with 
enforcing an arbitral award as opposed to enforcing a contract.  When the courts are 
                                                 
5 See D.S.T v Rakoil [1987] Lloyd’s Law Rep 246 at 254. 
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enforcing an arbitral award, they must pay attention to the facts and reasoning of the 
arbitrators as they appear from the award.  The court is considering the enforcement 
of the award not the underlying contract.6  In the OTV v Hilmarton case, Walker J 
stressed he was not adjudicating the underlying contract but deciding whether or not 
arbitration awards should be enforced.  However, the underlying contract is not 
isolated from the award.7  English court would take cognisance of the fact that the 
underlying contract on the facts as they appear from the award and the arbitral 
tribunal’s reasoning does not infringe one of those rules of public policy where the 
English Court would not enforce it whatever its proper law or place of performance.8  
The rules of public policy where English courts would not enforce whatever its proper 
law or place of performance were referred to as universal principles of morality in 
Lemenda Trading Co. Ltd v African Middle East Petroleun Co. Ltd.9     
In Lemenda, the court was concerned with enforcing an English contract which 
was to be performed abroad, but if performed in England would have been contrary to 
public policy.  The court held because the contract was against English public policy 
and the public policy in the place of performance, the contract was unenforceable.  
The court had to decide whether the fact it was against public policy in England barred 
enforcement when the place of performance was Qatar.  The judge considered the 
heads of public policy in England and concluded some heads of public policy are based 
                                                 
6 See Westacre Investments Inc. v. Juogoimport SPDR Holding Co Ltd, CA [2000] 1 QB 288 at 305B. 
See also Omnium Traitement et de Valorisation SA v Hilmarton Ltd [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 146 at 
149F.     
7 Westacre, Ibid., at 305B. 
8 Ibid. at 305C. 
9 [1988] Q.B 448.  
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on universal principles of morality.10  Where the contract infringes such rules, it will 
not be enforced whatever the proper law of contract or place of performance.  
However, the judge did not go as far as to say the particular case before it fell under 
such heads.  The Lemenda case involved parties entering into a contract to pay for the 
use of personal influence to procure renewal of a contract, in a situation where the 
party to be influenced was unaware of the pecuniary motive.  Where the case does not 
fall under this head, other principles of public policy based on considerations which 
are purely domestic apply.11 Such considerations may or may not lead to refusal to 
enforce.  In this instance, the judge based his decision on principles of morality of 
general application.  He refused to enforce the contract because he felt international 
comity and English domestic public policy militated against enforcement12.  
In Westacre Investments Inc. v. Juogoimport SPDR Holding Co Ltd, Waller L.J 
referring to the Lemenda case said that where contracts did not fall into the first 
category in Lamenda; and the place of performance was not England, English courts 
would not enforce the contract only if the place of performance as well as the English 
courts found the contract unenforceable.13  Waller L.J concluded that there is nothing 
which offends English public policy if an arbitral tribunal enforces a contract which 
does not offend the domestic public policy under either the proper law of the contract 
or its curial law, even if English domestic public might have taken a different view.14  
                                                 
10 Ibid. at 459. 
11 Ibid. at 459B. 
12 Ibid. at 461. 
13 Westacre Supra note 6 at 304F-H. 
14 Ibid.at 305C. 
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Therefore, it is not only the public policy of England, the place of enforcement which 
needs to be considered but the public policy of place of governing law, place of 
performance and curial law.   
Second, it is also important to point out what happens if on the face of the award, 
the tribunal finds no illegality, but the defendant in a court of enforcement claims the 
contract is illegal and therefore against public policy and should not be enforced.  
This is what happened in Westacre, the question the court sought to answer was 
whether a defendant should be allowed to go beyond the facts and reasoning of the 
arbitral tribunal award.  In order words, should the facts as found by the arbitrators be 
re-opened?15  In Westacre, Colman J, the trial judge said if the arbitral tribunal 
considered the issue of illegality and concluded the contract was not illegal, the court 
would enforce the award. 
In the Court of Appeal, Waller LJ was quick to point out there may be situations 
where the court would inquire into an issue of illegality even if the arbitrator found no 
illegality.16 He stated there were exceptional cases where the courts would allow a 
party to re-argue.  One of such cases was where illegality is raised and the evidence is 
so strong that if not answered it would be decisive of the case.17  The nature of the 
illegality, strength of the case of illegality and extent to which the asserted illegality 
was addressed at the arbitral tribunal were important factors he mentioned.18   
                                                 
15 Ibid. at 310C. 
16 Ibid. at 310H – 311A.  
17 Ibid. at 311G. 
18 Ibid. at 314G. 
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Waller L.J felt the Westacre case called for re-argument.  Unfortunately, the 
other members of the court did not agree with him in this regard.  Mantell LJ felt the 
allegation of bribery had been made, entertained and rejected in the arbitral award and 
this was clear from the award itself.19 Applying the criteria suggested in Soleimany v 
Soleimany,20 he concluded that even if a preliminary inquiry was necessary, on the 
facts of the case it would lead to the same conclusion that the facts should not be 
re-opened.  In Mantell LJ’s opinion the Westacre tribunal was a straightforward 
commercial contract.  The arbitrators had specifically found that the underlying 
contract was not illegal.  There was nothing to suggest incompetence on the parts of 
the arbitrators and no reason to suspect collusion or bad faith in rendering the award.  
Therefore, the decision of the arbitrators was unquestionable. 
In the high court, Colman J had also said that if enforcement is resisted on the 
basis that facts not placed before the tribunal demonstrates the contract is illegal, the 
courts would consider whether the public policy against the enforcement of illegal 
contracts outweighs the countervailing public policy in support of finality of awards.21  
Colman J concluded that the public policy of sustaining international arbitration 
awards on the facts of the case outweighed the public policy in discouraging 
                                                 
19 Ibid at 316F. 
20 [1999] Q.B 785.  Waller LJ had suggested obiter in Soleimany v Soleimany that if the arbitrator held 
there was no illegality, an enforcement judgment if there is prima facie evidence from one side that the 
award is based on an illegal contract, should inquire further to some extent.  Inquiry should include 
whether there is evidence on the other side to he contrary?; whether arbitrator expressly found the 
underlying contract was not illegal or it is fair to infer he did not reach that conclusion; whether there is 
anything suggesting the arbitrators were incompetent; whether there have been collusion or bad faith so 
as to procure award despite illegality. See paras 800E-G of judgment.  
21 Westacre Investments Inc. v. Juogoimport SPDR Holding Co Ltd [1999] QB 740 at 767H – 768A. 
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international commercial corruption.22  However, he felt if it had been a case of 
drug-trafficking the court should go behind the judgment in the interest of public 
policy.23  In the court of appeal, Waller L.J preferred to equate commercial corruption 
on the same level as drug-trafficking and perhaps rightly so.  More importantly, he 
felt that if the defendants were allowed to re-open their case, the allegation of 
commercial corruption would fall within category one in Lemenda – contracts against 
universal principles of morality which English courts would not enforce.24  
Therefore, from the foregoing, it can be said that if an international contract is 
tainted with illegality, a party seeking to enforce an arbitral award on account of the 
contract will be unsuccessful on the grounds of public policy if the rules of public 
policy infringed are those which whatever the proper law and whatever the place of 
performance, English courts will not enforce, i.e if the infringements fall under 
principles of universal morality.  Such infringements would apply to universally 
condemned activities such as terrorism, drug-trafficking, prostitution, paedophilia, 
fraud and corruption.25  However, if the rules of public policy infringed are based on 
purely domestic public policy, the rules of the place of performance, governing law 
and place of enforcement are important factors to be considered.26  The courts also 
have to factor in whether the arbitral tribunal considered illegality or not.  If they did 
consider illegality and found none, the award will be enforced subject to the enforcing 
                                                 
22 Ibid. at 773C. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Westacre, Supra note 6 at 315A-B. 
25 Supra note 6 at 775B. 
26 Supra note 9. 
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court being able to carry out a preliminary inquiry where evidence is adduced that an 
award is based on illegal contract.27 
 Applying the aforesaid to situations of bribery and corruption, it seems clear that 
in cases where on the face of the award there is undisputable bribery and corruption, 
such a finding gives rise to obvious policy considerations.  Further, such policy 
considerations would fall under Lemenda category 1 where English courts will refuse 
to enforce.  In Hilmarton v OTV, Walker J made it clear that the case of Soleimany v 
Soleimany was the kind of case which fell into the category of cases where as a matter 
of public policy no award would be enforced by an English court.28 In Soleimany v 
Soleimany, it was clear from the face of the award the arbitrator was dealing with an 
illegal enterprise for smuggling carpets out of Iran.  However, the arbitrator 
considered the illegality of no relevance under the applicable Jewish law.  The court 
held the enforcement was governed by the public policy of the lex fori and refused to 
enforce the contract as it was against public policy.   
The difficulty lies where an arbitral tribunal decides there is no bribery or in other 
words, it does not appear from the face of the award there was bribery.  In such cases, 
the judgments suggest English courts would enforce the award if a foreign proper and 
or curial law holds there is no corruption.  This is despite the fact that had the decision 
                                                 
27 Supra note 20. 
28 See Omnium de Traitement, supra note 6 at 151A.  See also E. Brown, Illegality and Public Policy – 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in England: Hilmarton Limited v Omnium De Traitement Et De 
Valorisation S.A, 2000 Int’l Arb. L. Rev. 31. 
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been made in England, the English courts may have concluded the underlying contract 
was against public policy and therefore unenforceable.29   
 
5.2.2 International Commercial Arbitration and the Validity of International 
Contracts Tainted with Bribery 
International commercial arbitration tribunals have had to consider the effect of 
corruption on international contracts.  These have raised issues about the role of 
arbitrators in addressing international corruption which is an international crime that 
the international community is seriously and aggressively trying to curb.  There is the 
emergence of transnational public policy aiming to ensure that corrupt contracts are 
not upheld.  This transnational public policy is evident in anti-bribery conventions.  
Increasingly, tribunals are relying on the anti-bribery conventions as the basis for such 
policy.  
In the ICSID case of World Duty Free Company Ltd v. The Republic of Kenya30, 
the claimant had obtained a contract for the construction, maintenance and operation of 
duty free complexes at international airports in Kenya.  At the arbitral tribunal, the 
claimant contended that the Government of Kenya expropriated its property and 
destroyed its rights under the investment agreement and requested restitution or in the 
alternative compensation.  During the proceedings, it was discovered that the 
claimant had paid USD 1 million to the then president of Kenya as bribes to obtain the 
contract.  The respondent contended that the investment agreement was 
                                                 
29 See Supra note 6.    
30 ICSID case no ARB/00/7. 
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unenforceable and requested the dismissal of the claims on the grounds that bribery of 
foreign public officials was against international public policy.  Further, the 
respondent added that under the applicable English law31 the investment contract was 
voidable as a result of the bribery and it as the injured party had validly avoided the 
contract.   
The tribunal in reaching a decision considered firstly: whether a bribe had been 
paid; and secondly whether the investment contract in dispute had been procured as a 
result of the payments.  The answers to both considerations were affirmative.  As a 
result, the tribunal had to consider the consequences of the bribe on the enforceability 
and validity of the agreement under international public policy and applicable laws.  It 
concluded that in light of domestic and international conventions relating to corruption 
and decisions of courts and tribunals, bribery is contrary to transnational public policy 
and cannot be upheld by the tribunal.  In reaching this conclusion, the tribunal 
examined two concepts of international public policy, one narrow which relates to 
domestic public policy applied to foreign awards and a broader concept which may be 
more appropriately called ‘transnational’ or ‘truly international’ public policy as it 
relates to a universal conception of universal standards and accepted norms.   
Concerning narrow domestic public policy, the tribunal considered procedural and 
substantive applicable English law.  Procedurally, domestic public policy prevents 
enforceability.  The tribunal affirmed the decision of Mr. Justice Phillips in 
                                                 
31 A relevant article in the contract had stipulated that applicable law in any arbitral tribunal would be 
English.   
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Lemenda32 where he held that English law should not enforce a contract to be 
performed abroad which is contrary to English public policy and where the same 
policy applies in the country of performance.  Substantively, English contract law on 
the avoidance of contracts was the relevant law.  English contract law provides that a 
contract procured by bribery is voidable and the innocent party must take positive 
actions to set it aside.  The tribunal applied the statement of general principle derived 
from the legal opinion of Lord Mustill that the agreement was voidable at the 
insistence of the respondent and accordingly the respondent had validly avoided the 
contract.33 
The World Duty Free case is an unusual case.  It involved the claimant alleging 
that money secretly paid to the Kenyan head of state to obtain a contract was not a 
bribe, but part of the consideration.  Bribes are usually paid in secret and are not 
included as part of the contract consideration.  The claimant also alleged that such 
payments were culturally accepted in the country where payment took place. The 
claimant’s case was that the personal donation made by its agents was sanctioned by 
customary practices and regarded as a matter of protocol in Kenya.  It was not a bribe.  
The payments therefore fell within the concept of Harambee which was a cultural 
practice of pulling resources together to finance community projects.   
In addressing this claim, the tribunal referred to the 2003 report of a Kenyan Task 
Force on Public Collections or Harambees where it was noted that “over the years, the 
spirit of Harambee has undergone a metamorphosis which has resulted in gross abuses.  
                                                 
32 Supra note 9. 
33 Supra note 30. 
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It has been linked to the emergence of oppressive and extortionist practices and 
entrenchment of corruption and abuse of office”.34  In the light of international 
attempts and actions to curb bribery, it is significant to note that a system which creates 
a situation where corruption can be entrenched is unlikely to be acceptable.  Customs 
are changing and it would be very difficult to hold in these present times that such 
donations are not bribes but culturally accepted.  This is because of the manifest and 
gross corrupt vices such concepts create or enhance.  Reference to such systems 
should be very carefully scrutinized to see if it entrenches corruption.  In this case, the 
tribunal was right to refer to the 2003 report and highlight the link between the 
Harambee concept and gross abuse of the concept by senior officials in the country.  
Such abuse was one of the factors which tilted the payment towards bribery.   
Most cases with bribery and corruption issues that come before arbitral tribunals 
involve payments of fees or commission where a resisting party would allege the 
agreement was actually for the payment of bribes and is therefore void, negating the 
arbitration agreement as well.35  An early case which considered this more usual 
international arbitration case is the 1963 ICC case no. 1110.36  The relevant facts of 
the case involved an agreement concluded between two parties whereby the 
respondent promised to pay a 10% commission of the price of an electrical equipment 
contract between the respondent and Argentine authorities.  The sole arbitrator, Judge 
Lagergren concluded that agreements between the parties contemplated the bribing of 
                                                 
34 Ibid. at Para 134.  
35 Julian D Lew et al, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003). 
36 (1994) 10 Arb. Int’l 282.  See also 1996 (21) Y.B. Comm. Arb. 47. 
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Argentine officials for the purpose of obtaining business and a major part of the 
commission to be paid to the claimant was to be used for bribes.  He therefore 
declined jurisdiction on the ground that the case seriously violated international public 
policy and would not be entertained in courts in France, Argentine or any other 
civilized country or arbitral tribunal. 
Primarily ICC case no. 1110 is notable for Judge Lagergren’s decision to decline 
jurisdiction.  However, the decision is noted here for Judge Lagergren’s observations 
in light of witness testimony, that during the Peron regime, everyone wishing to do 
business in Argentine was faced with the question of bribes, and that the practice of 
giving commissions to persons in a position to influence or decide upon public awards 
of contract seems to have been more or less accepted or at least tolerated in the 
Argentine at that time.  The judge felt the amounts of money involved were huge and 
the episodes of corruption were contrary to good morals and to international public 
policy.   
Commentators have stated that Judge Lagergren may have gone too far in 1963 by 
pronouncing that a general principle of law existed which made contracts seriously 
violating international public policy invalid or at least unenforceable.37  The case 
points to significant milestones that have occurred in the international public policy 
arena.  Now there is transnational public policy which makes corrupt contracts 
                                                 
37See Gillis Wetter, “Issues of Coruption before International Arbitral Tribunals: The Authentic Text 
and True Meaning of Judge Gunnar Lagergren’s 1963 Award in ICC Case No. 1110” (1994) 10 Arb. 
Int’l. 277 at 281. 
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unenforceable.38   Transnational public policy occurs where there is international 
consensus as to universal standards and accepted norms of conduct.  The current 
international initiatives and instruments on bribery and corruption which have already 
been discussed in previous chapters, illustrate rather nicely the development of such 
transnational public policy.   
The issue whether arbitral tribunals should be allowed jurisdiction in matters 
involving allegations of bribery and corruption which seriously violate international 
public policy have been dealt with in many commentaries.39  Commentators have 
stated Judge Lagergren failed to distinguish between the separability of the main 
contract and arbitration agreement.40  However, Gillis Wetter has pointed out that 
Judge Lagergren had no need to consider the separability doctrine because the 
arbitration agreement in that case was separate and independent of the main contract 
and the judge was aware of this fact.41     
A case which considered the questions of separability and arbitrators’ jurisdiction 
is the ICC Case No 6401, 1991, Westinghouse International Projects et al v National 
Power Corporation and the Republic of Philippines. 42   The case involved two 
separate contracts.  The first contract was between National Power Corporation 
(NPC) and Burns & Roe for engineering and consulting services provided by Burns & 
Roe.  The second contract was between NPC and Westinghouse Electric, a Swiss 
                                                 
38 Supra note 30.   
39 Supra note 35.  See also Wetter, supra note 36. 
40 Ibid.  See also Bernando Cremades and David Cairns, “Corruption, International Public Policy and 
the Duties of Arbitrators” (2003) 58:4 Disp. Res. J. 76. 
41 See Wetter, Ibid. at 280.  
42 See 7(1) Int’l Arb. Rep., B-1.  
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company for the construction of Philippine Nuclear Power Plant.  Westinghouse 
Electric assigned the contract to two other members of the Westinghouse group.  
Westinghouse was claiming payments for monies owed to it under the contract while 
Burns & Roe wanted a declaration that disputes relating to its consulting contract be 
decided by arbitration.  The defendants counterclaimed that claimants had committed 
fraud in procuring the contract amongst other claims.43  The defendants sought to 
rescind both contracts and recover restitutionary sums.   
The tribunal had to decide whether the arbitration clauses for both contracts were 
obtained in a manner as to render the clauses invalid.  The tribunal also had to decide 
whether the contracts were obtained in a manner to render them invalid.  The 
defendants’ main allegation was that the contracts and arbitration clauses were invalid 
because they were procured by bribery44 and as a result the arbitrators do not have 
jurisdiction.45  The defendants’ case was that a Mr. Disini, employed as a special 
representative to both Burns & Roe and Westinghouse, had bribed then president 
Marcos of Philippines for the contracts to be awarded to them.46 
On the issues of arbitrators’ jurisdiction and existence of the doctrine of 
seperability, the parties did not dispute.  The tribunal affirmed the basic principle that 
the tribunal had jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.47  The doctrine of 
kompetenz-kompetenz recognized the arbitrators’ power to determine their own 
                                                 
43 Other claims of the defendant was that the claimants carried out defective and deficient work, 
improperly drew a line of credit and abandoned the defective plant before it was complete. Ibid. at 4. 
44 Ibid. at 12.  
45 Ibid. at 36. 
46 Ibid. at 12. 
47 Ibid. at 16. 
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competency.  What the parties disputed was the effect of the arbitration clause on the 
nullity or invalidity of the main contract resulting from bribery.  The claimants’ 
contention was that the doctrine applied in all events.  The defendants argued that if 
they established that the main contracts were obtained by bribery, the tribunal would 
have to accept the doctrine of separability was not absolute.48   
The tribunal concluded that there may be instances where a defect going to the root 
of an agreement between parties affects both the main contract and the arbitration 
clause.  The example cited was contract obtained by threat.  With regards to the 
impact of bribery, the tribunal said “it would remain to be seen whether bribery if 
proved, affects both the main contract and the arbitration clause and renders both null 
and void.”49  Unfortunately, the tribunal did not consider the impacts of bribery as it 
held on the facts presented to it that the defendant had failed to prove their allegations 
of bribery.50 
Another case which considered the questions of seperability and whether arbitral 
tribunals should have jurisdiction in matters of bribery and corruption in violation of 
international public policy is the ICC Case No. 7047, 1994.51  The case involved a 
consultancy agreement for the sale of military equipment to Kuwait between Westacre 
and Federal Directorate of Supply (FDS), Yugoslavia.  Jugo-import was the successor 
to FDS.  Westacre was to receive a substantial percentage of the value of the contracts 
                                                 
48 Ibid. at 20. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 (1995) 2 ASA Bulletin 301.  See also 1996 (21) Y.B. Comm. Arb. 79.  The facts of the case stated 
here are deduced from the English case of Westacre, supra note 6.    
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entered into between FDS with the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defence.  Payment was to be 
guaranteed by a bank.  The agreement submitted to Swiss law and provided for ICC 
arbitration in Geneva. FDS terminated the contract and Westacre commenced 
arbitration in Switzerland.  The arbitrators awarded Westacre US 50 million plus 
interest.   
During arbitration, FDS and the bank contended that the agreement was void on 
the grounds that it violated international public policy.  FDS suggested that Westacre 
had bribed persons in Kuwait for the purpose of persuading those persons to exercise 
their influence in favour of entering a contract with FDS.  These suggestions were not 
presented in the facts brought before the arbitrators.  These proved to be a fatal 
mistake because the arbitrators felt that the failure to plead bribes in the facts meant 
they did not have to investigate the claim.  However, the arbitral tribunal was of the 
opinion they had a right to address issues involving bribery and corruption.52   
A majority of the tribunal found that FDS had not established bribery or that the 
activities of Westacre were illicit or that there was anything which rendered the 
agreement unenforceable as violating international public policy.53   Attempts to 
overturn the tribunal’s decision in Switzerland which was the applicable law and place 
where arbitration was held and England were enforcement was to be carried out was 
unsuccessful.   
It is interesting to note that in ICC case no. 1110.  The judge concluded the 
contracts contemplated bribery and declined jurisdiction.  In ICC case no 6401, the 
                                                 
52 See Lew et al, supra note 35 at 216. 
53 Westacre, supra note 6. 
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arbitrators confirmed their right to jurisdiction.  Although bribery was presented in 
the facts, the arbitrators concluded it was not proved.  In ICC case no 7047, bribery 
although not presented in the facts was considered by the arbitrators and they decided 
bribery had not been proved.  When the defendants sought to overturn the arbitrators’ 
award in Switzerland, they pleaded that Westacre in seeking to enforce the contract 
were claiming a bribe for a member of the Kuwaiti government.  The Swiss court 
requested the comments of the arbitrators who stated that the defendants had not put 
their case across that way in arbitration.  In arbitration, they had merely suggested that 
Westacre had bribed officials.   
The cases discussed show that arbitration tribunals have jurisdiction to adjudicate 
matters involving bribery and corruption.  In so doing, arbitrators are in a position to 
impact the anti-corruption fight positively.  Where corruption is proved, it very well 
maybe that the contracts would be unenforceable.  ICC case nos 6401 and 7047 show 
the need to plead and prove bribery allegations adequately.  Successful pleas and 
proof of bribery allegations will impact decisions of both the arbitration tribunal and 
any domestic court which may be required to enforce the award.                                      
In domestic decisions concerning ICC case no 7047, both the Swiss and English  
courts were not willing to challenge the arbitrators’ finding of fact.54  In the European 
Gas Turbine SA (France) v Westman International Ltd (UK),55 the Paris Court of 
Appeal rejected European Gas Turbines request to annul an agreement on the grounds 
of public policy.  European Gas Turbines argued that enforcement would violate both 
                                                 
54 See the dissenting judgment of Waller LJ discussed at supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
55 (1995) 20 Y.B Comm. Arb. 198. 
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French public policy and morality in international commerce.  Therefore, the contract 
should be declared null and void because its real object was traffic in influence or 
bribery.  The Paris Court of Appeal held there was no proof the contract was illicit.56  
Bagheri notes that there has been a shift in the pattern of contractual disputes from 
controversies over private rights to a more public law oriented model of contractual 
failure.57  He argues that the rule of contract law such as those relevant for illegality 
should not be used to achieve distributional objectives.58  According to Bagheri, the 
aim of distributive justice is to determine the boundaries of an individual’s freedom 
and autonomy as justified restrictions to ensure the welfare of the public at large.59  
He says bribery and similar offences fall into the category of distributive justice.60  In 
his opinion, the notion of international public policy, which reflects a public sense of 
justice can effectively undermine the validity of an arbitration agreement.61  Bagheri 
feels the most advantageous aspect of arbitration is its capability in maintaining the 
validity of the contract in the face of its incompatibility with economic regulation.62 
Bagheri sees public policy as relevant for distributional objectives or public 
interests as well as individual interest.   In relation to individual interests, public 
policy applies to principles applied as a moral shield enabling the forum to protect the 
                                                 
56 Ibid. at 200. 
57 Mahmood Bagheri, International Contracts and National Economic Regulation: Dispute Resolution 
through International Commercial Arbitration, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) at 43.  
58 Ibid. at 53. 
59 Ibid. at 14. 
60 Ibid. at 241. 
61 Ibid. at 125. 
62 Ibid. at 242. 
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sanctity of certain values and a minimum standard of justice amongst individuals.63  
He notes that there has been a failure to substantiate the content of public policy and 
the application of public policy has been vague and indiscriminate causing confusion 
and complexity.  He calls for the need to detach the justice in international contracts 
from distributional or welfare considerations.64   
The argument in this chapter is that clear international or transnational public 
policy is emerging in the area of international corruption.  This emergence calls for 
arbitration tribunals to pay adherence to the public policy which sees international 
bribery as a crime and therefore illegal and unenforceable.  Where such bribery is 
proved, arbitral tribunals have a duty to hold the contract unenforceable or invalid.  
The cases discussed illustrate the recognition of this transnational public policy by 
arbitral tribunals and should be welcomed.   
Arguably, the vast majority of cases which come before arbitration which are 
tainted by corruption may not even address issues of corruption.  Thus in cases where 
the issues do not involve payment of commission or the case is not a kind similar to the 
World duty case, the issue of corruption may not even be considered.  Take a situation 
where a contract between two parties comes before arbitration.  One of the parties 
procured the contract through bribes but the issue before arbitration involves breaches 
of the contract and no reference is made to the bribery implications, perhaps because 
the other party is not aware of the payment or because bribery being paid in secret 
tends to be kept secret.  In such situations, it is unlikely the bribery implication would 
                                                 
63 Ibid. at 126. 
64 Ibid. at 127. 
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be considered.  Therefore, it may be that the role arbitrators may play in the 
anti-corruption fight is limited.  Nevertheless, it is useful to highlight situations in 
which they may play a role and to see the impact if any of their role in curbing 
corruption and ensuring CSR. 
 
5.3 PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES BY VICTIMS OF 
CORRUPTION 
Victims of corruption fall into many different categories.  They include citizens of 
States, individuals and corporations.  The focus here will be on corporations as 
victims and perpetrators of international corruption in contract bidding.  In 
international business, corporations usually compete to bid for contracts and there may 
be instances where one corporation obtains the bid as a result of corrupt practices.  
The cases which will be discussed suggest that in such cases the losing bidder may be 
able to initiate a civil suit claiming damages.  
Article 3 of the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption requires 
member states to provide in their internal laws private right of action by persons who 
have suffered damages as a result of corruption.  Such persons have rights to initiate 
actions to obtain full compensation for such damage.65  Article 35 of the UNCAC also 
provides a similar private right of action.  It requires States to take measures in 
accordance with domestic law principles to ensure entities or persons who have 
suffered damage as a result of an act of corruption have the right to initiate legal 
                                                 
65 Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption, online: COE 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/174.htm>. 
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proceedings against those responsible for the damage in order to obtain 
compensation.66   
One author has noted that the broader reach of the UN convention will accelerate 
the trend for civil liability in recent years for parties who claim injury from another’s 
corrupt practices to bring civil suits.67 Whether this will be the case is yet to be seen.  
The US has noticeable civil liability cases for damages as a result of corrupt practices.  
The US has noted that the current laws and practices of the US are in compliance with 
article 35 of the UNCAC.68  It is therefore unlikely, at least in the case of the US for 
the trend to be accelerated.  This is because the US does not plan to adopt new federal 
legislation establishing a cause of action for damages suffered from corruption.69  
Rather, avenues for civil liability would still need to rely on existing practice.  Indeed, 
the FCPA which is a major act dealing with the criminality of transnational bribery 
does not create a private right of action for damages.70  This is despite the numerous 
calls which have solicited for the FCPA to include private rights of action.71 
                                                 
66 United Nations Convention against Corruption, U.N Doc A. Res/58/4 (2003), reprinted in 43 ILM 
(2004). 
67 Lucinda Low, “The United Nations Convention against Corruption: The globalization of 
anti-corruption standards”, Paper prepared for the conference of International Bar Association, 
International Chamber of Commerce and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – 
The Awakening Giant of Anti-corruption Enforcement, May 2006. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid.  See also Steptoe & Johnson International Law Advisory, September 2006, online: Steptoe  
<www.steptoe.com/publications-3831.html>.   
70 U.S v Ray, 238 F.3d 828. See McLean v. International Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 
1987). See also Lamb v Philip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Circuit 1990).   
71 See Daniel Pines, “Comment: Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include Private Right 
of Action” (1994) 82 Cal. L. Rev 185; Steven Salbu, “Battling Global Corruption in the New 
Millenium” (1999) 31 Law & Policy Int’l Bus, 47.  See also Mary Siegel, “The Implication Doctrine 
and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act”, (1979) 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1085 where Siegel argues that the 
 211
 
5.3.1 Private Actions against Corrupt Competitors in International Commerce 
In the UK, discussions on civil remedies for corruption focus on rights available under 
agency law and fiduciary relationships.72   A very well cited case dealing with 
corruption, agents and civil remedies is Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid73 in 
which the Privy Council held that an agent holds a bribe as a constructive trustee for 
his principal.  Reid was liable to Hong Kong government for breach of fiduciary 
obligations.  The Hong Kong government, the victim of the bribe was entitled to 
assert proprietary interest in any assets into which the money can be traced.  Many 
commentaries have addressed the issues raised by the Attorney General case.74   
The concerns here are with civil remedies for corporations which are victims of 
corruption in the contract bidding process.  Can such companies recover damages for 
the loss of the contract?  It is recognized that a company which tenders for a contract 
but fails to procure it because of bribery, can make a civil claim for damages for loss 
suffered.75  Actual cases brought before English courts where companies sue for 
damages for failing to procure contracts as a result of the bribes of a competitor are 
                                                                                                                                            
FCPA implies private action for injunctive relief but not damage relief for the anti-bribery provisions.  
Brett Witter, “Note: Lamb v. Philip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990): The Sixth Circuit Gets 
Sheepish on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement” (1992) 5 Transnatn’l law. 533. 
72 See Nicholls, Daniel et al, Corruption and Misuse of Public office (New York: OUP, 2006). Ch. 6.  
See also supra note 2.   
73 [1994] 1 A.C. 324. 
74 See Peter Birks, “Hitting Bribery Hard: A-G for Hong Kong v Reid” (1994) 6 Asia. Bus. L. Rev. 54 
75 See Nicholls et al, supra note 70 at para 6.04; Berg, ibid. at 36.  In English law, the claim would be 
based in tort for ‘illegal means’ conspiracy action.      
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very limited.76  Across the Atlantic in the United States, there are more cases reported 
of companies suing one another for damages resulting from the loss of contracts due to 
the bribery activities of competitors. Many such claims are filed under breaches of 
federal laws such as Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization (RICO) and 
Robinson-Patman Act.   
A well know case which involved claims for damages for bribery by competitors 
is Kirkpatrick v Environmental Tectonics Corporation international.77  In that case, 
Environmental Tectonics Corporation (ETC) alleged that Kirkpatrick obtained a 
construction contract as a result of bribes they paid to public officials of the Nigerian 
government.  ETC sought to recover damages for loss of contract from Kirkpatrick 
for violations under two federal laws, namely RICO and Robinson-Patman Act and 
relevant state laws.78  Kirkpatrick sought to dismiss the complaint on grounds, inter 
                                                 
76 See Nicholls et al, Ibid. at para 6.21  Nicholls et al do not cite a UK case but rather refer to a South 
African case whereby a para-statal paid a large sum of money in damages to a company which alleged it 
was fraudulent.  See also Berg, Ibid.at 62 which cites one English Case, Lonrho v Fayed [1992] 1 A.C 
448.  The actual case deals with conspiracy but there were no allegations of bribery. 
77 493 US 400.  See also Peter D. Trooboff, “International Decisions: W.S Kirkpatrick & Co. v 
Environmental Tectronics Corp., International. 110.S.Ct. 701, 29 ILM 182” (1990) 84 Am. J. Int’l L 
550. 
78 RICO claim was under 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1962-1968.  The Robinson-Patman claim was under 15 
U.S.C.S. § 13(c) which states: 
“ Payment or acceptance of commission, brokerage or other compensation. It shall be unlawful for any 
person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, 
anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in 
lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or 
merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other 
intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct 
or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation is 
so granted or paid.”  The court of appeal said a direct competitor of a company that obtains a contract 
through bribes has standing to press a section 2(c) claim against the bribery.  For more on regulation of 
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alia, that the suit was barred by the act of state doctrine.   The district court dismissed 
the suit, holding it was barred by act of state doctrine.  The court of appeal for the 
third circuit held the act of state doctrine did not apply to this case because 
adjudication of the claims would not require the courts to pass judgment on the validity 
of the foreign governments act within its own borders.  ETC was claiming damages 
from Kirkpatrick not the Nigerian government.  Rather, the case involved a 
determination as to a factual matter whether Kirkpatrick’s alleged bribery motivated 
the award of the contract.  The Supreme Court affirmed that position.79 
Although the Kirkpatrick case is better known for the Supreme Court’s judgment 
regarding acts of state doctrine, the decision of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court 
that acts of state doctrine was inapplicable called for a decision on the claims of ETC.  
The claim was based on violations of federal laws, which if proved would result in 
substantial damages to ETC.  It has been noted that a private RICO action could be 
wielded as a business weapon by an envious party alleging a competitor’s foreign 
bribery gave rise to an award of a contract.80 However, it must be said that the success 
or otherwise of such cases is subject to rigorous proof burdens and so the use of RICO 
for such purposes may be very burdensome and expensive. 
                                                                                                                                            
anti-competitive effects of bribery, see Notes: Bribery and Brokerage: An analysis of Bribery in 
Domestic and Foreign Commerce under sec 2 (c) of the Robinson- Patman Act, 76 Mich. L R 1343.   
79 Ibid. 
80 Christopher F. Corr & Judd Lawler, “Damned if you do, damned if you don’t? The OECD 
Convention and the Globalization of Anti-Bribery Measures” (1999) 32 Vand. J. of Transnat’l L. 1249 
at 1272. 
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In the US, claims may also be brought under tort law for intentional interference 
with prospective economic advantage.81  In the Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp., the supreme court of California affirmed the elements of the tort of intentional 
interference with prospective economic disadvantage which it had laid down in 
Buckaloo v Johnson.82  The Supreme Court also found the elements present in the 
case and concluded that Lockheed Martin was guilty of the tort.  The facts involved 
the Republic of Korea’s desire to purchase military equipment and solicitation of bids.  
Loral Corporation and MacDonald Detwiller, and Associates Ltd were competing 
bidders.  KSC represented MacDonald Detwiller in its bid and stood to receive a 
substantial commission of over $30 million if the bid went to MacDonald Detwiller.  
Loral which is now Lockheed Martin got the bid.  KSC contended that although its 
client, MacDonald’s bid was lower and equipment more superior, Loral got the 
contract because it had offered bribes and sexual favours to key Korean officials.83 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
Civil law remedies have a big role to play in the anti-corruption fight and there is some 
awareness of the possibilities of civil remedies.  However, much still needs to be 
                                                 
81 See 29 Cal. 4th 1134 (2003).  The case also involved claims under California’s Unfair Competition 
Law, but this claim was unsuccessful in the Supreme Court. 
82 Buckaloo v Johnson 14 Cal.3d 815, 827, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745, 537 P.2d 865.  These elements are 
usually stated as follows: " '(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with 
the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the 
relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) 
actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the 
acts of the defendant, ibid.at 950. 
83 Korea Supply, Ibid. at 1140. 
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done.  Studies on corruption focus on criminal remedies.  In this chapter, the impact 
of arbitration tribunal decisions on contract validity tainted by bribery has been 
considered.  Where such tribunals have awarded contracts in situations tainted with 
bribery, courts have had to decide whether such awards should be enforced.  The 
process involves applications of contract laws and private international laws carried 
out through civil litigation.   
With the development of transnational anti-bribery standards derived from 
international laws which arbitrators are increasingly required to adhere to, the roles of 
arbitrators in the anti-corruption fight is gaining recognition.  However, there is the 
view that arbitrators should uphold contracts, public interests should be distinguished 
from private interests and arbitration may not be suitable for addressing public interest 
concerns.  The chapter argued that arbitration has an important role to play in bringing 
civil remedy to the forefront of anti-corruption attempts.  There is the need for 
arbitrators to adhere to global condemnation of anti-corruption and where possible do 
their part to address these concerns. 
The chapter also considered the impact of domestic decisions in civil suits brought 
between parties competing for contract awards.  There is recognition that such parties 
may be able to sue under tort laws.  In the US such actions may be successful under 
the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.  In the UK, 
it may be successful under tort law for ‘illegal means’ conspiracy.  Cases in the UK 
have not been as forthcoming as cases in the US.  Nevertheless, for either tort law to 
be successful, parties alleging the tort need to provide satisfactory evidence of proof. 
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On the whole the chapter has focused on selected aspects of contract law and tort 
law which may address CSR as it relates to Corruption.  In the next chapter, corporate 
governance as a means of ensuring CSR will be examined.  Shareholder derivative 
suits which fall under the umbrella of corporate governance and provide instances of 
the impacts of corporate governance on CSR will be discussed.  Shareholder 
derivative suits also provide instances of the impact of civil litigation on CSR and 





CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CSR 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Previous chapters have examined multiple attempts by a large number of actors 
including, corporations, civil society, states and the international community to 
improve corporate behaviour.  These attempts fall under the large umbrella of CSR.  
CSR encompasses attempts to curb corporate misbehaviour, the effects of which are 
external to the company.  These include grand scale corruption, human rights and 
environmental abuses.  It also encompasses regulation to prevent corporate frauds, 
corruption and other vices, internal to the company which may ultimately cause the 
downfall of companies, big or small.  The focus of this study is on external CSR 
issues. 
It is widely accepted that more work still needs to be done to improve corporate 
behaviour.  As mentioned in chapter two, some have argued that the focus for any 
attempt to improve corporate behaviour should come from a change in perception of 
corporate governance and corporation law.1  The aim of this chapter is to examine the 
impact of corporate governance on broad CSR issues.  Some of the questions the 
chapter will seek to answer include – whether corporate governance has any 
significance in the CSR debate?  Whether the current approach of corporate 
governance towards broad CSR issues is adequate or even capable of addressing such 
                                                        
1 Janet Dine, Companies, International trade and Human Rights, (New York: Cambridge Univeristy 
Press, 2004). 
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issues?  What would need to be done in order for corporate governance to lead to 
better corporate behaviour in relation to CSR issues?   
 
6.2 WHAT IS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? 
Primarily, corporate governance deals with the relationship between shareholders and 
directors in managing the affairs of the company.  The U.K Cadbury Report on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance refers to corporate governance as the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled.2  The Cadbury definition has 
most successfully stood the test of time and is most widely adopted.3  Generally, 
corporate governance focuses on the system of controlling and directing a corporation, 
particularly the structure and process of governance.  The structure includes the make 
up of boards, numbers of and types of non-executive directors, board committees, 
while the process includes the provision of information, internal controls, financial 
reporting, and terms of service agreements.4 
Corporate governance also addresses the core areas of board responsibility such as 
strategy, performance, conformance and accountability to shareholders.5  For instance, 
the U.K combined code on corporate governance6 aims to provide best practice issues 
such as proper financial reporting and accountability, responsibilities of directors, need 
                                                        
2 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1 December 1992, online: 
ECGI <http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf>. 
3 See Richard Smerdon, A practical Guide to Corporate governance (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007).  
4 Ibid. at 2. 
5 See Bryan Horrigan, “Comparative corporate governance developments and key ongoing challenges 
from Anglo-American perspectives” in Stephen Tully ed., Research Handbook on Corporate Legal 
Responsibility (U.K: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2005) pg 22 citing an Australian CEO’s views 
on accountability to shareholders as including progress reports, seeking to align the collective interests 
of shareholders, boards and management. 
6 See the Financial reporting Council Combined Code, 2008, online: FRC 
<http:/www.frc.org.uk/corporate/combinedcode.cfm>. 
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for audit committees and responsibilities of auditors.  The U.S Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
aims to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate 
disclosures.7  These issues are all internal to the company, although they may have 
external consequences.  If a company collapses, creditors may be affected, employees 
will lose jobs with dire consequences for their families and communities may feel the 
impact.  
 
6.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS IT RELATES TO CSR 
The system of corporate governance does not focus on the “values’ or other 
behavioural matters or societal or economic obligations of companies, which typically 
broad CSR is concerned with.  However, the need for attention to broader values is 
becoming an essential part of good governance and the part values and other ‘softer’ 
issues should rightly play in the approach to good corporate governance is now being 
considered8 in the governance literature.  In relation to this, Smerdon’s explanation is 
premised on the purpose of corporate governance.  He discusses two shareholder 
theories, namely the shareholder value theory which has been developed into the 
enlightened shareholder value theory and the Stakeholder or Pluralist theory.9  
The enlightened shareholder value theory sees the basic goal of the company as 
generating long-term shareholder value, based on appropriate financial discipline, 
competitive advantage and within a framework which is economically, ethically and 
                                                        
7 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002 Pub.L.no. 107 – 204, 116 Stat 745. 
8 Supra note 3.  
9 Ibid. at 19. 
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socially responsible and sustainable.10  This view is based on the Company Law 
Review which recognizes that the company needs to foster relationships with its 
employees, customers and suppliers; maintain its business reputation; consider the 
company’s impact on the community and the working environment. 11   The 
stakeholder theory on the other hand sees the company serving a range of wider 
interest such as employees, suppliers, local communities and the environment as a 
means of achieving shareholder value.  
Smerdon notes that the enlightened shareholder value view is the more widely 
accepted view.  It expresses a growing belief by investors that in achieving enhanced 
shareholder value, corporations should behave in a socially responsible manner which 
has regard to all who have a stake in the company.12  Therefore, it seems that any role 
corporate governance may have in CSR matters is linked to shareholder value and the 
realization that it makes good business sense for companies to adopt ethical practices 
and make significant social contributions.13  Smerdon also adds that outstanding CSR 
performance by companies apart from making good business sense also ‘happens to be 
morally inspiring and motivating.14 
Janet Dine has argued that foci for any attempt to improve corporate behaviour 
should come via a change in the perception of corporate governance and corporation 
law.  This study argues that improvements to corporate behaviour typically discussed 
under the umbrella of CSR involves more than corporate governance because 
                                                        
10 This is called the Hermes Principle, Ibid at 21. 
11 Modernising Company Law, CM 5553, July 2002. 
12 Supra note 3 at 21. 
13 Ibid, at 431, para 20.002.  
14 Ibid. at 471. 
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corporate governance primarily deals with the relationship between managers and 
shareholders, particularly as it relates to shareholder value while CSR deals with the 
relationship between the company and multiple stakeholders.   
Moreover, CSR in an era of globalization is international in outlook, while 
corporate governance traditionally is confined to domestic law.  Corporate 
governance is a domestic attempt at regulating or promoting through corporate best 
practice good corporate behaviour.  Corporate governance issues are typically 
addressed in a domestic setting.  A mechanism which focuses on domestic law is 
clearly inadequate for regulating corporate behaviour in an era of expanding corporate 
power and influence.15  The principles guiding traditional corporate governance are 
inadequate for the CSR issues at hand.  As Douglas Branson notes: 
Traditional corporate governance theory, structure and practice deal with solving 
problems thought to be generated by the separation of ownership from control in 
large publicly held corporations.  They are simply irrelevant to the problems 
posed by the growth of large, sprawling multinational entities.16  
Another commentator notes that on the transnational and international level, the fields 
of international law and increasingly human rights law are the core fields within which 
corporations are discussed.  At this level, the domestic law framing of the issue of 
CSR – the extent to which the corporation may or must take into account effects of its 
actions on others, and the fundamental limitation of ultimate corporate purpose to 
                                                        
15 Michael Addo, Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations 
(Boston: Kluwer, 1999). 
16 Douglas Branson, "The Very Uncertain Prospect of ‘Global’ Convergence in Corporate Governance” 
(2001) 34 Cornell Int’l L.J 321. 
 222
shareholders – is increasingly rejected.17   
The OECD Principles on Corporate Governance which is putting corporate 
governance on the international scene, notes that issues relevant to a company’s 
decision making process, such as environmental, anti-corruption and ethical concerns, 
although taken into account are treated more explicitly in other OECD and 
international organization instruments. 18   Such instruments include the OECD 
Anti-bribery convention and the UNCAC.  These broad CSR issues are not addressed 
in any details in the OECD principles on Corporate Governance.  This is despite the 
fact that many corporations are global in outlook with networks of operations in 
different countries and that CSR issues are typically relevant for such corporations.  
Majority of the CSR concerns which have grabbed headlines take place in developing 
countries.  As such, it is arguable that broad CSR issues which are global in nature 
demand more than corporate governance which is domestic in nature.   
In domestic law corporate governance focuses on the relationship between the 
corporations and its shareholders.  Traditional notions of corporate governance are 
based on the twin models of shareholder primacy and shareholder maximization.  The 
main objective of these models is to increase the wealth of shareholders, within the 
limits of the company resources and capabilities.  Shareholders retain ultimate control 
of the corporate governance machinery and the duty of those appointed by them flows 
exclusively to the shareholders.19 
                                                        
17 Supra note 5 at 22. 
18 See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, online: OECD 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf>. 
19 Larry Cata Backer, “Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on 
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in 
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At best, corporate governance is suited to internal CSR issues affecting 
shareholders, employees and perhaps creditors.  When the Enron, WorldCom and 
similar scandals broke out, they affected shareholders and employees.  These scandals 
did not raise wider questions about companies’ responsibility to society.20  The post 
Enron era which tightened regulation of corporate governance dealt with reforms 
aimed at strengthening the roles of independent directors, audits and certification of 
corporate accounts.21  In Australia, one author has called for legislative protection of 
unsecured creditors to be seen as part of the CSR debate.22   These issues all fall 
under corporate governance and relate to CSR, albeit internal CSR issues directly 
affecting the company.  Clearly, such CSR issues which are internal to the company 
can safely be addressed by corporate governance.   
The post Enron reforms all pertain to traditional corporate governance structure 
and processes.  Indeed, the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted to prevent repeats of 
Enron type scandals.  It is argued that this is unfortunate.  The post Enron era needs 
to appreciate the role corporate governance mechanisms may play in ensuring 
corporate adherence to values and social obligations which strictly speaking may not 
further the twin models of shareholder maximization and primacy.  
CSR issues which are external to the company, i.e. the effects are not adversely 
felt in the company such as bribery of public officials (domestic and foreign), human 
                                                                                                                                                               
International Law” (2006) 37 Colum. H.R.L. Rev 287. 
20 J. Sabapathy, “In the dark all cats are grey: corporate responsibility and legal responsibility”  in 
Stephen Tully ed., Research Handbook on Corporate Legal Responsibility (U.K: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2005). 
21 See supra note 5 at 28. 
22 Helen Anderson, Corporate Social Responsibility – The case for Unsecured Creditors, (2007) 7 
O.U.C.L.J 93. 
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rights and environmental abuses are not effectively covered by corporate governance.  
Primarily, this is because the origins of corporate governance stem from the need to 
respond to the problems caused by separation of ownership and control.  It is only 
recently that corporate governance recognizes that corporations have obligations to 
multi-stakeholders23 and developments in this area may still be in the evolutionary 
stage.  
It must be said that at least in the UK, perhaps the time has come when corporate 
governance can have a big impact on broad CSR.  However, it appears the relevant 
area of law is very uncertain.  The Companies Act 2006 imposes a new duty on 
directors to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to— (a) the likely 
consequences of any decision in the long term, (b) the interests of the company’s 
employees, (c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, (d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community 
and the environment, (e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for 
high standards of business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly as between members 
of the company.24   However, there has been widespread concern regarding the 
codification of directors’ duties and there are fears this will give rise to a plethora of 
litigation.25   
In parliamentary debates about sec 172, there was considerable concern that the 
                                                        
23See supra note 5. See also Nicholas Bourne, “Corporate Governance in the UK and Overseas” (2007) 
28 Bus. L. rev. 292 which notes that current thinking on corporate governance recognizes corporation’s 
obligations to stakeholders. See also supra note 3 which discusses the shareholder value theory and the 
stakeholder theory.   
24 Sec 172 (1), Companies Act 2006. 
25 Supra note 3 at 17. 
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clause gives rise to uncertainty as to exactly what such a duty involves and to whom it 
is owed and how it is to be discharged.  Under the common law formulation, 
directors’ duties were owed to the company and sec 170(1) of the Companies Act 2006 
repeats this formulation.26  These means that only those who can act on behalf of the 
company can enforce these duties.  Sec 172 sought to address the issue of whose 
interests directors are required to pursue in the exercise of their powers.  Sec 172 
makes it clear that the shareholders interests are the primary objects of the directors’ 
efforts.27  It is still to be seen what effect this new duty will have on CSR standards, 
but at the present time it has generated a spate of controversy.  For the time being, it 
seems that models of corporate governance in the UK and US at least focus on 
shareholder primacy.   
There is not much scope for other stakeholders to participate in the internal aspects 
of corporate governance.28  Any possibility of such a scope seems limited to creditors 
and employees who can be said to have long term interest in the business of the 
corporation.  One commentator in a study on comparative corporate governance notes 
that corporate governance focuses on the suppliers of capital (creditors and 
shareholders) and the managers or those who control management.29  
However, a broader view of corporate governance which would focus on 
multi-stakeholders has been canvassed by some commentators because the governance 
of large corporations has an impact on other interests and such interests have a role to 
                                                        
26 See Paul Lydon Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Smith and 
Maxwell, 2008) 479. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See Detlev F. Vagts, The Governance of the Multinational, (2005) Wis. Int’l L. J. 525 at 532. 
29 Arthur R. Pinto, “Globalization and the Study of Comparative Corporate Governance (2005) 23 Wis. 
Int’l L. J. 477 at 479. 
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play in corporate governance. 30  Hot on the debate of corporate governance, is the 
question whether models of corporate governance should include a role for 
stakeholders other than shareholders.31  Stakeholders are persons who affect or are 
affected by the actions and activities of organizations and who corporations should be 
responsible to.32  They include shareholders, employees, creditors and the society as a 
whole.  Such commentators say that the role of stakeholders can be viewed from an 
external or internal perspective.  An external perspective sees stakeholders as outside 
the internal corporate governance and may suggest that their interests be protected by 
the concept of corporate social responsibility. An internal perspective on the other hand 
looks to include stakeholders more directly in corporate governance”33 
The prospect of including some categories of stakeholders is feasible and already 
happening.  However, such stakeholders are limited to employees and creditors.  
The prospects of including general stakeholders such as the ‘nation/society’ more 
directly in corporate governance models seem stretched.  Who would qualify for 
such stake-holding?  What impacts would this have on the business as a whole?  It 
is argued that the impact would be very great and more substantially that protecting 
the interests of general stakeholders such as the society is beyond the scope and intent 
of corporate governance.  The external perspective which sees the CSR concept as 
the way to protect such stakeholders is preferred.   
The CSR agenda focuses on stakeholder primacy.  Its scope and purpose makes it 
                                                        
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. where he addresses this in the context of comparative corporate governance. 
32 Supra note 20. 
33 Ibid. at 479.  
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more appropriate to address broad CSR issues.  Corporate governance which 
focuses on shareholder primacy is inadequate to address the type of issues and 
stakeholders of concern in broad CSR matters.  To put this in the context of 
international corruption, anti-bribery is a CSR standard which raises ethical issues 
affecting the society as a whole.  A nation is adversely affected by bribery, 
particularly bribery on a grand scale involving public officials.  Corporate 
governance is unable to consider the impact of such bribery on general stakeholders 
without consideration of the impact on shareholder primacy. 
However, corporate governance is capable of ensuring that managers and 
shareholders are aware of stakeholder interests; and that company internal corporate 
governance policies create avenues where CSR standards would be upheld. While 
internal corporate governance role for creditors and employees is workable, such 
roles for the general stakeholder – nation/society is unattainable and perhaps rightly 
so.  Seen in this light, the need for the corporation to pay attention to social and 
ethical values and obligations as well as profit maximization becomes clearer.   
It has been said that every corporation should be thought of as a social enterprise 
whose existence and decisions can be justified only insofar as they serve public or 
social purposes.34  While many would readily agree that corporations are a product 
and part of society, not many would agree that their existence and decisions can be 
justified on the basis of their service to public and social purposes.  Most may be 
more prepared to accept that in these present times, corporations need to pay attention 
                                                        
34 See Preface to Stephen Tully ed., Research Handbook on Corporate Responsibility (U.K: Edward 
Elgar, 2005). 
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to social obligations while achieving profitable goals.   
At this juncture, it may be useful to consider the three theories influential in 
shaping models of companies.35  The first is the contractual theory which is made up 
of legal and economic contractualism.  Legal contractualism sees the company as an 
amalgamation of the decision of two or more parties to carry on commercial activities.  
The social responsibility of the company is limited and the state’s justification for 
regulatory interference is minimal.  Economic contractualism sees the company as a 
voluntary association between shareholders.  It excludes the need to consider the 
social responsibility of corporations.36 
The second is the communitaire theory which sees the grant of company status as 
creating an instrument for the state to utilize.  It creates a situation where the company 
has no strong commercial identity and goals but rather has diffused goals.37  The third 
is the concession theory which sees the existence and operation of the company as a 
concession by the state, which grants it the ability to trade using the corporate tool 
particularly where it operates with limited liability.38  The three theories discussed are 
concerned with the relationship between the state, regulation and the company.  The 
contractual theory sees a limited role for the state and regulation.  The communitaire 
theory sees the state ideals as the main reason the company comes into existence, while 
the concession theory agrees that there is the need for state regulation but essentially to 
ensure fairness and democracy in corporate governance. 39  It is argued that a focus on 
                                                        
35 See Janet Dine, The Governance of Corporate Groups (U.K: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
36 Ibid. at 8. 
37 Ibid. at 17. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. at 21. 
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any of these models of companies is unhelpful in determining the approach companies 
should have to social responsibilities affecting societal or ethical values.   
For one, society may have different aspirations from the State and any theory 
which focuses on the State is bound to miss that point.  Further, the communitaire 
theory which is said to have the closest link to social responsibilities is problematic 
because it suggests the corporation should have no strong commercial identity.  The 
concession model which welcomes regulation to ensure fairness and democracy in 
corporate governance may also claim to have links to social responsibility, if it is 
viewed in the light of the enhanced shareholder value theory.  However, because that 
theory limits the role of external stakeholders, it cannot entirely capture CSR matters 
and is also problematic. 
A model which effectively considers CSR will address the relationship between 
the company and multi-stakeholders.  It will see the need for corporations to take CSR 
seriously and will factor in regulation as an agent assisting this goal.  This is because 
as previously argued in other chapters, CSR which is voluntary is unlikely to address 
broad CSR concerns adequately.  Regulation will complement corporate decision 
making sensitive to broad CSR matters.  In situations, where corporate decision 
making is not sensitive to broad CSR matters, regulation may help compel adherence 
to clearly identified rules.   
An application of this approach can be seen in relation to the CSR issue of 
international corruption.  International corruption is an economic and social vice 
which should be eliminated or at least reduced.  There is therefore the need for 
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companies to consider the impact corrupt activities have on the society and to 
recognize the laws against corruption as well as make provision in their policies, 
practices and procedures to eliminate corruption.   
However, it must be said that not all companies are on the same wave length when 
it comes to CSR.  Some companies engage in CSR as a result of bad publicity with the 
intention of repairing reputational damage.  Other companies have good policies 
imbibed in their corporate makeup.  Whatever may be the reason for including CSR 
policies in a company, such inclusion must be welcomed.  However, until and unless 
corporate governance can frame CSR issues beyond shareholder value, corporate 
governance will have a limited role to play in ensuring companies behave responsibly 
with regard to broad CSR matters concerning multi-stakeholders, particularly society.   
The next section will identify and address the use of shareholder derivative suits as 
an example of the limited role corporate governance currently plays in ensuring 
responsible behaviour in broad CSR matters, especially international corruption. 
 
6.3.1 International Corruption and the Use of Shareholder Derivative Suits 
Shareholder derivative suits fall under the umbrella of corporate governance.40  In this 
section, shareholder derivative suits will be cited as an example of the impact corporate 
governance may have on broad CSR issues.  As noted in the previous section, 
traditionally, corporate governance is ill suited for addressing broad CSR matters.  
However, through the use of derivative actions, corporate governance is able to address 
                                                        
40  Supra note 26 where derivative claims are discussed under Corporate Governance. 
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the traditional corporate governance notions of shareholder and director management 
whilst aiding the anti-corruption and CSR campaign.  The use of shareholder 
derivative actions in the US to hold directors responsible for breach of fiduciary duty 
dealing with fraud or corrupt payments, illegal wrongdoing and waste of corporate 
assets will be examined.  The development of statutory rules in the UK for derivative 
suits which may impact broad CSR issues will also be examined. 
Discussions in this section will also be relevant for chapter five which focused on 
civil law remedies, namely enforceability of international contracts tainted by illegality 
and development of private right of actions for damages for victims of corruption as 
civil remedies.  This is because shareholder derivative suits are also civil measures 
useful in the anti-corruption fight.  The measures discussed in chapter five, were 
viewed from the perspective of contract and torts laws.  The measures discussed here 
will be viewed from the perspective of corporate governance.   
 
6.3.1.1 Derivative Suits in the U.S 
Derivative suits allow shareholders to assert a corporate claim when directors fail to do 
so.  The right is a corporate right and recovery goes to the corporation.41  In the US 
there have been cases where shareholders have sued their directors for breach of 
fiduciary duty or waste of corporate assets.  For shareholders to pursue a derivative 
suit, they need to either make a demand on the board of directors or show demand that 
                                                        
41 Comment - Zapata Corp v Maldonado: Restricting the Power of Special Litigation Committees to 
Terminate Derivative Suits, (1982) 68 Va. L. Rev 1197 at 1199.  
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is excused where such demand would be futile.42   
The cases which will be discussed are mainly those dealing with questionable 
payments made by corporations.  In such cases, although the aim of the payments was 
to further the corporation’s interest, shareholders were able to sue alleging corporate 
waste or breach of fiduciary duty.  However, the success or otherwise of such 
derivative suits in the US is frequently hampered by the application in the courts of 
three rules, namely the business judgment rule; the net loss rule; and no duty to 
disclose rule.   
This section will address the effects of these rules on decisions of the courts 
involving derivative suits.  Such analysis will in turn help determine the likelihood or 
otherwise of success in future cases.  It will seek to establish whether there is prospect 
for frequent use of derivative actions in ensuring respect for broad CSR and in the fight 
against corruption. 
 
6.3.1.1.1 Business Judgment Rule 
Firstly, the impact of the business judgment rule on three cases will be addressed.  In 
these cases the derivative suits were dismissed as a result of the application of the 
business judgment rule.  The business judgment rule vests responsibility for decision 
making in the corporation’s board of directors and prevents shareholders from 
disrupting the board’s decision through derivative actions where the board determines 
such actions are not in the interest of the corporation.  Exception to the application of 
                                                        
42 See Notes – Demands on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, (1960) 73 
Harv. L. Rev 746 at 748.  See also Mark Underberg, “The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits 
against Directors, (1980) 65 Cornell L. Rev. 600 at 601. 
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the rule applies where the decision barring derivative action is made in bad faith, 
fraudulently or the directors themselves are subject to personal liability in the action.43   
In Abbey v Control Data Corporation,44 a shareholder brought a derivative action 
to compel seven senior officers and directors of Control Data Corporation (CDC) to 
repay monies owing to CDC due to civil and criminal penalties brought about as a 
result of the corporation’s guilty plea to criminal charges.  The charges stemmed from 
illegal payments the corporations had made to certain foreign entities.  The 
shareholder claimed the defendant had violated federal securities law and common law 
fiduciary principles of corporate waste and mismanagement.  In response to the suit, 
the CDC board created a Special Litigation Committee (SLC) to investigate the 
charges.  The SLC was made up of outside directors not involved in the suit or with 
knowledge of the illegal payments.  The SLC investigation concluded the suit was not 
in the best interest of the corporation for a number of reasons including the fact the 
defendants had not been directly involved in the payment and had not profited from the 
acts; and that at the time the payments were made, such payments were a customary 
business practice. 
When the case came before the District Court of New York, the court terminated 
the derivative action based on the business judgment rule.  The shareholder tried to 
argue that where the defendants are charged with criminal conduct or violations of 
                                                        
43 See Abbey v Control Data Corporation, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.1979) Cert. denied, 444 U.S 1017, 
Auerbach v Bennet, 419 NYS 2d 920 (1979).  See also Gall v Exon, 418 F.Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y 1976).  
Gall concerned shareholder claim that directors approval of payments to Italian political parties were 
waste of corporate assest and failure to disclose payments violated federal securities law.  The board 
established a Special Litiigation Committee to look into the matter.  SLC determines suit will not be in 
best interest of the corporation.   
44 Abbey, ibid. 
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federal securities laws, the business judgment rule should not apply.  The District 
Court rejected this and held that where an autonomous board determines reasonably 
and in good faith that the derivative action is not in the corporation’s best interest, the 
courts should uphold the board’s decision.  Accordingly, the business judgment rule 
applied.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the District Court and a 
certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied.  
Similarly in the UK, a litigation decision is like any other decision a board of 
directors might take and should be left to the normal decision making process of 
directors.45  However, just as there are exceptions to that rule in the US, in the UK it is 
clear that the board of directors may not be able to take decisions which are in the best 
interest of the company.  This would be the case where such directors are involved in 
wrongdoing and the wrongdoers make up the majority of the board or are able to 
influence a majority of the board.46  In the US it is common for board of directors to 
appoint SLCs to look into whether it is in the best interest of company to sue for wrong 
doing.  In the U.K the use of committees is not so well known, although there is the 
reported case of John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw47 where the company’s 
articles allocated the litigation decision to a committee of the board from which the 
wrongdoers were excluded.48  
In Auerbach v Bennet49, a shareholder filed a derivative shareholder action against 
directors of a company, General telephone & Electronics Corporation (GTE), and the 
                                                        
45 Supra note 26 at para 17-2. 
46 Ibid.  
47 [1935] 2 K.B 113. 
48 Supra note 26 at para 17-2. 
49 See Auerbach, supra note 43.  
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company’s auditors.  The shareholder alleged the board of directors were liable to the 
corporation for breach of their duties to the corporation and should be made 
accountable for the payments made in those transactions.  The case arose because the 
management of GTE directed internal preliminary investigations into the possibility 
that questionable payments had been made to public officials or political parties in 
foreign countries.  The investigations revealed the corporations or its subsidiaries had 
made payments constituting bribes and kickbacks totaling more than $11 Million. 
As a result of the derivative action and the possibility of others, the GTE board of 
directors created a SLC to determine the position GTE should take in litigation 
involving present and similar shareholder derivative claims.  The SLC found there 
would be no proper interest served if the claim against the directors and the auditors 
continued.  They found the auditors conducted their work in accordance with 
accepted auditing standards and in good faith.  They also found the directors had not 
violated their duty, had not gained personally and the claim was without merit.   
Before the New York Court of Appeal the important question was whether the 
business judgment rule applied to shield the decision of the SLC from judicial scrutiny.  
The SLC was made up of a three person committee and had joined the board after the 
transactions were made.  The derivative suit was brought against four directors out of 
a 15 member board.  It did not appear any of the directors participated in the illegal 
transactions and the other directors had no knowledge of the transactions.  The court 
held that the substantive aspects of a decision by a committee of disinterested directors 
appointed by the corporation’s board of directors are beyond judicial inquiry under the 
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business judgment rule.  However, the court can inquire as to the disinterested 
independence of the members of that committee and as to the appropriateness and 
sufficiency of the investigative procedures chosen and pursued by the committee.  In 
the case, the Court of Appeal did not find anything wrong with the method and 
procedures of the SLC and concluded that the determination of the SLC foreclosed 
further judicial inquiry. 
The cases are useful in analyzing the impact shareholder derivative actions can 
have on CSR, particularly the anti-corruption standard because it shows shareholders 
have the right to bring such derivative actions where directors have been involved in 
bribes.  However, the cases also show the difficulties such actions may face.  The 
business judgment rule and the use of independent committees by board of directors 
impacts on derivative actions and where properly applied may be used to halt such 
actions.50  Commentators have opined that the application of business judgment rule 
must face increased scrutiny to halt the regrettable trend towards judicial abdication 
and managerial immunity.51  There is the need for derivative suits to remain an 
effective tool for shareholder attempts to redress corporate wrongs.52     
In the light of Zapata Corp v Maldonado,53 the business judgment rule may not 
have the final say in determining whether a derivative suit should proceed or not.  
                                                        
50 George Dent, “The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the 
Derivative Suit?” (1980) 75 Nw.U.L.Rev 96.  For a more recent discussion on problems shareholder 
litigation face with regard to special litigation committees, see Eric Moutz, “Janssen v Best & Flanagan: 
At Long Last, The Beginning Of The End For The Auerbach Approach In Minnesota?” (2003) 30 Wm. 
Mitchell L. Rev. 489. 
51 See J. Johnson, “The Business Judgment Rule: A review of its application to problems in illegal 
payment” (1980) 6 J. Corp. L. 481. 
52 ibid. 
53 430 A.2d 779. 
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Zapata, introduced the application by the court of its own independent business 
judgment.  The Zapata case is different from the cases of Abbey Control Data 
Corporation and Auerbach because it did not concern breaches of corporate waste for 
bribery payments.  However, it is similar to these cases because it involved 
application of the business judgment rule, derivative suit and decisions of a committee.  
Commentators have stated that the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Zapata 
preserves the derivative suit as an effective means of redressing breaches of fiduciary 
duty by corporate management.54   
In Zapata, a shareholder brought a derivative suit against ten directors and officers 
of Zapata Corp alleging breaches of fiduciary duties.  The board of directors created 
an investigation committee made up of two new board members appointed after the 
alleged acts to look into the case and other cases.  The investigation committee 
concluded the suits against the corporation should be dismissed.  Zapata Corp moved 
for dismissal or summary judgment.  The Chancery Court refused to grant summary 
judgment on the grounds the business judgment rule is not a grant of authority to 
dismiss derivative actions and shareholders have individual rights to maintain 
derivative actions in certain cases.  Zapata Corp thus brought this interlocutory appeal 
before the Supreme Court of Delaware.  The Supreme Court of Delaware rejected the 
grounds on which the Chancery Court denied summary judgment.55   
However, with regards to the role the business judgment rule should play in 
                                                        
54 Leah Tompkins, “Corporations – The Court’s Independent Business Judgment will be applied to a 
Decision of a Committee of Disinterested Directors to Dismiss a Derivative Suit Alleging a Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty by a Majority of the Corporations Directors” (1982) 27 Vill. L. Rev 1308 at 1324.  See 
also supra note 41 at 1198. 
55 Supra note 53 at 785. 
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dismissing derivative suits brought by shareholders, the Supreme Court was of the 
view that mere inquiries into independence, good faith and reasonable investigation 
was not a sufficient safeguard against potential abuse.56  The court devised a two step 
test which should be applied in cases where motions are filed for dismissal of 
derivative suits where an independent committee has carried out an objective and 
thorough investigation.   
Step one inquires into the independence and good faith of the committee and bases 
of the supporting committee’s conclusions.  If the court determines the committee is 
not independent or has not shown reasonable bases, the court should deny the 
corporation’s motion.  However if the court is satisfied the committee is independent 
and has shown reasonable bases for good faith findings and recommendations, the 
court will proceed to step two.  Step two requires the court to apply its own 
independent business judgment.  The aim is to thwart instances where corporation 
meets criteria in step one but the result does not satisfy its spirit or to prevent 
termination of shareholder grievance which needs further consideration in the 
company’s interest.57   
Another commentator has noted that perhaps the Zapata case over protects the 
shareholder and questions whether the courts two step test adequately balances the 
competing interest of shareholders and corporations.  It may be that the first step 
sufficiently balances the competing interests because it accounts for corporation’s need 
to rid itself of detrimental litigation by demonstrating a reasonable basis and protects 
                                                        
56 Ibid. at 787. 
57 Ibid. at 788 – 789. 
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shareholder interest as the court would not dismiss the suit unless it is convinced 
decisions were made on sound basis.58   
While this argument is valid, in light of the decisions before Zapata were courts 
were dismissing derivative suits because the business judgment rule applied and had 
been applied procedurally accurately, it may be easier to understand the basis for the 
two step process.  Overall it seems its goal is to achieve fairness with a slant towards 
protecting shareholders who are the more vulnerable party in need of assistance in such 
instances.  In any case, a subsequent decision by the Supreme Court of Delaware four 
years after Zapata has held that courts need not, but may exercise its own business 
judgment.  This decision brings Delaware’s view closer to Auerbach and other New 
York decisions,59 thereby justifying the arguments that the second step of Zapata is 
unnecessary.60 
In the U.K, the power to initiate litigation is a managerial power.  However, it 
may be that it is not only the board of directors which have a say in whether litigation 
would be in the best interest of the company.  Davies has argued that common law 
appears to take the view that, even if the board does not wish to sue, it is open to the 
shareholders collectively by ordinary resolution to decide whether the companies 
should initiate litigation.61  Davies notes that the abolition by the Companies Act, 
2006 of the rule in Foss v Harbottle62 reduces the force of the argument that collective 
                                                        
58 David Beyer, “Business Judgment Dismissal of Shareholder Derivative Suits by Board Litigation 
Committees: An expanded rule for the courts” (1982) 35 Vand. L. Rev 235 at 257-260. 
59 See Norwood Beveridge, “Does the Corporate Director have a Duty Always to Obey the Law? (1996) 
45 Depaul L. Rev 729 at 738 where Kaplan v Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Del. 1985) is cited. 
60 Ibid. Beveridge also makes the argument that Zapata step 2 is unnecessary.   
61 Supra note 26 at para 17-3. 
62 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189. 
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shareholders have the power to initiate litigation by ordinary resolution.63  It may 
therefore be that the decisions of the board whether or not to initiate litigation may take 
priority and the use of committees to show the decision of the board is not prejudiced 
may be on the rise, similar to the US.  Davies has suggested other possible solutions 
for determining who should decide if the company should initiate litigation.  These 
include the use of non-executive directors or subset of members of the board; a group 
of shareholders lying between individual and whole shareholders; and giving the right 
to commence a derivative action to someone outside the company altogether.64 
 
6.3.1.1.2 Net Loss Rule 
In situations where directors have breached fiduciary duty resulting in illegal acts, the 
business judgment rule does not shield directors from judicial scrutiny for breaching 
relevant statute.65  However, one commentator has noted that the net loss rule and the 
use of SLCs (which have already been discussed) provide the result of shielding 
directors.66   The net loss rule requires the corporation to have suffered loss before a 
shareholder derivative claim may be made.   
In Miller v American Tel & Tel Co.67 which concerned a shareholder derivative 
action against the directors for breach of fiduciary duty in violating the federal statute 
that prohibits corporate campaign spending, the Court of Appeal held that since the 
shareholders had alleged actual damage to the corporation, they had a claim upon 
                                                        
63 Supra note 26 at para 17-4. 
64 See ibid. at para 17-5 for discussions on the usefulness or otherwise of each suggestion.   
65 Miller v. American Tel & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759. 
66 Beveridge, supra note 59 at 733. 
67 507 F.2d 759. 
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which relief could be granted.68  Thus in situations where the corporation has been 
involved in illegal acts which profit the corporation, if there has been no damage to the 
corporation, shareholders would face difficulty in bringing derivative claims. 
 There may even be situations where the corporation has suffered a loss but the 
shareholders may have difficulties bringing derivative suits. For example, a 
corporation makes illegal payments and these payments lead to initial profits for the 
corporation.  However, as a result of the discovery of these illegal payments, criminal 
convictions are imposed causing the shares of the corporation to tumble.  Can 
shareholders recover for the damages to the corporation?  It seems that even in such 
situations, application of the net loss rule may prevent recovery.   
To illustrate the point, if shareholders are claiming the directors breached their 
fiduciary obligation to maximize share price, the net loss rule requires shareholders to 
show that the loss in share price resulting from the illegal acts outweighs the gain in 
share price resulting from the increased sales or profit the illegal act produced. Only if 
the illegal acts results in ‘net loss’ can the director be held to have breached fiduciary 
obligation to maximize share price69.  The American Law institute has proposed three 
modifications to the net loss rule which some commentators welcome and others do 
not.70 
 Shareholders may also have problems proving the breach of statute was the 
                                                        
68 Miller v. American Tel & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759. 
69 Geoffrey Rapp, “On the Liability of Corporate Directors to Holders of Securities for Illegal Corporate 
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courts should refuse to offset profits contrary to public policy; and corporations should have the burden 
of proving that illegal act resulted in profit. 
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proximate cause for the injurious claim.  In Lewis ex rel. American Express Co. v. 
Robinson (In re American Express Co. Shareholder Litigation),71 the shareholders 
brought a derivative action against certain directors and officers of American express 
claiming defendants violated section 14(a) of the securities act 1934 and Sec 1962 (c) 
and (d) of the RICO as well as other fiduciary obligations under state law.72  The 
shareholders alleged that as a result of illegal activities, the corporation was injured in 
its business and property, the corporation suffered loss and was exposed to potential 
liability.  The District Court held with the Court of Appeal affirming that the RICO 
illegal act was not the proximate cause of the injuries the shareholders asserted.  The 
appellants were not the targets of the RICO violations or competitor.  The violations 
were intended to benefit the corporation.73   
Citing the Supreme Court decision in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation,74 which said proximate cause would have a direct relation between the 
injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged, the court reasoned this precludes 
recovery by plaintiff who complains of harm flowing merely from misfortunes visited 
upon a third person by defendant’s act.75  The Court of Appeal also referred to its 
earlier decision in Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc.,76 where it had described 
                                                        
71 39 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 1994). 
72 In the appeal, the shareholders abandoned the Seurities Act claim and focused on the RICO claim.  
The review here will be concerned with the RICO claim. See 18 USCS § 1962.  Sec 1962 (c) states “It 
shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the 
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, 
in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of 
unlawful debt”.  Sec 1962 (d) states “It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of 
the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section. 
73 Re American Express Co. Shareholder Litigation, 39 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 1994) at 399. 
74 503 U.S 258 (1992). 
75 Supra note 73 at 399. 
76 897 F.2d 21, 23 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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the proximate cause limitation as restricting liability to cases in which the RICO 
pattern or acts “are a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation and … 
the injury is reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence”.77  Like 
Hecht, the Court of Appeal said that the injury to the shareholders was not reasonably 
foreseeable, the illegal acts were not directed at them and they were not the 
corporation’s competitor. 
 
6.3.1.1.3 No duty to disclose rule78 
Still on the subject of illegal corporate practices such as payment of bribes, 
shareholders may face difficulty when suing under the federal securities law.79  Courts 
have held that unlawful conduct by itself is not material per se.80  The Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) requires corporations to disclose material information as 
well as information the concealment of which will make the information released 
misleading.  However, it seems the touchstone for materiality is financial materiality.  
Thus companies would be required to disclose issues pertaining to earnings and loss, 
stability of earnings, risks attendant to future profitability amongst other material facts 
which would be dependent on a particular case.81 
The SEC has pointed out that improper payments have important bearing on 
quality of a corporation’s earning and that such payments are pertinent to evaluating 
                                                        
77 Supra note 73 at 400. 
78 The no duty to disclose rule relates to breaches of federal securities law. 
79 See Eric Roiter, “Illegal Corporate Practices and the Disclosure Requirement of the Federal Securities 
Law, (1982) 50 Fordham L. Rev 781. 
80 Ibid. at 788.  Roiter points to the exception where SEC requires company’s to report any formal 
criminal charge of illegal domestic campaign contributions. 
81 Ibid. at 790 ff where he discusses financial materiality. 
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management’s stewardship over corporate assets.82  However, the SEC has not made 
these facts important issues in determining materiality.  Rather SEC weighs in each 
case the benefits of disclosure against its assessment of the extent of investors’ interest, 
cost and utility of particular disclosure.83 
Where the cases involve proxy solicitation and shareholders suing for failure to 
disclose a material fact or giving misleading facts, the material fact which was not 
disclosed must affect the investors in their dealing with the corporation’s shares.  In 
Abbey v Control Data Corporation, the shareholders claimed the directors violated sec 
13a and 14a of the Securities and Exchange Act which prohibit corporations from 
including false and misleading statements in proxy solicitation. The false or 
misleading statements were the failure to disclose the illegal foreign payments.  The 
court went in to the reason for the securities law and said the federal securities laws 
were designed to protect investors engaged in the purchase and sale of securities by 
implementing a policy of full disclosure.84  The court held that remedy for claiming 
breach of corporate waste or mismanagement lay in state laws and plaintiffs should not 
try to use the federal securities laws to claim remedies where the apparent 
non-disclosure had little if any impact on Plaintiff’s dealing with the corporation’s 
shares.85 
There has been debate whether disclosure should deter management self dealing 
                                                        
82 See Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal Corporate 
Payments and Practices, Report to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 44 
(May 1976). See also Charles McManis, “Questionable Payments Abroad: An Antitrust Approach” 
(1976) 86 Yale L. J 215 at 227. 
83 McManis, Ibid. at 227. 
84 Abbey, supra note 43 at 731. 
85 Ibid. 
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and conflicts of interest or should be broader deterring illegal or unethical corporate 
conduct that do no necessarily impair and may even in some cases advance corporate 
profitability.86 In Roeder v Alpha Industries87, the Court of Appeal for the First circuit 
rejected a claim that corporate directors have a duty to disclose illegal acts.  The court 
ruled bribery was not material under Rule 10b-5 until the US attorney was likely to 
indict a company official and the company as a result had no duty to disclose the 
company’s illegal acts.  As it is, disclosure which is not material is not mandatory.  
There is no general duty to disclose that a corporation is involved in illegal conduct 
unless governmental proceedings are pending or known to be contemplated.88 
Rapp has touched on the tension between state courts which apply the net loss rule 
and federal courts which apply the no duty to disclose rule in deciding whether 
shareholders can recover for losses to share prices and highlighted that these tension 
has led to very few cases which have held directors liable to shareholders for illegal 
acts 89  Rapp is concerned with the tension as it affects shareholders who buy shares 
after the market takes into account positive results but before disclosure is required if it 
is found out the corporation has engaged in illegal conduct.  Here, the concern is with 
the impact the established rules have on the rights of shareholders to sue directors for 
illegal acts which suggest a breach of their fiduciary duty 
On the whole, it can be seen that the application of the business judgment rule, net 
                                                        
86 Supra note 79 at 786. 
87 See Roeder v Alpha Indus., Inc, 814 F.2d22 (Ist Cir. 1987).  See also supra note 69 at 112 for 
discussion on the case. 
88 See United States v Matthews, 787 F.2d 38 where the court of appeal for the 2nd cir. Held that the SEC 
regulations did not require the appellant to disclose incharged criminal conduct in his proxy statement 
for election to board of directors.  See also supra note 69.  
89 Rapp, supra note 69. at 106-107.  
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loss rule in state courts and no duty to disclose in federal courts affect greatly the 
success of the use of derivative suits to ensure corporate management behave 
responsibly.  Some of the difficulties shareholders’ face in bringing such suits has 
been highlighted.  It is hoped that with this knowledge, shareholders would appreciate 
what needs to be done before they can be successful in such claims.  The law has been 
applied as it relates to illegal foreign payments such as bribes which are important CSR 
issues corporations are still battling with.  
 
6.3.1.2 Derivative suits in the U.K 
In English law, a derivative suit occurs when a shareholder (claimant) who cannot 
procure the company to bring the action itself, brings a claim on behalf of the company, 
which the company could, if willing to do so, have brought.  The claimant joins the 
alleged wrongdoers and the company for whose benefit the derivative action was 
brought as defendants.  A common feature of derivative actions if successful, is for 
the courts to order payment of damages to the company, rather than payment of 
damages to the claimant.90 Scarman LJ in Wallersteiner v Moir (No.2) 91 stated that 
the stockholder derivative action is well recognized in the United States and that the 
grounds for bringing derivative actions in the US are wider than those in the UK.92 
A recent US derivative action suit which highlights this difference is City of 
                                                        
90 See Halle v Trax BW Ltd [2000] BCC 1020.  The case involved appeal against the refusal by lower 
court to make an order pursuant to Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, Ord 15r.12(a)(13), for claimant to 
be afforded an indemnity as to the costs of the action out of the assets of the corporate defendant.  
91 [1975] QB 373. 
92 Ibid. referring to Gower, Modern Company Law, 3rd ed. (1969). 
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Harper Woods Employees Retirement System v. Richard Olver et al.93 The case 
involved allegations of breach of fiduciary and corporate waste of assets committed by 
the individual defendants, directors of BAE Systems Plc (BAE plc).  BAE Plc is a UK 
defense contractor headquartered in London.  The plaintiffs alleged the directors of 
the company allowed the company to pay improper bribes to a Saudi Arabian prince in 
connection with the Al Yamamah military program whereby UK sold war planes to the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.   
The case, although pursued in the US concerned the application of the English law 
rule in Foss v Harbottle.  This was because the District of Columbia applies the law of 
the state of incorporation of the nominal defendant company, in this instance the law of 
BAE plc.  The court dismissed the case because the rule in Foss v Harbottle applied 
and the exceptions to the rule were inapplicable.  The court took pains to examine the 
rule in Foss v Harbottle.  It concluded that while the case could succeed in the District 
of Columbia, it could not succeed in the UK. 
One of the issues which came before the court in deciding the choice of law to 
follow was whether the UK laws and the District of Columbia laws were in substantial 
accord.  The court said there was no substantial accord between the two laws 
regarding derivative law suits. The UK law, referring to Foss v Harbottle precludes 
shareholders from bringing derivative actions except in limited circumstances, while 
the District of Columbia law provides for a more liberal derivative remedy. 
Prior to the enactment of the U.K Companies Act 2006, shareholder derivative 
                                                        
93 2008 U.S. Dist. Civil Action No. 07-1646 (RMC). 
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suits were governed by the rule in Foss v Harbottle.  Under the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle, a suit by a shareholder instead of by a company can be brought in a limited 
number of situations, namely in the case of ultra vires or illegal actions or proposed 
actions by the company or of fraud or oppression on the minority by those who control 
the company.94  Konamaneni and others v Rolls-Royce Industrial Power (India) Ltd 
and others95 was a case which raised for the first time in England the question of the 
operation in the international context of derivative claims and the exceptions to the rule 
in Foss v Harbottle.96  The Konamaneni case involved allegations of bribery brought 
by minority shareholders of Spectrum Power Generation Ltd (SPGL), an Indian 
company against two English companies.  The shareholders alleged the English 
companies paid SPGL’s Indian managing director bribes in order to secure contracts 
for the construction and maintenance of power station in India. 
In order to commence the action in the UK and because the case concerned a 
foreign company, the claimants sought leave of the court to serve proceeding on SPGL 
outside the jurisdiction.  Permission was granted and the defendants subsequently 
applied to set the order aside.  The defendants argued England had no jurisdiction to 
hear the claim.  In order to be successful, the claimant also had to bring the case 
within one of the exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle.  They therefore alleged 
that there was a fraud on the minority.  Amongst other issues, the court had to 
consider whether England was the appropriate forum.  The court held that the English 
                                                        
94 Supra note 62.  For more on the case of Foss v Harbottle and the exceptions to the application of the 
rule, see Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd and Others (No 2) 1982 1 All ER 354. 
95 [2002] 1 All ER 979. 
96 Ibid. at 983. 
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courts have jurisdiction to hear derivative claims concerning foreign companies.  
However, it found the connection to India overwhelming.  It also found that the 
shareholders had failed to satisfy the burden of showing England was the appropriate 
forum. 
The case gives incite into how the fraud on minority exception operated under the 
rule in Foss v. Harbottle.  The exception prevents a wrong doing without redress 
where conduct amounts to a fraud and the wrongdoers are in control of the company.  
Fraud includes cases where wrongdoers are endeavouring directly or indirectly to 
appropriate themselves money, property or advantages belonging to the company.97 
With the enactment of the Companies Act 2006, the rule in Foss v Harbottle which 
permitted minority shareholders to sue only in the limited situations stated above was 
abolished.  Derivative actions in the UK involving directors are now only possible 
under statute.98  Shareholders seeking to bring a derivative suit must issue a claim 
form and seek the permission of the court to take further steps in the litigation.  
Whereas the rule in Foss v Harbottle decided whether an individual shareholder had 
standing to sue, the statutory claim decides whether it is in the interests of the company 
for the litigation to be brought and whether the litigation is desirable.99 
The use of shareholder derivative actions for CSR issues such as bribery 
allegations is possible by virtue of section 260 of the CA 2006.  Section 260 (3) 
allows claims in respect of a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed act or 
                                                        
97 Ibid. at 987. 
98 See Part 11 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
99 Supra note 26 at para 17-7.  For more on the factors courts will consider in determining whether to 
give permission for the derivative claim, see Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate 
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) ch 4.  
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omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director 
of the company.  Indeed in the US City of Harper Woods case, the parties agreed that 
had the conduct occurred after 1 October 2007, Sec 260 would have been applicable.  
It has been noted that the CA 2006 will potentially allow a broader range of claims to 
be brought more easily than is presently the case at common law.100  However, it is yet 
to be seen if this will actually be the case.  Moreover, it seems that the statutory 




CSR is increasingly been mentioned in the corporate governance discourse.  However, 
a closer examination of corporate governance and its approach to external CSR issues 
suggests it is incapable in its present form of aiding such CSR without reference to 
shareholder’s interest.  Corporate governance which focuses on the relationship 
between shareholders and the company cannot adequately address CSR issues of 
concern raised in this study.  Corporate governance is geared towards shareholder 
primacy.  External CSR issues go beyond shareholder primacy and maximization of 
shareholder value.   
Through derivative actions, which is an aspect of corporate governance, 
shareholders’ attempt to direct and control company actions.  The aspect of derivative 
actions discussed in this chapter show the shareholders’ ability to shape decisions of 
                                                        
100 Reisberg, ibid. 
101 Ibid.   
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the corporation dealing with ethical and social obligations to society.  This ability is 
more obvious in the US cases as opposed to the UK cases.  Derivative actions can 
therefore be seen as a means by which corporate governance addresses external CSR 
concerns.   However, there is the need for increased application of derivative actions 
relevant for external CSR issues in many domestic jurisdictions.  The application at 
present is mostly limited to the US and this is unlikely to effectively impact CSR 
which is a global issue.     
The use of derivative suits and the other civil remedies discussed in the 
preceding chapter, as well as criminal laws addressed in chapter 3 are relevant for 
effective responsible corporate behavior.  The next chapter will consider the impact of 




GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND CSR 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Previous chapters have addressed the elimination of corruption from a CSR point of view.  
In chapter six, the link between corporate governance and CSR in relation to broad CSR 
matters, particularly anti-corruption was explored.  In this chapter, the link between 
global governance and broad CSR issues will be explored.  Global governance aims to 
address common global concerns through the activities of governments, 
intergovernmental networks and relationships, and non-state actors.  These actors are 
involved in interactive decision making and considerations of multiple policies and 
practices in the creation of instruments to address global concerns.  In the area of 
corruption, many such instruments - international, regional and domestic have been 
created to address the issue of corruption as a global concern.  Such instruments have 
been discussed in previous chapters.  
Corruption impacts nations and gives rise to reduced economic development and 
poverty.  In many situations, corruption is linked to governance or government in the 
sense that bad governance or government decisions lead to corruption.  One author has 
stated that the emphasis of international efforts on good governance in the mid 1980s to 
mid 1990s was on political democratization and economic liberalization which gave 
States a minimalist role.  Now the emphasis is on improving and reforming the 
functioning of democratic institutions including deepening democracy and exploring 
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more active and creative roles for non-state actors.1 This suggests that governance is still 
primarily concerned with governments, but increasingly is also interested in the role non-
state actors can play in strengthening democracy.  
It is argued that international efforts on governance are also concerned with 
managing issues of global concern such as the elimination of corruption.  The focus of 
international efforts in this instance should not be solely on governments and the need to 
strengthen democracy.  The changing dynamics to the global political, economic and 
social climate brought about by globalization suggest that governance is no longer just 
about national governments and intergovernmental networks.  Non-state actors are 
playing a bigger role in governance.  These roles are not simply to strengthen democracy 
but to develop policies and practices for addressing common global concerns.  The 
development of policies and practices by non-state actors for the elimination of 
corruption is an example of the role non-state actors are playing in governance. 
This chapter will aim to address how global governance as a whole impacts CSR.  Is 
global governance leading to improved behaviour in which corporations are mindful of 
the increased necessity for obligations?  Such obligations include the need for business 
decisions to comply with societal needs for corporate sensitivity to human welfare and 
economic progress.  Is the bigger role non-state actors are playing in global governance 
impacting CSR, particularly responsibility towards anti-corruption?  After all, 
governance includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, 
as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or 
                                                        
1 Thomas G. Weiss, “Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges in 
Porden Wilkinson, ed, Global Governance, (New York: Routledge, 2005) 69-78. 
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perceive to be in their interest.2  Approached in this light, it is hoped the significance of 
global governance for the CSR agenda can be fully appreciated.   
A discussion on global governance will not be complete without considerations of 
the impact of the emerging principle of global administrative law on global governance.  
Global governance is increasingly being associated with global administrative law.  This 
chapter will therefore examine the relationship between global governance and global 
administrative law.  The problems encountered in regulating global governance through 
the use of administrative law mechanisms will be explored.  The impact of global 
administrative law on developing countries will be considered.   
Finally, the chapter will link the issue of development to human rights.  This will be 
done through an analysis of the Right to Development.  The chapter will address the 
relationship between human rights, development and administrative law principles.  
Beyond the Right to Development, the chapter will examine the role of corporations in 
development and their impacts on developing countries brought about as a result of 
globalization. 
 
7.2 WHAT IS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE? 
The commission on global governance sees global governance as a broad, dynamic, 
complex process of interactive decision making that is constantly evolving and 
responding to changing circumstances. It involves a wide range of actors and partnership 
building for developing joint policies and practices on matters of common concern.3  Jim 
Whitman sees governance as a social function centered on the making of collective 
                                                        




choices regarding matters of common concern to the members of human groups.4   
Rosenau highlights the need to clarify that global governance refers to more than 
formal institutions and organizations through which the management of international 
affairs is sustained.  It extends to command or control mechanisms of social systems 
including the private enterprise and does not necessarily include legal or political 
authority.  The possession of information and knowledge, the pressure of active or 
mobilizable persons, use of careful planning, good timing, clever manipulation and hard 
bargaining have all been cited by Rosenau as examples of actions which foster control 
mechanisms that sustain governance without government.5 
Rosenau’s classification of global governance which is not limited to legal or 
political authority or one might add any kind of authority makes it difficult to measure 
the relevance, if any global governance may have on common global concerns such as 
anti-corruption measures.  This is because, under such a view, it becomes difficult to 
determine what constitutes global governance and what does not.  For example, the 
activities of an organized group such as NGOs who mobilize others to subscribe to a 
particular view may be classified as global governance.  While such NGO activities 
should be welcomed, it is necessary to set some parameters before classifying such 
activities as global governance.  It is not often clear whether it is the rules that may 
emanate from such activities which should be properly classified as global governance or 
the mere action of social systems which may or may not lead to rules which should be 
classified as global governance.  It is submitted it should be the former.   
Arguably, the aim of global governance is to create a better world and address global 
                                                        
4 Jim Whitman, The Limits of Global Governance (London: Routledge, 2005) 17. 
5 James N. Rosenau, “Governance in the twenty-first century” in Porden Wilkinson, ed., Global Governance, (New 
York: Routledge, 2005). 
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issues through the activities of a large number of actors.  Its main challenge is 
interdependence which makes global governance more complex.6  However, 
interdependence which ensures that actions at one level create consequences at other 
levels should be seen as an asset.  For example, human rights abuses carried out by 
MNCs in developing countries have effects on how such MNCs and their products are 
viewed in developed countries.  There may be calls for boycotts of such products 
resulting in bad publicity for the MNCs.  Such abuses typically lead to calls for national 
or international regulation of corporate responsibility matters.  They may also lead to 
proliferation on codes of conducts to address such MNC behaviour.  These consequences 
arise as a result of activities taking place on the global scene giving rise to the 
development of formal and informal rules.  Such activities may or may not involve legal 
or political authority, but are properly classified as global governance 
In global governance there is the need for co-operation and interdependence among 
the large number of actors recognizable on the global scene.  Intergovernmental 
institutions and national governments are unable to ensure global governance on their 
own.  The co-operation and interdependence envisaged on such a large scale in global 
governance necessarily means there will be the need for compromises on how 
governance is achieved.  In some situations, legal regulation and enforcement will take a 
back seat while market forces take the front seat.  In other situations, there will be friction 
between opposing sides with different views on the way forward.  For example, NGOs 
and trade organizations such as the ICC are at logger headds regarding the need for 
mandatory rules regarding CSR.  A role of global governance should be aimed at bringing 
                                                        
6 See Ibid. at 48.  Many authors including Rosenau argue that the complexities of the modern world make governance 
very difficult.   
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these opposing views together and for a consensus or agreement to be reached.  The 
problem is that in many such situations, it will be difficult for a consensus to be actually 
reached.   
Many see global governance as an amalgamation of many rules, formal and informal, 
organized and unorganized present on the global scene wanting to control global affairs.  
With such a system, it has been said that there can be no consensus or single institution 
with the capacity or authority to regulate such rules.  This is true to an extent.  However, 
there is the need for consensus in global governance and for bodies or international 
institutions to be appointed to co-ordinate global efforts to control global affairs.  This is 
because there are simply too many forces in the regulatory space vying for domination, 
and there is a tendency that the forces with the most political and or economic clout 
would carry the day.  Worse still, it may mean that those with power will be able to 
achieve their preferred rules.   
In the context of CSR, the need for such consensus is justifiable.  The social and 
ethical problems MNCs which are major vehicles of globalization face have brought CSR 
to the forefront and placed it firmly under global governance.  Attempts at ‘global’ 
corporate responsibility have proved futile.  There has been partnership building on 
different levels to develop practices and policies relevant for CSR.  However, it is argued 
that no consensus has been reached and perhaps none can be reached under the global 
governance agenda.  This may be because CSR is very broad encompassing many 
different issues.  Different actors may have different agendas so the possibility of 
reaching a consensus is more difficult. 
This begs the question - what significance therefore does global governance have for 
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CSR?  The accomplishment of CSR principles requires a multi-faceted approach 
involving multiple decision makers.  This is because the ripples of wrong social 
behaviour will be felt at different levels and should be addressed at all levels.  However, 
for global governance to impact CSR, it may be useful for CSR to be broken down into 
identifiable sections.   Such identification would typically include the universal CSR 
standards mentioned in this study such as anti-corruption, human rights and the 
environment.  By identifying specific areas of CSR, global governance has a better 
chance of being effective in bringing opposing views together and attempting consensus.  
The next section will focus on corruption in the context of global governance. 
 
7.3 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION 
In the introduction to this chapter, the link between governance and corruption was 
alluded to.  However, as stated most writings on governance and corruption address 
governance in relation to governments and corruption. To re-iterate the point, many 
believe bad governance leads to corruption.  Here, the attempt is to link global 
governance – decision making involving multi-actors – to corruption.  Specifically, what 
role can global governance play in reducing corrupt activities carried out by MNCs?  
What are the effects of global governance on corruption?   
The global society is showing increasing awareness of the need to curb corruption.  
There is no failure of instruments, national, regional and international to curb corruption.  
The problem lies with enforcement mechanisms for implementing such instruments.  
Putting this in global governance terminology, there are agreed global frameworks for 
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actions and policies to be carried out at appropriate levels.7  But there is the need for 
reformed and strengthened institutions – public, private and intergovernmental to ensure 
effective adherence.  
 
7.3.1 Reform and Strengthening of Institutions for the Curb of Corruption 
It must be said that the reform and strengthening of institutions is beginning to happen.  
The World Bank and United Nations office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) launched a 
partnership in September 2007 to help developing countries recover stolen assets.  The 
initiative called Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) operates on the premise that both 
developed and developing countries must work in partnership.  In a press report 
publicizing the intiative, StAR called for the ratification by all countries of the UNCAC 
and essential collective effort with multilateral and bilateral agencies, civil society and 
the private sector.8  The initiative will help member states who have signed the UNCAC 
strengthen their capacity to implement chapter V on Asset Recovery.9 Therefore, although 
the initiative is not regulatory in nature, it will be of assistance to UNCAC which is 
regulatory.   
 The StAR initiative aims to address the ‘other side of the equation’ on corruption 
which “ignores that stolen assets are often hidden in the financial centers of developed 
countries, bribes to public officials from developing countries originate from 
multinational corporations; and the intermediary services provided by lawyers, 
accountants, and company formation agents, which could be used to launder or hide the 
                                                        
7 Supra note 2. 
8 See World Bank and UNODC to Pursue Stolen Asset Recovery, 17 September 2007.  Online: UNODC 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2007-09-17.html>. 
9 See Joint Announcement of the President of the Republic of Indonesia and the Presidient of the World Bank on 
Indonesia World Bank Co-operation, 25 September, 2007.  Online: UN 
<http://www.csp2indonesia.org/media/STAR/Joint_Announcement_StAR.pdf>. 
 260
proceeds of asset theft by developing country rules, are often located in developing 
country financial centres”10  This is welcomed and is a good example of how global 
governance can impact corruption positively.  Hitherto, the initiative acknowledges that 
the focus of the international development community has been on addressing corruption 
and weak governance.11 
Many countries developing and developed have shown interest to participate in 
StAR.12  It would be interesting to see what effect StAR will have in the near future. The 
initiators have noted that developing countries will face serious obstacles in recovering 
stolen assets.  This is because of the limited legal, investigative and judicial capacity 
available in such countries.  Inadequate financial resources and failure of developed 
countries with stolen assets to render legal assistances are other reasons cited for 
difficulties in recovering stolen assets.13   
 An interesting press report highlighted by Transparency International in October 
2007 illustrates the difficulties developing countries currently face in attempts to recover 
stolen assest.   The report recounts Indonesia’s difficult attempts to recover assets stolen 
by its business persons as a result of its extension of US16 billion in liquidity assistance 
to banks affected by the East Asian Financial Crisis.  Hendra Raharja, an Indonesia 
businessman was arrested in Australia while trying to cross over from Hong Kong. 
Indonesia’s attempts to recover US800 millions of Raharja’s property from Hong Kong is 
proving futile.  Hong Kong has requested that Indonesia pay a 20% administrative fee 
                                                        
10 See Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plans, Report by the UNODC 
and World Bank, 2007.  Online: World Bank  
< http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Star-rep-full.pdf>. 
11 Ibid. 
12 See Nigeria First, Nigeria to join UN/World Bank Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, 19 December, 2007, online: 
Nigeria first <http://www.nigeriafirst.org/article_7932.shtml>; Switzerland, see Ulrika Lomas, Switzerland Supports 
Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative, Law and tax-News, 19 September, 2007, online: Tax-News <www.tax-
news.com/asp/story/Switzerland_Supports_Stolen_Assets_Recovery_Initiative_xxxx28453.html>. 
13 See supra note 10. 
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and split the rest of the 80% between the two countries.  Australia has been involved in 
the negotiations to try and get Hong Kong to return the money to Indonesia.  As at 2004, 
Indonesia has only been able to recover AUS 642,000.14  It is hoped the StAR will 
address situtations such as this and others developing countries may face. 
At this juncture, it is useful to recall earlier efforts by other developing country 
governments such as Nigeria and the Philippines to recover stolen assets.  Although such 
countries have enjoyed some success in asset recovery, the process has been time-
consuming and costly.15  In the case of Nigeria, it is reported that Ex-Military dictator, 
General Sani Abacha looted between US$2 billion and US$5 billion.16  Upon his sudden 
demise in June 1998, attempts were made to recover the stolen assets.  First, the interim 
military administration set up following his death and headed by General Abdulsalmi 
Abubakar were able to recover US$800million from the Abacha family.17   
Then, in 1999, the newly elected democratic government headed by General 
Olusegun Obasanjo sought to recover assets stashed abroad.  The assets were laundered 
through banks and companies in the U.K, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, 
Jersey and Bahamas.18  Letters requesting mutual assistance were sent to a number of 
these states.  As a result of such request, the Swiss authorities issued a general freezing 
order on Abacha’s assets.  However, Swiss law required Nigeria to present the Swiss 
authorities with a final forfeiture judgment reached in the Nigerian courts.  This proved 
legally and politically problematic.  Fortunately, the Swiss legal firm of Monfrini and 
Partners whom the Nigerian government had engaged to assist with tracing and recovery 
                                                        
14 Amber Poroznuk, A little known story of asset recovery. Online: Transparency International 
<http://www.transparency.org/publications/newsletter/2007/october_2007/spotlight>. 





of assets abroad were able to successfully argue that the Swiss authorities could waive the 
final forfeiture requirement.19  This was because there was adequate proof of the criminal 
origin of the Abacha funds.  Between 2005 and early 2006, US$500.5 million was finally 
repatriated with the assurance that the World Bank would monitor the recovered asset.20  
In the case of the Philippines, it is reported that President Marcos looted between 
US$5 billion and US$10 billion.21  In 1986, the Presidential Commission on Good 
Government (PCGG) was launched to recover the assets stolen by Marcos.  The assets 
had been laundered abroad through shell corporations which invested the funds in real 
estate in the U.S or by deposits in offshore banks.  Letters requesting mutual assistance 
were made to the U.S and the Swiss authorities.22  As a result of such requests, the Swiss 
authorities froze Marcos assets in Switzerland.  After a series of legal battles in 
Switzerland relating to the issue of repatriating the assets even before a final forfeiture 
judgment required by the Swiss courts is obtained.  The Swiss authorities transferred the 
deposits to an escrow account in the Philippines.  It was only in 2004, after the Philippine 
Supreme Court had issued a forfeiture decision in July 2003 that the PCGG remitted the 
deposit of US$624 million recovered to the Philippine Bureau of the Treasury.23 
Governments of developing countries face a multitude of problems in their attempts 
to recover stolen assets.  The bilateral relations such States have with other States are 
important.24  Where there is mutual legal assistance, it may take many years before 
                                                        
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid.  Other reports cite a much higher figure of US$27 billion.  See Collin Nicholls et al. eds., Corruption and 
Misuse of Public Office, (Oxford: OUP, 2006) para 7.57. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.  For more on the difficulties faced by the Philippines government in recovering the Marcos assets, see David 
Chaikin, Tracking the Proceeds of Organised Crine? The Marcos Case, Paper presented at the Transnational Crime 
Conference convened by the Australian Institute of Criminology in association with the Australian Customs Service, 9-
10 March 2000. 
24 Ibid. 
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documents are handed by assisting State to requesting State.25  In the Abacha case, it took 
the United Kingdom four years to hand over documents.26  A reason cited for this delay 
was the judicial review proceedings which the Abacha family sought to challenge the 
British Home Secretary’s decision to give assistance.27  The absence of compliance with 
norms of international mutual assistance, including standards of human rights, lack of 
independent judiciary may also thwart the recovery process.28   
The actual tracing of the assets is extremely difficult now because of the mobility of 
wealth and sophisticated modes of laundering money.29  In the Marcos case, the 
Philippine government was able to locate some of the stolen assets deposited in Swiss 
banks because of the overwhelming evidence the Philippine government provided as a 
result of documents Marcos left behind after his deposition and flight from the country.30  
Without those documents it would have been difficult to trace the assets. Bank secrecy31 
and third party claims may also hinder or prolong the recovery.  However, it must be said 
that increasingly, bank secrecy is no longer an obstacle to money laundering 
investigations.32 In the case of Swiss banks, although there are reports of the misuse of 
Swiss bank secrecy, recent reports suggest Switzerland is no longer a financial haven for 
illicit money.33   
Where proprietary or tracing claims are concerned in the recovery of assets, there 
have been significant developments in common law jurisdictions such as Singapore and 
                                                        
25 See Collins et al, supra note 21 at para 7.61. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Abacha v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWHC Admin 787.  See also Collins et al, supra 
note 21 at para 7.59 -7.61. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See David Chaikin, supra note 23. 
31 For more on Bank Secrecy, see David Chaikin, Policy and Fiscal Effects of Swiss Bank Secrecy, (2005) 15 Revenue 
L.J 90. 
32 See Edith M. Lederer, UN, World Bank Start Corruption Fight, Associated Press, 17 September 2007. 
33 Supra note 31 at 101. 
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Hong Kong.34  The Singapore case of Sumitomo Bank Ltd v Kartika Ratna Thahir and 
others35 where Lai Kew Chai J held that a proprietary remedy was available to a victim 
of bribery for an employee’s breach of fiduciary duty paved the way for developments 
in this area.  In such cases, the fiduciary is a constructive trustee of the profits. 
The Sumitomo Bank case involved grand corruption.  Pertamina an Indonesian State 
Corporation was entrusted with the task of developing a number of projects vital for 
Indonesia.  This included constructing infrastructure facilities for steel works in West 
Java.  Vast amounts of public finds were entrusted to and used by Pertamina to 
implement these projects.  General Thahir, an employee of Pertamina, entrusted with 
extensive responsibility and general assistant to Pertamina’s president director from 
1968 until his death in 1975 was found to have accepted bribes.  The bribes in question 
in the case were paid by two German contractors, namely Klockner Industrie Analgen 
and Siemens AG.  The bribes were given in order for the companies to obtain better 
contractual terms and preferential treatment where payments were concerned.  Thahir 
deposited the proceeds into 19 Asian Currency Units accounts in Sumitomo Bank 
Singapore.  17 accounts were denominated in DM53 million while two accounts were 
denominated in US Dollars each having US$ 593,249.31 and US$608,959.42 
respectively.  Following the death of Thahir, three different parties namely, his wife, his 
estate and Pertamina were claiming entitlements to the proceeds of his account.  The 
court held the 17 accounts denominated in Deutschmarks were bribes paid by Siemens 
                                                        
34 The cases which will be discussed are technically not binding on the English courts, however it has been noted that if 
the points come before the House of Lords, it is likely Lister & co v Stubbs will be overruled.  See Philip H Petit, 
Equity and the Law of Trusts, (Oxford: OUP, 2006) 144.  See also Daraydan Holdings Ltd and Others v Solland 
International Ltd and others, [2005] 4 All ER 73 where Lawrence Collins J discusses Lister & Co v Stubbs in light of 
constructive trusts.  Lord Goff of Chieveley & Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2007) para 33-025. 
35 [1993] 1 SLR 738. 
 265
and Klockner to Thahir.  However, with regards to the other two accounts, Pertamina 
had failed to discharge its legal and evidential burden of proof. 
The case is important for Lai Kew Chai’s J assessment of the English case of Lister v 
Stubbs36 which held that there is no proprietary or tracing claim against a bribed agent 
with regards to bribes.  In Lister v Stubbs, an employee had taken secret commissions 
from a company which sold goods to his employers as an inducement and reward for his 
purchase of goods on behalf of his employers.  It was alleged he received the bribes 
over a period of nine years.  He used some to buy land, invested some of the money in 
other ways and held some as cash.  On discovery by his principal of the receipt of 
bribes, the plantiffs unsuccessfully sought to follow the bribes into the investments.  The 
court held the employee was personally liable to account for the bribes but the 
relationship between him and his employer was that of debtor and creditor not trustee 
and cestui que trust.37 
Lai Kew Chai said Lister v Stubbs was wrong and its undesirable and unjust 
consequences should not be imported and perpetuated as part of Singapore law.  When a 
Singapore court exercised its equitable jurisdiction, it must reflect the mores and sense 
of justice of the society which it served. Furthermore the authority of   the case was so 
extensively undermined and questioned that it should be confined to its special facts.38 
In the Privy Council case of A-G for Hong Kong v Reid,39 the privy council affirmed 
the earlier decision given by Lai Kew Chai J in Singapore and held that that the victim 
of bribery is entitled to assert a proprietary interest in any assests into which the bribe 
                                                        
36(1890) 45 Ch.D 1. 
37 For discussions in favour of Lister v Stubbs, see Roy Goode, “The Recovery of a Director’s Improper Gains: 
Proprietary Remedies for Infringement of Non-Proprietary Rights” in Ewan McKendrick ed., Commercial Aspects of 
Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (Oxford: OUP, 1992) 137. 
38 Supra note 35. 
39 [1993] 3 WLR 1143; [1994] 1All ER 1. 
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money can be traced.40  The A-G for Hong Kong case involved a Crown Prosecutor for 
Hong Kong government who had in the course of his employment as servant of the 
crown had received bribes as inducement for exploitation of his official position by 
obstructing the course of justice.   
 
7.3.2 Co-ordination of Anti-corruption Collaborative Efforts. 
There are important questions to be asked in situations involving collective co-operative 
actions against corruption.  How will such efforts be co-ordinated?  Is there a need to co-
ordinate efforts?  Is the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) or some 
other UN institution the appropriate institution?  Is there a real role for third world 
countries or developing countries with limited technological and media resources?  In 
many developing countries, the internet which is a great source of information for civil 
society is underutilized due to a number of factors.  Such factors include poor network 
connections, assess to computers and electrical failures.  How can it be ensured that the 
voices of the relevant sectors of society are heard and their participation is sought, 
particularly in poor developing countries? 
The international Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination (IGAC) is a collaborative 
effort initiated by the UNODC.  It attempts to co-ordinate anti-corruption efforts of 
donors, multilateral anti-corruption enforcement officials and NGOs to avoid duplication 
and leverage resources.  It provides a platform for exchange of views, information, 
experiences and best practice on anti-corruption activities.41  On the group’s website, 
there are series of useful publications regarding the fight against anti-corruption.  An 
                                                        
40 For discussion on the implications of the A-G for Hong Kong case beyond bribery, see Peter Birks, Hitting Bribery 
Hard: A-G for Hong Kong v Reid, (1994) 6 Asia Bus. L Rev. 54. 
41 See online: UNODC <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/interagency-coordination.html>. 
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example is a 153 page report titled “Global Action against Corruption: The Merida 
Papers.42   
The Merida papers were collated from a side event during the signing of the UNCAC 
in 2003.  The event had four panels.  Panel one was on Preventive Measures against 
Corruption: the Role of Private and Public Sectors.43  It had representatives from the 
European Union, Countries like Kenya, Korea, Norway and Venezuela as well as Shell 
Mexico to relay their experiences in tackling corruption.  The panel concluded that the 
fight against corruption required an integrated and long term strategy involving changes 
affecting the political, social and economic spheres.  The fight against corruption also 
required an integrated system of collaboration and active participation by private sector 
and civil society.  In short an international approach is needed.44 
The need to identify and emphasize the role of civil society organizations and NGOs 
is increasingly being canvassed.45  Such organizations are playing a central role in such 
co-operative actions.  An example of the need and complexities of ensuring collective co-
operative actions can be gleaned from the case of New African Development Partnership 
for Development (NEPAD)46.  Civil society complained that African governments did not 
engage them to participate meaningfully in the NEPAD process.  Some saw it as western 
concept imposed on Africa.47  Government representatives claimed NGO participation 
was limited because of the disorganization and failure of NGOS to send representatives.  
                                                        
42 See online: IGAC <http://www.igac.net/publications.html>. 
43 The other three panels were The Role of Civil Society and the Media in Building a Culture against Corruption; 
Legislative Measures to Implement the UNCAC and Measures to Combat Corruption in National and International 
Financial Systems respectively. See online: IGAC <http://www.igac.net/pdf/publication_merida_e.pdf>. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Supra note 2 at 41. 
46 NEPAD is a partnership formed by a group of African Leaders to foster economic growth and development, eradicate 
poverty and prevent the marginalization of Africa.  See online: NEPAD <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/home.php>. 
47 Emmanuel Koro, “Linking Conservation with Development: NEPAD Sets Goal at WSSD, Development Outreach”, 
World Bank Institute, Fall 2002. 
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However, government representatives agreed on the need for coordinated actions 
involving NGOs, governments and other actors.48  Transparency and accountability is 
necessary not just with governments, but equally needed in co-operative actions.  Global 
collective responsibility is a necessity.49   
The Global Compact sustainability report notes that only a faction of companies 
world wide are addressing CSR.  The proliferation of initiatives and the lack of a clear 
global policy framework are contributing to a sense of ever-shifting goal posts for 
business.50  The need for clear global policy frameworks is necessary for matters 
involving CSR.  Global governance should aim to achieve this.  MNCs and business 
generally need to know what they are to be responsible for and how they will be held 
accountable.  Repetitive pronouncements of the use of global governance without an 
emphasis on reaching a global framework will be ineffective.   
Some of the implications of the private sector in corruption include direct bribery, 
facilitation payments, corporate fraud, indirect complicity in money laundering and 
source of funds to illicit government officials or business persons who embezzle such 
funds or use them further for corrupt and fraudulent vices.51 There have been many laws - 
national, regional and international to address many of these problems.52  There have also 
been many initiatives public and private to address these problems.  The pressing need 
now is concerted efforts on all sides to identify relevant policies and ensure they are 
upheld. 
                                                        
48 Ibid. 
49 The term ‘Global Collective Responsibility’ is used to suggest what the developed world, MNCs, international 
financial institutions and donors can do to promote governance and anti-corruption.  See Daniel Kaufmann, “Back to 
Basics - 10 Myths about Governance and Corruption” IMF Journal ‘Finance and Develoment’ (2005) 42:3. 
50 See Global Compact Sustainability report, Gearing Up: From corporate responsibility to good governance and 
scalable solutions.  Online: Sustainability <http://www.sustainability.com/publications/gearing-up.pdf> section 2.4. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Examples include those discussed in chapter three such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, UNCAC. 
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The Commission on Global Governance for one believes the United Nations must 
continue to play a central role in global governance.  “The UN should serve as the 
principal mechanism through which governments collaboratively engage each other and 
other sectors of society in the multilateral management of global affairs.”53  There have 
been criticisms of the UN’s records in achieving effective governance.  Rosenau notes 
particularly in relation to the UN’s primary functions of preventive diplomacy, 
peacekeeping and peacemaking that the readiness to implement multilateral goals and 
enhance the UN’s authority to achieve effective governance is woefully lacking.54  The 
UN may have a pivotal role to play in traditional governance issues, but the question 
remains whether the UN is the preferred institution to play a vital role where matters of 
other governance concerns such as anti-corruption, economics and global trade are at 
hand.  In such situations should the focus be on one of its other agencies which have 
separate member states, governing bodies, executive heads and secretariats.55 
In the area of corruption, the UNODC is proving to be an effective co-ordinator of 
anti-corruption co-operative actions.   It has the potential to play a central role in 
addressing corruption matters which properly fall under global governance.  This may be 
because such a role falls within its mandate.56  Other international specialized agencies 
involved with economics and global trade such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
or International Monetary Fund (IMF) are unlikely to be able to co-ordinate anti-
corruption co-operative actions.  This may be because of the structure and set up of such 
organizations.   
                                                        
53 Supra note 2 at 28. 
54 Supra note 5 at 61. 
55 Examples of such agencies include the WTO, IMF and World Bank.  Each in its own way addresses corruption 
issues. 
56 The UNODC is involved in international co-ordination of anti-corruption efforts.  See UNODC 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/index.html>. 
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Many scholars have argued for and against the use of the WTO as an avenue for 
curbing corruption.57 While, it may be concluded that the use of the WTO as the main 
avenue for anti-corruption is in doubt, the involvement of such organizations through the 
use of rule making addressing bribery and corruption should not be in doubt.   
However, it would seem that the WTO has not given bribery and corruption 
prominence in rule-making in the WTO Agenda.  In the 1990s when international rules 
against anti-corruption were evolving, the WTO had no action aimed at bribery and 
corruption.58  Abbot has commented on three reasons why bribery and corruption were 
not given prominence in rule-making in the WTO agenda.  Firstly, he cites the lack of 
influential private or public actors willing to initiate and wage sustained campaigns for 
new international rules.59  Related to this point, is a fact he points out that the WTO has 
restricted transparency and participation by civil society more than many other 
international organizations.60  Thirdly, the institutional character of the WTO which is 
based on reciprocal concessions rather than mutual interests stalled serious considerations 
for rules on bribery and corruption.  Accordingly, although rules on bribery and 
corruption would have been in the interest of all, negotiations for such rules would have 
been at the expense of other rules seen as more concrete.61   
The WTO stance on corruption and bribery is confined to issues relating to 
                                                        
57 See Peter Eigen, “Controlling Coruption: A Key to development- Oriental Trade”, Carnegie Endownment TED brief 
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L 275. 
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government procurement.62  Government procurement is the purchase of goods and 
services by governments.  It is relevant for traditional governance notions which focus on 
good governance and governments.  At the Singapore Ministerial conference in 1996, a 
working group was established to look into transparency in government procurement. 
One reason given for introducing transparency in government procurement to the WTO 
agenda was an attempt to smuggle anti-corruption measures into the WTO.63  This may 
be because a goal of public procurement regulation is to control corruption and 
transparency in procurement addresses the demand side of corruption.64  Others have 
seen transparency in procurement as a trade issue or attempts to facilitate market access.  
In any case, even if transparency in procurement is seen as an anti-corruption measure, 
the WTO working group has failed to produce results.65  In 2004, WTO general council 
decided to put this work on hold.66  
The IMF on its own part also links corruption to governance.  It sees governance as 
encompassing all aspects of the way a country is governed including economic policies 
and regulatory framework.  Poor governance provides great scope and incentives for 
corruption, as a result, the IMF believes by promoting good governance, corruption will 
be combated.  Other aspects of good governance the IMF are concerned with include 
ensuring the rule of law and improving efficiency and accountability of public sectors in 
member states.  The governance the IMF is chiefly concerned with is that pertaining to 
governments and national administrations.  However, there is awareness of the need for 
good corporate governance which will aid the smooth functioning of a country’s business 
                                                        
62 Ibid at 278. 
63 Ibid at 286. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. at 278 
66 See online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/overview_e.htm>. 
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and financial sectors.  By virtue of its mandate and expertise, the IMF is concerned with 
economic aspects of governance.  Therefore, it looks at the economic policies of member 
countries to see how they comply with international economic standards and practices.  It 
also considers the transparency and accountability of policy makers in its member States.   
The IMF tackles corruption indirectly.  It focuses on governance which if carried out 
effectively will reduce corruption.  While this is true especially for developing countries, 
it must be accepted that good governance does not necessarily equate to less corruption.  
There are perhaps many countries in which it may be said that the governance is good, 
yet corruption is prevalent.  An example is the United States where there have been 
increased opportunities for corruption at all levels of government.67  The policitization of 
senior civil service and personnel management, the privatization of government services 
and reduced control over government functions are examples of situations he sees as 
breeding corruption.68  However, there are also countries with good governance and low 
corruption.  An example is Singapore which has a meritocratic civil service and the 
control on government functions by government is high.  A well functioning civil service 
has been cited as an example of transparency in good governance.  Other principles of 
good governance include transparency in decision making and implementation of 
institutional and operational decisions; participatory decision making; assess to 
information; appropriate reporting and evaluation mechanisms; and financial 
management. 69 
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68 Ibid.  
69 See International Law Association, New Delhi Conference, Committee on Accountability of International 
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Like the IMF, the World Bank sees corruption as a symptom of failed governance.70  
However, unlike the IMF, the World Bank addresses corruption directly.  This may be 
because the World Bank’s overarching mission is to reduce poverty and the harmful 
effects of corruption on the poor in society have been widely appreciated.  In 1997, the 
World Bank developed an anti-corruption strategy focusing on prevention of fraud and 
corruption in bank projects; mainstreaming corruption concerns and lending active 
support to international efforts to address corruption.  The StAR initiative already 
discussed is an integral part of the anti-corruption strategy.71  
To accomplish these strategies, the World Bank lends active support to international 
efforts through sponsorships of major conferences and support for adoption of 
international conventions.72  The World Bank has procurement guidelines in place and 
carries out intensive audits of projects.  The World Bank has more than 330 firms and 
individuals debarred from carrying out World Bank projects for period lasting a year to 
permanent debarments.73   
On the whole, it may be said that of the three institutions discussed above, the World 
Bank is the most active in curbing corruption both directly and indirectly.  As a result, 
there may be a valid argument for the World Bank to play a pivotal role in co-ordinating 
efforts to curb corruption.  Indeed its work with the UNODC suggests it is already 
playing this role.  It is submitted that the efforts of the IMF and WTO which focus 
primarily on good governance in relation to national administration is inadequate.   
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71 Supra note 8 ff. 
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Corruption lurks in both developing and developed States.  A State with good 
governance may still have significant corruption.  While it is useful to consider 
corruption in the light of traditional notions of governance, governance is broader than 
national administration or government and discussions should not be limited to that 
aspect of governance. The World Bank’s approach is more prospective.  Its attempts to 
eliminate corruption which spans governments, developed and developing countries and 
private sector is commendable and should be encouraged.   
The World Bank’s focus on providing financial and technical assistance to 
developing countries to combat poverty aids its cause to fight corruption. The World 
Bank’s reach into the developing as well as developed world broadens the scope and 
boundaries of its potential effect in the anti-corruption fight.  It is therefore perhaps best 
that a UN organ such as the UNODC coordinate corruption efforts with the help of an 
organization such as World Bank.  WTO and IMF are unlikely to be able to co-ordinate 
such efforts.   
 Another important issue which should be considered in discussions on global 
governance and corruption is the determination of the overall goal of global governance.  
Does global governance aim to bring a measure of coherence to the multitude of 
jurisdictions proliferating on the global scene or does it aim to simply create a 
proliferation of frameworks with no coherence or agreement?74  To put it another way, the 
tendency of global governance is to produce a multiplicity of frameworks.  Should it aim 
to produce agreed global frameworks?   
In the area of corruption, global governance has created a ‘vast number of rule 
systems in an interdependent world’.  It is argued that global governance needs to focus 
                                                        
74 Supra note 5. 
 275
on ensuring that frameworks are agreed upon, coherent and effective, rather than simply 
on the process of creating more frameworks.  This would involve an examination of the 
actors on the global scene contributing to rules affecting global affairs.  Accordingly, 
there may be the need to streamline the relevant actors on the global scene.  Clearly, 
governments and international organizations automatically qualify.  Governments qualify 
because they are the peoples chosen mandate to effect global change.  International 
organizations qualify because they have authority or legitimacy for decision making in 
global affairs.  The activities of NGOs and civil society may need to be scrutinized more 
carefully.  As discussed in a previous chapter, the authority and legitimacy of NGOs must 
be considered.  However, the problem such a proposition faces is the growing perception 
that global governance should consist of all the rules formal and informal which affect 
management of common affairs. 
While it cannot be disputed that NGOs are a substantial and active part of global 
governance as generally understood, the need to streamline their concerns in reaching 
agreed goals may be necessary.  The common criticism is that they have their own 
agenda.  However, it is important to stress that their activities must not be undermined.  
Their roles should increasingly be considered and factored into attempts by 
intergovernmental institutions and national governments to reach global governance in 
the sense of agreed global frameworks which are workable and produce positive results. 
It may be said that there will always be a conflict between the role of global 
governance to produce agreed frameworks and the role of global governance to create 
multiple frameworks which need not necessarily be agreed on.  If global governance is 
seen in the light of multiple frameworks with no need for coherence, it would be difficult 
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to determine the effect of global governance on corruption.  Alternatively, it may be that 
global governance in the real sense of the word may not be able to curb corruption in any 
measurably way, but rather contributes to the fight against corruption in a haphazard way.  
Global governance is best seen as governance which includes both formal and 
informal rules aiming for consensus.  Global governance takes away the need to address 
issues in international law such as international legal personality, but should still aim to 
reach consensus.  A relevance of global governance is that it legitimizes the rights of non-
state actors to participate on the global scene.  In other words, it removes the pitfalls 
international lawyers would ordinarily argue prevents non-state actors from participating 
in global affairs.  It brings an informal air to global affairs.  Nevertheless, for such 
informality to be effective there needs to be consensus.  The main writers in global 
governance are in the field of political science.  They dismiss the need for global 
consensus in global governance.  It is argued that attempts to curb corruption via the 
avenue of global governance calls for agreed consensus.   
The emergence of a concerted effort towards the elimination of corruption by multi-
players has produced a clear consensus that corruption is wrong.  The next step is to 
ensure that corruption is discouraged by effective deterrence applicable to multi-actors.  
Both the emergence of consensus that corruption is wrong and the need for effective 
deterrence are examples of global governance at work.  The next section will consider the 





7.4 REGULATION AND CONTROL OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
THROUGH GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
In recent times, there have also been writings about the rise of global governance and 
global administrative law. 75 It has been said that the regulation and control of global 
governance is addressed by an emerging area of law called global administrative law.76  
In national settings, administrative law refers to the branch of law that disciplines public 
administration and governs its relationship with private parties.77  It relates to the control 
of governmental power and aims to keep government within their legal bounds and 
protect citizens against governmental abuse.78 Administrative law demands that 
governments respect the rule of law and democracy.   
Global administrative law refers to regulation and administration on a global level.  
Krisch and Kingsbury who have undertaken principal work in the area of the emergence 
of global administrative law refer to global administrative law as comprising “the 
mechanisms, principles, and practices, and supporting social understandings that promote 
or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by 
ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, 
and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions these bodies 
make”.79  These global administrative bodies include intergovernmental institutions, 
informal inter-governmental networks, national governmental agencies acting pursuant to 
global norms, hybrid public-private bodies engaged in transnational administration, and 
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79 See Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, (2005) 68 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 15 at 17. 
 278
purely private bodies performing public roles in transnational administration.80 
There has been talk of the emergence of a global administrative space in which the 
strict dichotomy between domestic and international has broken down, administrative 
functions are performed in often complex interplays between officials and institutions on 
different levels, and regulation may be highly effective despite its predominantly non-
binding forms.81  The multiplication of possible exercise of public power in global 
governance brings issues of legitimacy, accountability and transparency to the forefront.  
Legitimacy, accountability and transparency are principles synonymous with 
administrative law. 
Global administrative law therefore aims to hold global regulatory governance 
accountable through administrative law type mechanisms.  It calls for the need for 
governance of the conduct of international entities and national governments in 
international matters through mechanisms of administrative law such as accountability, 
fairness, protection of individual rights, and democratic decision making.82  The 
principles of domestic administrative law such as procedures of legality and due process; 
the rule of law; good governance and rights based values are therefore relevant in global 
administrative law.83   
The problem with accountability through administrative law type mechanisms is that 
the number of actors on the global scene is vast.  The global scene includes international 
organizations, governments, public and private bodies including NGOs and MNCs.  
Except for governments and international organizations, it may be difficult to pinpoint 
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how other entities may be held accountable; whether there will be agreement on the need 
for accountability; and who such entities are accountable to.  In national administrative 
law, it is easy to determine that governments need to be accountable to their citizens who 
have elected them into office.  Arguably, in global administrative law, governments are 
still accountable to their citizens.   
However, it may not be easy to transport principles of national administrative law 
into global administrative law because global governance is all encompassing, 
accommodating and subject to multiple actors, formal and informal.   Some areas of 
global regulatory governance in which accountability through administrative law type 
mechanisms have been canvassed include global banking regulation, security council 
sanctions administration, international administration of refugees, and domestic 
regulation of transboundary environmental issues.84  
These areas can easily be identified as involving international organizations and 
specialized agencies and governments.  In such situations, global administrative law is 
workable.  These institutions can be held accountable to their members and society.  
There is agreement on the need for them to be accountable.  In many instances, they have 
a legitimacy to act on behalf of governments and citizens in global affairs.  However, it 
should be noted that even in such situations, the level of transparency, participation and 
review will vary.   
An area of global governance in which accountability through administrative law 
type mechanisms may not be workable is in standard setting by private institutions.  For 
example, the Equator Principles (EP) developed in 2003 by 10 banks is an example of 
standard setting in global governance where accountability through administrative law 
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type mechanisms is unworkable. The EP is a very useful benchmark for a common 
standard in the approach private institutions involved in project financing should have 
towards environmental and social risks.   
The EP was originally developed in June 2003 and based on the policies and 
guidelines of the World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC).85  In 2006, the 
principles were revised (EP II) to incorporate the performance standards set by the IFC in 
a finalized review of its environmental and social standards.86  The aim of the principles 
is to ensure projects financed by private financial institutions are developed in a socially 
responsible manner reflecting sound environmental management practices.  However, the 
implementation of the principles has given rise to much question.   
Currently, there are 56 EPFIs each required to implement the EP through individual 
internal social and environmental policies, procedures and standards relevant for project 
financing activities.  The freedom of banks to implement and monitor fulfillment of EP 
has given rise to much criticism.87  There have been calls particularly by NGOs for more 
transparency and information on implementation.  In an attempt to address these issues, 
the EP II, principle 10 requires EPFIs to report on the progress and performance of 
Equator Principles’ implementation on an annual basis.  A look at the annual reports for 
2007 shows 33 of the 56 EPFIs reporting.  The reports are basic and show assessments 
figures for the previous year (2006) including project, sector, transaction and capital costs 
and location.88 Arguably, it is unlikely these reports in their current format will fully 
address transparency concerns.   
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Moreover, confidentiality agreements prevent banks from disclosing information 
concerning projects which were unsuccessful for failure to meet the EP standards.  Each 
bank has the freedom to decide whether a borrower has complied with its social and 
environmental policies, procedures and standards.  The quality and comprehensiveness of 
some environmental management systems have also been questioned.89  Different banks 
have different environmental management systems. Therefore, a glaring weakness in 
implementation is the lack of commonality in the approach banks must take.   
Some EPFIs have independent verification of their implementation.  HSBC for 
example has carried out independent verification of its implementation.  The reviews 
were positive recognizing that HSBC used independent external consultants to carry out 
social and environmental impact assessments and categorize projects.  However, the 
group was advised to put in place an automated internal report mechanism.90  Others such 
as the ING rely on internal equator principle advisory teams separate from commercial 
units which provide training, guidance and compliance.  The ING in its report made no 
reference to independent verification.91  
The disparity in the methods by which EPFIs implement the EP is a serious issue 
which still needs to be addressed.  The need for a common guideline on implementation 
which is transparent, consultative and informative can be gleaned from the case of 
Botnia, a Spanish company and its paper mill in Uruguay.  ING Group had considered 
funding loans to Botnai and or ENCE, a Swedish company for paper mill production in 
Uruguay.  Many NGOS reported violations of Equator principles and requested ING to 
                                                        
89 M Chan-Fischel, ‘Unproven Principles: The Equator Principles at Year Two’, 2005. Online: Bank Track 
<http://www.banktrack.org>. 
90 HSBC, Corporate Responsibility Report, 2006.  Online HSBC  
<http://www.hsbc.com/1/2/corporate-responsibility/csr-reports-and-updates/assurance>. 
91 ING Group, Corporate Responsibility Report - Equator Principles.  Online: ING <http://www.ing.com/cr>. 
 282
suspend loan considerations until the sponsors complied with IFC environmental and 
social policies and the equator principles.   
In December 2005, Centre for Human rights and Environment (CEDHA) released an 
Equator Compliance Complaint letter written to ING regarding this loan. The letter 
reported violations of Equator Principles and requested ING to cease considerations of 
financing projects until the sponsors complied with IFC environmental and social 
safeguard policies and the Equator Principle.92  It is not clear to what extent ING’s 
internal advisory committee had considered the environmental and social impacts of such 
project financing.  However, in April 2006, ING Group in a letter to CEDHA stated that 
following recommendation by its advisory and coordinating team it would no longer 
participate in the project.93   
NGOs believed that ING’s decision not to participate was based on impacts the 
project would have on the EP and public resistance.  ING asserted that its decision was 
not based on assessment of the project’s compliance with EP.  This assertion by ING was 
widely seen as necessary to prevent potential lawsuits from Botnai.94 However in 2006, it 
was reported that Calyon, another member of the Equator Principles had approved loans 
to Botnia after its finance team considered it a general loan to the company, and not 
project finance, which would result in greater scrutiny by the bank under its commitments 
to the Equator Principles.95   
It is unfortunate that another member of the EP would agree to grant a loan to Botnai, 
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especially in light of the allegations of breach of the EP.  Calyon’s ability to grant the loan 
stems from a technicality.  Calyon claims that the loan was a general loan and not project 
finance.  The case shows that the financial institutions which are signatories to the EP 
have much freeway in implementing the code.  This has clearly led to inconsistency in 
application and discontentment on the EPs usefulness.  The versatility of banks in 
implementing the principles makes it difficult for there to be common status on the 
approach to be taken in ensuring accountability.  There is the need for more transparency, 
consultation and information to be provided.  However, the realization of these 
administrative type principles has been slim.   
The case also shows that accountability through administrative law type mechanisms 
in the traditional sense may simply be unworkable in private party standard settings for 
global affairs.  The EP is an example of private party standard setting for global affairs 
where administrative law type mechanisms are proving unworkable.  The EPFIs are not 
international institutions to which national administrative law systems should be 
extended.  They are simply private institutions interested in setting global standards on 
how financial institutions should behave.  There is obvious difficulty in subjecting private 
parties to adhere to administrative law mechanisms.  Administrative law is to protect 
citizens against governmental abuse.  It is not meant to protect citizens against the acts or 
abuses of other citizens.   
Even where international organizations are involved in the rule setting, the voluntary 
nature of many of the rules emanating from international systems may make the 
regulation of global governance through administrative law mechanisms more difficult to 
achieve.  The Global Compact (GC) is an example of rule setting through international 
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organizations.  The GC has been discussed in chapter 2.  Its inclusion here relates to its 
inability to address important issues of accountability - transparency and monitoring.  
The GC emphasizes that it is not designed to monitor or measure corporate 
performance.96  Nevertheless, aware of the importance of issues of accountability, the GC 
has put some integrity measures in place.   
Businesses are required to communicate progress in implementing the Global 
Compact principles, but the Global Compact cannot guarantee the accuracy of the 
reports.97  Currently, its website is requiring individuals to review communication on 
progress reports online.98  Such an approach is subject to criticisms and its legitimacy is 
questionable.  It would be better for review to be undertaken by professionals skilled in 
corporate responsibility.  However, corporate responsibility as a subject is still in infancy 
and it may be difficult to find the necessary resources.  Moreover, the expense this will 
incur may not be something bargained for. 
The development of global administrative law through the systems of international 
organizations such as the UN; international specialized agencies such as the WTO; 
transnational networks of administrative actors engaged in agenda-setting and other joint 
(governmental) enterprises; groups of private institutions or hybrid groupings with 
delegated regulatory functions such as Commission on Food Safety Standards; and self 
regulatory schemes of private bodies such as International Olympic Committee have also 
been advocated.99  While this may be welcome, the application of global administrative 
law may be problematic.  
In the case of the WTO, it has already been pointed out that the WTO restricts 
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transparency and participation by civil society.100  In relation to corruption, the WTO’s 
work on Transparency in Government Procurement (TGP) has been put on hold.  Many 
Developing States objected to the proposals put forward for the multilateral agreement on 
TGP on the basis that they could undermine the ability of the States to use procurement 
for socio-economic goals.101  Such States rejected the application of principles of global 
administrative laws in WTO issues.  Malaysia fiercely resisted the creation of a WTO 
multilateral agreement on TGP because of fears that the agreement would adversely 
affect national domestic policies of granting preferences to Bumipetra.102  Another factor 
which led to developing country opposition to TGP was the fear that implications for 
domestic regulation of international economic agreement are very expensive.103  
Therefore, it would seem that much still needs to be done for the adoption and 
implementation of administrative law type mechanisms such as TGP and ensuing 
domestic review proceeding and WTO dispute settlement procedures into the WTO.   
So far, this section has discussed the regulation of global governance through 
administrative law mechanisms.  This is based on the assumption that administrative law 
principles, which are western constructs, are desirable for developing and developed 
countries.  In light of the questions which have been raised whether administrative law 
principles are acceptable or desirable for developing countries.  The remainder of the 
chapter will consider the potential impact of global administrative law on developing 
countries. 
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7.5 IMPACT OF GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ON DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
In the last section, the link between global governance and global administrative law was 
explored.  Global administrative law was seen as the mechanism for regulating global 
governance.  In this section the impact of global administrative law on developing 
countries in relation to global issues such as development, human rights, curb of 
corruption and eradication of poverty will be explored.   
Writers have sought to explore the relationship between traditional administrative 
law principles and development.104  Such writers have sounded a loud and clear warning 
that the transportation of administrative law and other legal principles such as democracy, 
good governance (western legal principles) from western or developed countries to 
developing countries may impact unfavourably on developing countries or be unsuitable 
for such countries.  Attention must be given to these cautionary voices105 warning of the 
adverse consequences that result from the transporting of principles applicable to western 
countries directly to developing countries.   
To illustrate the point, free markets and ‘democracy’ are western principles which 
are constantly been sought to be transported into developing countries.  There are 
writings suggesting such imports lead to ethnic conflagration.  Amy Chua in her best 
seller106 suggests there is a relationship between markets, democracy and ethnic hatred.  
She talks about the phenomenon of ‘market dominant minorities’ that turn free market 
democracy into engines of ethnic conflagration.  Market dominant minorities which 
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include groups like the Chinese in South East Asia, Jews in Russia, Whites in Zimbabwe 
and Indians in Fiji and East Africa dominate economically under market conditions.  The 
market concentrates wealth in their hands, while democracy increases political power of 
the impoverished majority.   
In such situations, ‘the pursuit of free market democracy becomes an engine of 
potentially catastrophic ethno-nationalism, pitting a frustrated ‘indigenous’ majority, 
easily aroused by opportunistic vote seeking politicians against a resented wealthy ethnic 
minority.107  McCrudden and Gross have tested Chua’s thesis and cite Malaysia as a 
paradigmatic example of the problems countries face as a result of a market dominant 
minority.  In this instance, the Malay Chinese are the ethnic minority dominating 
economically under market conditions the indigenous majority.  Interestingly, they 
discuss the problems Malaysia faces in managing the backlash from free market 
democracy in the light of Malaysia’s reluctance towards WTO TGP.  Malaysia’s 
reluctance chiefly stems from the impact the TGP will have in hampering preferences for 
particular ethnic groups in government.108 
Chua’s thesis will also be expanded here in relation to the problems happening in the 
Niger Delta region in Nigeria.  The indigenous majority in the resource rich areas are 
protesting against the activities of MNCs and government’s failure to ensure development 
and proper revenue allocation.  These protests raise issues of democracy, governance, free 
markets while producing ethnic rivalries and conflicts. The MNCs can be referred to as 
the market dominant minority.  Although Chua made no express reference to MNCs in 
her book, she refers to foreign investors.  According to Chua, market dominant minorities 
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along with their foreign investor partners, invariable come to control the crown jewels of 
the economy, often symbolic of the nation’s patrimony and identity.109  It is interesting to 
note her thesis can be extended to MNCs.  Afterall, MNCs are the vehicle and driving 
force for foreign investment.  They are the essence of free markets.  Studies are now 
being carried out on the impact of internal ethnic divisions on the shaping of foreign 
investment laws and policies within States.110   
In the case of oil rich Niger delta, there is recurring violence between members of 
different ethnic groups competing for political and economic power.111  There have been 
reports of killings, kidnappings of ordinary citizens as well as individuals affiliated with 
oil corporations.112  Companies have been charged with contributing to conflicts through 
practices they carry out in the protection of their business interests.   In order to protect 
business interests, companies often enter into public and private security arrangements to 
protect their investments. Governments are also heavily involved in such protection.  In 
the Niger Delta, there have been many reports of companies fuelling conflicts through the 
use of public and private security arrangements.113  In such situations, companies have 
also been implicated when private and public security officers use corporate property 
such as helicopters and boats to attack and kill members of communities around the Niger 
Delta region.114  
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It would seem the international outcry which resulted from such actions led to the 
development of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights by the U.S and 
U.K governments in 2000.115  The principles were designed to provide practical guidance 
to ensure security arrangements of the extractive industry are managed in accordance 
with human rights standards.  In light of allegations regarding oil companies and security 
arrangements at least five years after the principles were established, it is difficult to 
ascertain their effectiveness.  There have been reports that governments involved in the 
establishment of the principles fail to monitor compliance by companies who claim to 
support the principles.116  
However, it must be said that it is not all gloom and doom to have administrative 
type principles play a part in development.  Participation, equality, transparency and 
accountability are models of administrative law principles useful in development.  To 
illustrate the point, the conflicts in the Niger Delta are as much a failure or inability to 
implement such administrative type principles as it is the need for caution in applying 
western constructed principles such as democracy, free markets and other principles 
including administrative principles.  
During the height of the Niger Delta crisis in the nineties, poverty, lack of 
community participation and equality in distribution processes gave rise to conflicts.  
Corporations’ approach to issues such as governance, corruption, revenue transparency 
and expenditure; contribution to environmental damage, human rights abuses was 
lacking.   Principles dealing with these issues were ignored and companies enriched 
certain parts of the region to the detriment of other parts.  This created tension among the 
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people and led to fights for a share of the wealth and to violent protests against MNCs.117  
Government took the side of the corporations when dealing with tense situations giving 
rise to catastrophic events such as the killing of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight others.  Since 
then, many corporations have admitted that their practices fuelled violence.118  The 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative was established to tackle issues of poverty, 
corruption and conflict resulting from failure to account for receipts and payments 
pertaining to oil.119   
Currently, the situation in the Niger Delta is still alarming.  There is still a struggle 
for political and economic power.  Economic development in the area is slow and 
violence is continuing.  There is the need for participation, transparency and 
accountability from both non-state actors and state actors.  For non-state actors it is 
difficult to measure the level of accountability required and the need to adhere to 
administrative type mechanisms in the strict or traditional sense.  However, a translucent 
use of the terms is acceptable for non-state actors.  Overall, the situation in the Niger 
Delta calls for the need to put real bark to the voices of concerns and ensure 
administrative principles and other western principles are not adopted abstractly and to 
the detriment of developing countries.   
Other cautionary voices against the use of administrative and other western 
principles in developing countries point to colonization and cultural imperialism.  Harlow 
states that the administrative law is a western construct biased towards Anglo-American 
legal systems.  Its agenda seeks to constitutionalize values such as openness, 
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participation, transparency and accountability in respect of the legitimacy of standard 
setting in global space.120  Harlow opines that the agenda represents a double colonization 
and furthers cultural imperialism.  The first colonization occurs when an administrative 
law system absorbs as a principle background values of global governance, notably the 
ideals of democracy, participation, transparency and accountability.  The second 
colonization involves a complex process of ‘cross-fertilization’ or legal transplant, 
whereby principles from one administrative law system pass into another.121  In 
particular, the stance is that where developing countries are concerned, the transplant of a 
western ideology of administrative law represents a further wave of cultural 
imperialism.122  
There are arguments that the western principle of Neo-liberalism exemplifies 
colonization, specifically economic colonization and is detrimental to developing 
countries.  Dave Whyte, writing in the context of the legality or otherwise of western 
based economic rule in Iraq after the invasion, refers to a neo-liberal rule which promotes 
a value system that elevates entrepreneurialism and the pursuit of self-interest above 
other social values.123  In his view, the importation of such a rule into the Iraq system 
after the invasion should be understood as part of a wider strategy of political and 
economic domination.   
Whyte also notes that the transportation of neo-liberal rules to economies dominated 
by State enterprise give rise to a phenomenon known as ‘neo-liberal shock therapy’.124  
He argues that the restructuring of the Iraq economy carried out by the Coalition 
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Provisional Authority appointed by the American government resulted in widespread 
corruption caused by ‘neo-liberal shock therapy’.125  Neo-liberal shock therapy occurs 
when an economic system dominated by state enterprise such as Iraq moves towards a 
private-based economy such as the US and as a result there is a rapid process of re-
regulation.126  Such re-regulation involves the removal of regulatory controls on 
individual economic actors and creation of new sets of rules that encourage intense 
economic activity in particular fractions of the economy.127  Neo-liberal shock therapy 
creates spaces whereby corruption is allowed to breed and eventually manifest itself. 
The cautionary voices against colonization and cultural imperialism remind 
international society of the clash of civilization.  The clash of civilization produces an 
enduring dilemma of modernization seeking to harmonize indigenous traditions with 
external or imposed standards.128  There will always be a clash between cultural 
relativism and cultural imperialism.  The examination on the impact global administrative 
law may have on developing countries illustrates the ongoing clash between cultural 
relativism and cultural imperialism.  Another relevant area in which the clash between 
cultural imperialism and cultural relativism is well illustrated is the area of human rights, 
development and administrative law which will be discussed next. 
 
7.5.1 Development, Human Rights and Administrative Law 
Human rights and development are inextricably linked, complementary and multi-
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dimensional.129  Human rights are rights universal to mankind.  They derive from the 
inherent dignity of the human person or group of persons and are non-derogable in 
nature.  Development is difficult to define.  For the purposes of human rights, 
development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process which 
aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all 
individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development 
and in the fair distribution of benefits.130   
The relationship between human rights and development dates back to more than 40 
years ago when the World Conference on Human Rights, organized by the United 
Nations in Teheran put the widening gap between economically developed countries and 
developing countries as an impediment to the realization of human rights in the 
international community.131  The 1968 Teheran proclamation gave rise to the structural 
approach which sought amongst others to link human rights to major worldwide patterns 
and issues, assess human rights in the light of concrete contexts and situations, and 
recognize the diversity of political and social systems, cultural and religious pluriformity 
and different levels of development.132  A criticism of the structural approach was that it 
jeopardized the need for consistency and uniformity because it introduced social and 
cultural relativism and double standards.133 
Third world countries were the strong advocates for this structural approach to be 
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used in the UN.134  The 1986 declaration on the Right to Development which was first 
articulated by developing countries in the context of the New International Economic 
order (NIEO)135 is an example of the structural approach.136  The Right to Development 
has been the subject of much controversy.  Questions abound about its legal basis, 
enforceability and clarity.  Scholars have questioned whether it is a new right or 
encompasses old rights, such as the right to self determination.137  They have questioned 
whether it is an individual right, collective right or state right.138  Suffice it that whatever 
may be the criticisms of the right, by virtue of the Declaration on the right to 
development, the affirmation of the right in the Vienna Declaration139 and African 
charter,140 the Right to Development is firmly established as a principle of international 
human rights law.   
The Right to Development is an alienable human right by virtue of which every 
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interests of their people; James C. Paul, ‘The Human Right to Development: Its Meaning and Importance’ 1992 Third 
World Legal Studies, 17 where he says the right to development is the human right of peoples affected by development 
processes to realize existing, universally recognized human rights in and through development processes.  Cf with S.R 
Chowdhury, E. Denters and P. De Waart (eds), The right to Development in International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus 
NijhoffPublishers, 1992) 153 where the Right to Development of States is seen as nothing more than the right of a State 
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139 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, G.A conf. 157/23. 
140 See Article 22, African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, adopted 27 June, 1981.  OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
rev. 521 I.L.M 58 (1982).  Article 22 (1) states all peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural 
development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of 
mankind; (2) States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development. 
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person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, 
social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms can be fully realized.141  It includes full sovereignty over natural resources, self-
determination, popular participation in development, equality of opportunity, creation of 
favourable conditions for the enjoyment of other civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights.142  Its realization involves the full observance of economic, social, 
cultural, civil and political rights.  The Right to Development embraces the different 
concepts of development of all development sectors, namely sustainable development, 
human development and the concept of indivisibility, interdependence and universality of 
all human rights.143 
However, it must be said that the Right to Development which has metamorphosed 
today is quite different from the Right to Development as articulated by Developing 
States.  In current times, the Right to Development is seen as unifying in itself the civil 
and political rights as well as the economic, social and cultural rights.144  Hence, it 
fortifies the principle that human rights are indivisible, interdependent and universal.  
However, the controversies surrounding the Right to Development cast doubt on whether 
human rights are really indivisible, interdependent and universal.  The Right to 
Development is very much in a state of flux.  On this changing plane, the principles 
which should be followed seem clear, but the mechanisms and procedures for following 
such principles are unclear.  It is also unclear the impact, if any, the Right to 
Development has for the application of international human rights.  The Right to 
                                                        
141 Supra note 130, Article 1.1. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable Human Development: A UNDP Policy Document, UNDP, Jnauary1998.  
Online: UNDP< http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/HR_Pub_policy5.htm>. 
144 Supra note 135 at 839.  
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Development if applicable would be beneficial to developed states and development.  
However, there is much difficulty in gathering consensus on the approach to be taken for 
effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability.   
 Accountability lies from the duty bearers for the Right to Development, which are 
made up of developing states, developed states and the international community to the 
right holders who are the peoples and individuals affected.   Developing states have the 
duty to formulate appropriate national and international development policies and 
measures, create favourable national and international conditions, eliminate violations of 
human rights and obstacles to development resulting from failure to observe all human 
rights.145  Developed states have the duty to co-operate with less developed states to 
ensure development and eliminate obstacles to development, formulate international 
development policies, promote respect for human rights146 while the international 
community has the duty to promote fair development policies and effective international 
cooperation.147  In carrying out these duties, developed states and the international 
community tend to link development aids to the establishment of principles such as good 
governance, democratic institutionalization, transparency and accountability.  While these 
principles are of themselves good, they must be considered in the light of the discussions 
in this chapter pertaining to the impact of such principles on developing countries. 
The relationship between human rights, development and administrative principles is 
more recent on the human rights and development radar.148  The relationship is well 
illustrated by the recent attention given to a concept know as the rights-based approach.  
                                                        
145 Supra note 130, articles 2(3), 3(1) and 4(1). 
146 Ibid., articles 3(3), 4(1) and 6(1). 
147 Ibid., article 4. 
148 Henry J. Steiner et al, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics and Morals, (New York: 
OUP, 2008) 1433 ff.  See also Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (New York: Anchor Books, 1999). 
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The rights-based approach integrates the norms, standards and principles of international 
human rights into plan, policies and processes of development.  The principles include 
express linkage to rights, accountability, empowerment, participation and non-
discrimination and attention to vulnerable groups.149  It is argued that just as the 
importation of administrative principles to the governance of developing countries 
produces ripples, the importation of administrative principles to the application of human 
rights principles is controversial.150  Furthermore, such importation may promote cultural 
imperialism.   
So far, the discussions on development, human rights and administrative law have 
focused on States and the International community primarily because they are the duty 
bearers in international law.  T he next section will address the role of MNCs as non-state 
actors in international law and their impact on development.  
 
7.6 IMPACT OF MNCS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
There is the need to consider the role MNCs may play in development.  First in relation 
to the Right to Development - a reading of the Declaration of the Right to Development 
and the Vienna Declaration suggests legal responsibility lies with States and the 
international community.  Corporations are not listed as duty bearers under the 
Declaration or the Right to Development.  As such the administrative type mechanisms 
such as participation and transparency stated in the right to development are not directly 
applicable to corporations.   
There are many instances where corporations are involved in development activities 
                                                        
149 See online: UN <http://www.unhchr.ch/development/approaches-06.html>. 
150 For discussions of such controversy, see supra note 83 at 204 ff. 
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and breach human rights, including the right to development.  For instance, 
environmental destruction is an obstacle to the implementation of the right to 
development.  A safe and healthy environment is a criterion for measuring progress in the 
implementation of the right to development.151  Corporations which engage in human 
rights abuses affecting the environment and people living in such societies are therefore 
contributing to the obstacles and acting as barriers to the progress of the right to 
development.  However, like most areas of international human rights corporations 
cannot be held directly responsible for such human rights abuses.  This is partly because 
they are not considered duty bearers under the right to development.  This is also because 
of the limited direct liability corporations have under international human rights law. 
Should this mean that corporations have no role to play?  It seems the answer to this 
question would be an emphatic no.  Corporations involved in development activities, 
which typically would be those in the natural resource industry such as oil, gas and 
mining have a role to play in development.  While specific duties such as those outlined 
above for states and the international community are yet to be elaborated for 
corporations, there is the need to specify the policies in pursuance of the obligation in the 
right to development which corporations as well as states parties and the international 
community should carry out to implement the rights.  The UN Secretary General has 
stated that corporations do have a duty to promote the right to development.  The problem 
lies in the lack or limitation of corporate accountability for human rights violations. 
The lack or limitation of corporate accountability for human rights violations has 
raised debates about the possibility of direct corporate responsibility under international 
                                                        
151 See Paul J.I.M. de Waart, Implementing the Right to Development in S.R Chowdhury et al (eds), The Right to 
Development in International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1992) 191 at 210. 
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law.  Chapter 4 of the study also addressed the possibilities and obstacles of direct 
corporate responsibility.  Under international human rights law, States are required to 
hold corporations responsible for human rights violations.  However, in many situations 
corporations are not held accountable.  Two well cited examples are the Ogoni/Shell case 
in Nigeria and the Asia Pulp Paper case in Indonesia.  The Ogoni case is the subject of 
ongoing litigation under the ATCA in the United States. It was discussed in chapter 2 of 
the study.  Such cases as well as others discussed under foreign direct liability and ATCA 
in chapter two attest to the adverse impact corporations in the natural resource industry 
have on the environment and the people living therein.  The cases also provide a direct 
link for corporate responsibility in relation to human rights violations whilst showing the 
limitations of corporate accountability.  
Beyond the right to development, MNCs and other enterprises have an impact on 
developing countries.  In the context of human rights, there is a clash between economic 
development brought about by corporate activities and the cultural and social deprivation 
and degradation brought about by the activities of such companies which go against the 
principles of international human rights.  These clashes are most prevalent in developing 
countries endowed with natural resources which create foreign investment flows.  
Increasingly, the need for consideration of both the benefits of foreign investments and 
the responsibilities they create is being canvassed and can clearly be seen in this study.   
MNCs are the vehicles and the driving force of globalization and foreign investment. 
Their impacts on developing countries have been classified into three models or 
frameworks.152  The first model is the modernization theory which views development as 
                                                        
152 See generally Gerald F. Cavanagh and Arthur F. McGovern, Ethical Dilemmas in the Modern Corporation (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988) p 165. 
 300
best achieved through technology, skills and business values used in the development of 
Anglo-american societies and stresses the positive contribution of MNCs to developing 
countries.153  The theory sees development as an inevitable, evolutionary process of 
increasing societal differentiation that would ultimately produce economic, political and 
social institutions similar to that in the west.154 The dependency theory on the other hand 
views foreign investment as impediments or distortions to development in developing 
countries.  The theory emphasizes the negative assessments of foreign investment.155  
Finally the bargaining theory studies the conflicts that arise between MNCs and Host 
States and the processes by which the parties reach agreements.  The trend is usually that 
the stronger the bargaining power of the host country, the likelihood of benefitting from 
multinational investment.156   
No doubt, foreign investment is useful and necessary for developing countries.  The 
key source of foreign investment is derived from economic activities.  MNCs which set 
up infrastructure, manpower and other resources in developing countries provide much 
needed foreign investment and exemplify globalization at work.157  Some believe 
globalization brings economic liberalism and development.  In the eighties, there was a 
strong rise of free market economies and liberalization.158  National controls on 
international capital markets were removed or relaxed.  Privatization and elimination of 
price controls were canvassed.  For developing countries to attract investment there was 
                                                        
153 See WW Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). 
154 See Amy Chua, “Markets, Democracy and Etnicity: Toward a new paradigm for Law and Development, (1998) 108 
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155 For examples of proponents see Richard Barnet and Roland Muller, Global Reach: The Power of MNCs (New York: 
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156 Theodore H. Moran, ‘MNCs and Third World Investment in Michael Novak and Michael P. Jackson eds., Latin 
America: Dependency or Interdependency? (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1985) 16-17. 
157 For discussions on Multinational Corporations and Globalization, see Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work 
(London: Penguin Books, 2006) at 187 ff. 
158 Sol Picciotto ‘ Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business’ (2003) 42 Colum. J. of Transnat’l 
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the need for an open door policy, abandonment of access controls, ownership restrictions 
amongst other procedures.159  
In the late nineties with the economic crisis in Asia, foreign investment was no 
longer seen as the panacea for economic development.  The view that globalization 
widens the gap between poor and rich; and threatens the economic and social well being 
of developing countries was more real.  Globalization with proper harnessing can impact 
society for good. The need for globalization with foreign investment responsibilities and 
not just protectionism is gaining visible grounds.  The successful protests by NGOs 
against the OECD’s plan to fashion a multilateral agreement on investment in the late 
nineties attests to this.  However, the many bilateral investment treaties (BITS) of which 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)160 is a prime example of the need 
for more considerations for responsibilities in such treaties.  This is more so because BITs 
reflect the triumph of liberal economy in the sphere of international investment.161 
NAFTA provides strong investor-state resolution mechanisms.162  Investors have a 
unilateral right to invoke arbitration against the host state.163  The rights of investors are 
adequately protected while their responsibilities are rarely stated.164   
Economic liberalism is the recognition of the right of free economic activity and 
economic exchange based on private property and markets.165  Writers have identified 
different degrees of economic liberalism, including hard libertarianism, neo-liberalism 
                                                        
159 Ibid. 
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and corporate libertarianism.166  Hard Libertarianism holds that respect for the individual 
is at the heart of a free society.  Libertarians insist on a near unfettered liberty to act and 
resist state intervention.167  Any intervention by the State should be to protect private 
property and basic market freedoms.168   
Neo–liberalism dominates the macro-economic policies of most liberal democratic 
governments today.169  The role of the State is minimal and is mainly to provide 
guarantees for the security and protection of property and contract.170  Neo-liberalism is 
associated with the free movement of capital and investments leading to stricter standards 
of investment protection and resolution of investment disputes.171  However, there has 
been an assault on this form of neo-liberalism.  The end of colonialism and the cold war 
created the non-aligned movement.  The movement formulated new doctrines asserting 
the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and calling for the 
establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).  The aim of NIEO was to 
ensure fairness in trade to developing countries; and control over the process of foreign 
investment.172  Although, there has been record of the diminishment of the NIEO,173 the 
assault on Neo-liberalism continues.  Writers argue that a form of Neo-liberalism still 
emphasizing the benefits of economic constitution but unopposed to the protection of 
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fundamental rights or the environment174 is emerging.  One writer has acknowledged that 
there is an allowance for environmental issues in neo-liberal policies but sees them as 
inadequate and at a level of rhetoric. 
Corporate libertarianism or the profit maximization approach seeks to increase the 
freedom of corporations at the expense of human freedom.175  In this study, the impact of 
evolving CSR movement on profit maximization has been explored in chapter two.  
Profit maximization is no longer a corporation’s only goal.  Social responsibilities 
resulting from corporate activities have to be factored into corporate decisions.     
 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to link global governance to CSR.  It examined the activities of 
states, international organizations and non-state actors in curbing global concerns such as 
corruption.  Global governance holds relevance for CSR because it is a means whereby 
corporate misbehaviours can be seen on a global scale and global attempts by multiple 
actors can be made to address these issues.  However, there is the need for consensus in 
global governance and for co-ordination in global efforts to address global concerns. 
In the area of CSR, the chapter argued for the need to break CSR into specific 
sections in order for global governance to be effective.  It then focused on corruption 
which is the main CSR issue addressed in this study.  The work of the UNODC which is 
at the forefront of reforming, strengthening and co-ordinating efforts to curb corruption 
                                                        
174 See supra note 83 at 196. 
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was examined. Of three specialized institutions reviewed – the IMF, WTO and World 
Bank, the World Bank is the only institution which addresses corruption directly, the IMF 
and WTO address it indirectly.  As a result, the IMF and WTO are unlikely to be able to 
co-ordinate corruption efforts.  Moreover, all three institutions look at corruption from the 
point of view of promoting traditional good governance.  The chapter argued that 
traditional good or bad governance should not be synonymous with corruption.  
Governance attempts to curb corruption should not focus on governments alone.  There is 
the need to consider the activities of other actors such as international organizations and 
non-state actors. 
The chapter also examined the emergence of global administrative law which seeks 
to regulate global governance.  Global governance involves a diverse group and network 
of private and public actors vying for power and space in global affairs.  This diverse 
group is involved in rule making on the global scene.  The chapter argued that the 
regulation of global governance through the use of global administrative law may not be 
workable for some actors making rules in global affairs.  This includes standard setting 
by private institution.  The voluntary nature of many rules in global governance may also 
make regulation through administrative law mechanisms more difficult to achieve.  The 
development of global administrative law through the systems of international 
organizations which have been canvassed for may be problematic.  For instance, in the 
area of corruption, the WTO restricts transparency and participation by civil society.  The 
WTO’s work on TGP which illustrates the development of administrative principles for 
government procurement is on hold. 
The discussion on global administrative law led to general considerations of the 
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impact global administrative law and other western principles may have on developing 
countries in relation to issues such as development, human rights and the curb of 
corruption.  The imposition of administrative law and other western principles in 
developing countries produce ethnic tensions.  It also points to colonization and 
imperialism which in the broad scheme of things countries do not ordinarily want to be 
associated with, mainly because of the ugly scars from centuries past such issues display.  
However, an example of such colonization and imperialism can be seen in the tendency 
for global administrative law and other western principles to promote neo-liberalism and 
other capitalist ideologies without considering the impact these principles have on 
developing countries.  This approach must be discouraged and it is hoped that the 
discussion in this chapter provide strong evidence towards this outcome.   
There has been a push towards the adoption of universal administrative principles for 
global governance.  This reminds society of the clash between cultural imperialism and 
cultural relativism.  From the perspective of a developing world view of human rights 
and development against a developed world view of the same, primarily through the 
examination of the Right to Development, the chapter sought to show this clash.  The 
inclusion of administrative law principles, as has recently been the case in the human 
rights and development agenda further raises issues of imperialism. 
Finally, the role of MNCs as non-state actors in international law and their impacts 
on development was examined.  These are issues which are all linked to CSR and global 
governance.  They also show the limitation of corporate accountability and the need for 
more corporate responsibility obligations in foreign investment and thus are necessary in 




OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
CSR is typically seen as voluntary non-binding rules which corporations adhere to in 
an attempt to be socially responsible.  Recent studies caution against the need to 
classify CSR as either voluntary or mandatory rules because such debates fail to 
appreciate the relationship between the law and social responsibility.  The study 
approached CSR as binding and non-binding rules which corporations adhere to in 
order to be socially responsible.  It identified different regulatory approaches, 
applicable for solving the problem of corruption as it relates to CSR.  Hard laws and 
self-regulatory laws, notably soft law initiatives were examined. 
Corruption is a problem associated with CSR, but rarely addressed in conjunction 
with CSR.  Arguments regarding CSR seldom include corruption.  Corruption is 
generally associated with public office and governments (public corruption).  
However, public corruption is also relevant for CSR because transnational bribery 
often involves corporations, especially MNCs and public government officials.    
The study therefore focused on corruption to address this gap in CSR discourse. 
The central aim of the study was to advance and extend the scope of current 
discussions on CSR.  CSR includes internal issues such as fraud which directly affect 
the company.   The study did not address the internal issues of CSR in any detail.  
CSR also includes external issues such as human rights, environmental and corruption 
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issues which do not directly affect the company.  These are all broad or external CSR 
issues, which the study was concerned with.  The central arguments in this study were 
that universal standards are emerging in the area of human rights, environment, and 
anti-corruption.  These standards are calling for effective deterrence and enforcement.  
Non-binding rules which are the preferred mode for deterrence and enforcement are 
inadequate to address CSR issues.  In many instances, binding rules are needed to 
complement non-binding rules.  However, binding rules are in much need of reform. 
One criticism leveled against skeptics of self-regulatory laws is the 
over-generalization that soft laws are ineffective.  The study examined self-regulatory 
laws relevant for transnational bribery and concluded that such laws are inadequate 
and of themselves unable to address transnational bribery.  In many cases, such laws 
are effective in creating awareness to the problems of transnational bribery but unable 
to deter transnational bribery, thus calling its overall effectiveness into question.  
Binding rules on the other hand lack effective deterrence and enforcement mechanisms.  
The study highlighted many of these failures and provided suggestions for improving 
the effectiveness of binding rules. 
The study advanced and extended the scope of discussions on CSR by applying 
corporate governance, specifically the use of derivative actions to broad CSR issues, 
particularly corruption.  Corporate governance is an area of law which typically 
addresses internal CSR issues.  Corporate governance is chiefly concerned with the 
relationship between managers and shareholders.  There are arguments that attempts 
to improve corporate behaviour should come via a change in the perception of 
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corporate governance and corporate law.  Despite numerous arguments for change in 
the approach of corporate governance towards social responsibility which would 
necessitate considerations of the interests of stakeholders other than the shareholder, 
the shareholder stakeholder theory is still the prevailing approach.  The shareholder 
stakeholder theory or shareholder profit maximization theory is seen as hostile to the 
introduction of ethical and social concerns.1  The study is therefore novel in using 
derivative actions, an area of law primarily relevant for shareholders and arguably 
protecting their traditional powers of control to argue for corporate responsibility for 
broad CSR issues. 
The argument might go that corporate governance should aim to address broad 
CSR on a more substantial level.  This may be because derivative actions are seen as 
not amounting to an effective controlling mechanism.2  The response is that, until and 
unless corporate governance is able to extend the ‘stakeholder’ relevant for the 
company to include other stakeholders, the interest of other stakeholders will only be 
considered insofar as they serve the interests of the shareholders.  The use of 
derivative actions should therefore be seen as a way corporate governance can address 
broad CSR concerns. 
The study also advanced and extended the scope of discussions on CSR by 
examining other areas of law applicable to corruption and CSR.  These included 
contracts law, specifically enforceability of international contracts tainted by illegality; 
                                                        
1 Jane Dine, Companies, International trade and Human Rights, (New York: Cambridge University 
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2 Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation, (Oxford: OUP, 2007) is 
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tort law, specifically private rights of actions for damages by victims and actions 
against corrupt competitors in international business; and private international law and 
arbitration.  Hitherto, the focus of discussions on transnational bribery has been 
criminal in nature.  Criminal law is the main approach used in domestic and 
international laws for addressing transnational bribery.  It has been given the most 
attention.  The study therefore put the spotlight on other useful areas of law which 
have seldom received sufficient attention. 
In addition, the study addressed the loopholes present in national and international 
criminal law mechanisms for deterring and enforcing anti-corruption laws.  The 
domestic and extra-territorial criminal laws in four selected countries, namely Nigeria, 
Singapore, United Kingdom and United States were examined.  At the national level 
in the selected countries, effective deterrence and enforcement of binding rules 
relevant for curbing corruption involving corporations were lacking.  A reason for this 
included the problems encountered when corporate criminal liability is sought to be 
prosecuted.  Another reason was the lack of corporate investigations, prosecutions 
and political will to hold corporations accountable.  The UK laws illustrated these 
problems emphatically.  The laws of Singapore showed an overall effectiveness in 
curbing corruption.  However, Singapore does not appear to be very concerned with 
corporate criminal liability.  Further the extra-territorial reach of Singapore applies to 
its citizens, it is not very clear if this includes legal persons such as corporations.  
Civil liability and debarments are Singapore’s preferred stance for curbing corporate 
corruption.  In the case of Nigeria, the focus seems to be more on punishing the 
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demand side of international corruption, to the neglect of the supply side of which 
corporations are chiefly suspect.  The Nigerian, Singapore and UK laws when 
contrasted with the US laws projected the US as the most active in holding 
corporations criminally liable for corruption.   
At the international level, the numerous treaties addressing corruption rely on 
national level and accordingly, deterrence and enforcement at international level is also 
lacking.  In light of this observation, the study argued for direct corporate 
responsibility in international law for the international crime of corruption.  Direct 
corporate responsibility as opposed to universal jurisdiction was deemed necessary.  
This was for a number of reasons.  One reason was based on the overall focus of the 
study which was concerned with the direct effects of non-compliance of international 
laws on erring corporations.  Another reason was based on precedence which shows 
that all treaties to date addressing corruption adopt either territorial or national 
jurisdictional links.  Universal jurisdiction applies to jus cogens norms and 
international corruption is not a jus cogens norm.  Finally, such a model of 
international corporate responsibility was chosen because it would help poor countries 
without the necessary resources fight transnational bribery.  Corporations would be 
brought to trial through IGOs and streamlined NGOs before specialiazed agencies, 
thus the financial burdens for holding corporations liable will be distributed amongst a 
large pool of actors.  The study identified and addressed several problems and 
unintended consequences such a model of direct corporate responsibility will 
encounter.  This included States free riding on corporate responsibility and the 
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perception that such a model will bring uncertainty to international law, especially to 
the established doctrines of State responsibility and sovereignty.  
The impact of corporate behaviour on developing States is an issue pertinent in 
CSR.  Many of the human rights and environmental abuses which brought CSR to the 
limelight occurred in developing countries.  A criticism of CSR is that it is a western 
construct dominated by western ideas.  This is not necessarily a bad thing so long as it 
impacts positively on developing countries.  CSR has been able to impact developing 
countries positively through the many initiatives, codes of conduct and regulations 
which have arisen as a result of bad corporate behaviour.  There is much awareness 
for the need for responsible corporate behaviour.  However, questions still remain 
whether these initiatives and laws have deterred corporations from irresponsible 
behaviour and whether enforcement mechanisms to ensure CSR are effective. 
This study on CSR and corruption has added in a positive and refreshing way to 
attempts to eliminate corruption and promote development.  Corruption is a vice 
which severely affects developing countries.  Kofi Anan, former secretary general of 
the UN summed it well saying corruption diverts funds intended for development, 
undermines governments ability to provide basis services, feeds inequality and 
injustice.  There is therefore a strong need to eliminate corruption.  When 
corporations participate in corrupt activities, they affect development and impact 
developing countries.   
Most discussions on corruption are linked to governance.  Traditionally, 
governance was used synonymously with government.  Bad governance or 
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governments equated to corruption.  However, governance as it can now be 
understood involves more than government.  It includes activities of non-state actors 
such as NGOs and corporations.  A discipline which recognizes non-state actors and 
perhaps gives legitimacy to such actors is global governance. Global governance is the 
sum of the many ways global affairs are managed. Global governance aims to tackle 
global concerns including corruption through the activities of governments, 
intergovernmental networks and non-state actors. Accordingly, discussions on 
corruption necessarily need to address state and non-state actors. 
The study advanced and extended the scope of current discussion on CSR to 
include implications of global governance for CSR.  It provided a direct link between 
global governance and CSR by considering the national, international and soft law 
initiatives designed to curb corruption involving corporations.  These initiatives all 
qualify as global governance activities.  The study focused on the activities of state 
and non-state actors involved in global governance, especially activities geared 
towards the elimination of corruption.  States and non-state actors are developing 
policies and practices to address common global concerns, such as corruption.  The 
link between global governance and CSR was examined with the aim of exploring the 
effects of global governance in ensuring responsible business behaviour which impacts 
positively on developing States.   
A problem of global governance identified in the study was the difficulty in 
ascertaining what constitutes global governance and what does not.  Global 
governance is not limited by political or legal authority.  Rules that emanate from 
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many activities by diverse groups such as NGOs and corporations qualify as global 
governance.  Mere actions which may or may not lead to rules have also been said to 
qualify.  A goal of global governance portrayed in the study was therefore the need to 
bring consensus or agreement to opposing views and for co-ordination in the 
management of global affairs.  CSR is an area where such consensus and 
co-ordination is justifiable.  However, CSR is a very broad area encompassing 
different issues, different agendas and different actors. It is therefore difficult to reach 
consensus.  One way to reach consensus is by breaking down CSR into identifiable 
sections.   
The study focused on corruption and concluded that there are agreed global 
frameworks for actions and policies in anti-corruption measures.  The emergence of 
reformed and strengthened institutions to ensure effective adherence to such 
frameworks is developing.  Global governance initiatives are beginning to address 
both the demand and supply sides of corruption.  CSR concerns the supply sides of 
corruption.  The StAR initiative is an example of global governance attempts to focus 
on the impacts of non-state actors in the elimination of corruption.   
With regard to co-ordination, the study considered the activities of the UNODC 
and other specialized international institutions.  It concluded the UNODC is at the 
forefront of anti-corruption co-ordination.  Specialized institutions such as the WTO 
and IMF are unlikely to be able to co-ordinate anti-corruption co-operative actions.  
Civil society has a role to play in global governance.  There is the need for more 
engagement of civil societies, although there is the need to streamline relevant actors. 
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Finally, the impacts of emerging global administrative law on global governance 
were addressed.  Global administrative law aims to hold actors in global governance 
accountable through administrative law mechanisms.  The problem is that for 
non-state actors, it is difficult to pinpoint how they can be held accountable, whether 
they need to be held accountable and to whom?  Certainly, it is difficult to hold 
private institutions involved in international standard setting accountable through 
administrative law principles focused on legitimacy, accountability and transparency.  
This is not only because traditionally, administrative law principles are to protect 
citizens against government abuse, but also because administrative law principles are 
simply proving unworkable. Even where international organizations are involved in 
the rule setting, the voluntary nature of such rules may make regulation through 
administrative law mechanisms difficult to achieve. 
Narrowing the impacts of global administrative law to rules setting for corruption, 
the outstanding contention was the reaction of developing States to the application of 
principles of global administrative laws in the WTO’s TGP.  The work on TGP is 
currently on hold at the WTO.  These reactions suggested that administrative law 
principles may not be desirable for developing countries. In the particular case of the 
WTO, the reasons cited were the cost implications on developing countries and the 
effects on national domestic policies.  These created a sense of the need to dig deeper 
into the question whether administrative law principles are desirable for developing 
countries.  There was also an appreciation that any excavations needed to be relevant 
to the central theme of the study – CSR and corruption.  With this in mind, the context 
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in which the question was framed was in relation to the relationship between 
administrative law, development and human rights in developing countries.   
Firstly, the cautionary voices warning against the transportation of administrative 
and other legal principles to developing countries were heeded.  Amy Chua’s thesis 
warning against ethnic conflagration brought about as a result of free markets and 
democracy was considered.  The study extended her thesis to MNCs which were 
referred to as market dominant minorities.  The MNCs operating in the Niger Delta 
region in Nigeria could be seen as fuelling conflicts and violence through the use of 
security arrangements to protect their investments.  The development of the voluntary 
principles on security and human rights, a CSR initiative was seen as an attempt to 
reduce the conflicts.  Questions remain whether the voluntary principles are effective.  
However, the study concluded that administrative type principles could be useful to 
diffuse the conflicts in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria.  The conflicts in the Niger 
Delta arose as a result of poverty, lack of community participation and equality in 
distribution processes, lack of transparency and accountability.  The EITI, another 
CSR initiative was developed to address this. 
Other cautionary voices pointed to colonization and imperialism.  Neo-liberalism 
which exemplified economic colonization was seen as detrimental to developing 
countries.  Colonization and imperialism were seen as accentuating the problems 
inherent in a clash of civilizations.  A relevant area in which the clash of civilizations 
was well illustrated was human rights, development and administrative law.  Human 
rights and development are linked and developing countries were the strong advocates 
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for this link.  This link culminated in the Right to Development which originally was 
articulated in the context of the NIEO but was later taken up as unifying the civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights.  The relationship between human rights, 
development and administrative principles is more recent and projected through the 
rights based principle.  The study submitted that just as importation of administrative 
principles to governance in developing countries produces ripples, the importation of 
administrative principles to the application of human rights is proving controversial. 
Turning to the question of the controversy whether corporations have a role to play 
in the Right to Development, the study submitted that corporations indeed have a role.  
This is despite an appreciation of the fact that the Right to Development puts States 
and the international community as duty bearers.  Corporations do not have direct 
duties under the Right to Development.  In light of the reports of the impacts 
corporations involved in developmental activities have on the developmental process, 
there is the need for CSR which projects policies and practices relevant for 
corporations in development.  Corporations, civil society and governments each have 
a role to play in the development and enactment of such policies and practices.  The 
lack or limitation of corporate accountability for human rights violation needs to be 
addressed.   
Beyond the Right to Development, corporations impact developing countries and 
there is the need for considerations of both the benefits of foreign investments and the 
responsibilities brought about by corporate activities which can positively or 
negatively impact development.  These responsibilities include the elimination of 
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corruption, human rights and environmental abuses.  CSR, made up of both binding 
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